UNIONS, PELLAGRA, AND SCHOOLS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT by Schmick, Ethan
 
 
UNIONS, PELLAGRA, AND SCHOOLS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Ethan Schmick 
 
B.A., Economics, Muhlenberg College, 2012 
 
M.A., Economics, The University of Pittsburgh, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
 
the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment 
 
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
2017
 ii 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
 
THE KENNETH P. DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
 
by 
 
 
Ethan Schmick 
 
 
It was defended on 
 
May 26, 2017 
 
And approved by 
 
Werner Troesken, Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh 
 
Randall Walsh, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh 
 
Allison Shertzer, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh 
 
Karen Clay, Professor of Economics and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University 
 
Dissertation Adviser: Werner Troesken, Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © by Ethan Schmick 
 
2017 
 
 iv 
 
 
UNIONS, PELLAGRA, AND SCHOOLS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Ethan Schmick, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2017 
 
 
 
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In each chapter I attempt to answer a question that 
pertains to the development of the American economy and also appeals to a general interest 
audience. I answer these questions in as straightforward of a manner as I deem possible and, 
when appropriate, I eschew technical details in favor of intuition. 
The first chapter of this dissertation sets out to answer one of the most enduring and 
contentious questions in the social sciences: why is the American labor movement so weak 
relative to other countries? In the spirit of Olson (1965), I build and test a model of labor union 
formation and activity, and, in the process, put forth industrial structure (particularly firm size) as 
a new explanation for the relative weakness of the American labor movement.  
The second chapter of this dissertation (co-authored with Karen Clay and Werner 
Troesken) addresses another enduring question in economic history and development: does cash 
cropping, and the commercialization of agriculture more generally, adversely affect nutrition? 
We use pellagra, a disease caused by a niacin deficiency, to study the impact of cash cropping on 
nutrition. Our work shows that cash cropping can displace local food production and set in-
motion nutritional deficits that have long-term consequences not only for health but also for 
socioeconomic status. 
The third chapter of this dissertation (co-authored with Allison Shertzer) addresses a 
controversial question in labor and education economics: do school resources improve 
educational and labor market outcomes? We exploit the first large expansion in school resources, 
which occurred between 1900 and 1930, when expenditures per student almost doubled, student-
teacher ratios decreased by 20% and teacher salaries increased by a third. We find that increasing 
per pupil spending did, indeed, increase wages later in life. However, we find little evidence that 
increases in per pupil spending increased educational attainment. 
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1.0 COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 
 
 
This chapter proposes and tests a theory of labor union formation and activity. The model and 
the empirical results indicate that there is a hump-shaped relationship between group size and 
collective action. Using a new county-by-industry level dataset containing the location of unions, 
the location of strikes, and average establishment size around the turn of the twentieth century, I 
find that workers in counties with intermediate-sized establishments are more likely to charter a 
union and are more likely to strike than workers in counties with small or large establishments. 
This relationship has implications for the weakness of American unions.  
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
There is broad consensus that labor unions in the United States are weak relative to other 
countries. Among OECD countries the United States has the third lowest collective bargaining 
rate (11.9%), the sixth lowest trade union density (10.8%), and is last in employment protection.1 
The weakness of the American labor movement is one of the most important features 
distinguishing the United States from other countries. Indeed, the search for causal explanations 
for the weakness of American labor unions began in the late 1800s, and more than a century 
later, the question remains one of most contested and salient in the social sciences.2 Prominent 
explanations include: the relative prosperity of the American worker (Sombart 1976 [1906]; 
                                                        
1  Furthermore, the collective bargaining rate in the United States is considerably lower than countries with a 
common institutional history; in the United Kingdom the collective bargaining rate is 29.5%, it is 57.6% in 
Germany, and 98% in France. Additionally, in an index of labor union rights the United States ranked fourth lowest 
among OECD countries with a score of 2.86 out of 10. See Appendix A for more details on these measures along 
with bar charts of these measures for OECD countries. 
2 The dearth of unionization and the absence of a formal labor party in the United States are at the core of academic 
debates about “American exceptionalism.” 
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Brown and Browne 1968), the racial and ethnic heterogeneity of the United States (Archer 1997; 
Marshall 1967; Northrup 1943 and many others) and the nature of political institutions in the 
United States (Currie and Ferrie 2000, Oestreicher 1988, Perlman 1928, Schattschneider 1942 
and many others). Despite this expansive literature, there are few formal treatments of the factors 
that contribute to and hinder the formation of unions and the decision of workers to strike.3 This 
chapter is an attempt to bridge this gap in the literature.  
In this chapter, I propose and test a theory of union formation and activity that has 
received little attention in the extant literature. Working through the logic of collective action, I 
suggest that establishment size helps to explain variation in union strength and strike activity in 
the United States in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. While my central 
hypothesis is inspired by Olson’s (1965) classic work on collective action,4 my model is a variant 
of Esteban and Ray (2001), which is a more general treatment of group formation. Specifically, 
my model allows the benefits of collective action to have both public and private characteristics, 
which is typical of the benefits that unions bargain over and go on strike to attain. Additionally, 
my model allows for a monetary fixed cost of collective action, typical of a fee that must be paid 
for a local union to obtain a charter. Under these assumptions about the costs and benefits of 
collective action, my model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between group size and 
collective action, with the probability of union formation and strikes maximized for 
intermediate-sized establishments. 
To test this model, and identify the causal impact of establishment size on union activity, 
I construct a dataset containing two independent measures of labor strength. The first measure is 
whether the workers in a county-by-industry cell had chartered a local branch of a national union 
by 1882, 1892, and 1902.5 Specifically, I collect local branch locations for ten large, national 
                                                        
3 There is, however, a large empirical literature that studies labor union membership, not formation. These mainly 
older studies have focused on national trends in labor union membership and predictors of individual labor union 
membership using the period 1900-1970. Early studies believed that union membership was related to the business 
cycle with union membership increasing during expansions and decreasing during recessions. Two well-known later 
papers are Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) and Bernstein (1954). See Fiorito and Greer (1982) for a review of this 
entire literature. This literature informs us about the predictors in trends in national labor union membership, but it 
tells us little about the process by which workers decide to take collective action by forming a union or going on 
strike. 
4 Olson believed that the relationship between group size and collective action governed the formation and behavior 
of labor unions. He would frequently use labor unions to explain a concept and he devoted one out of six chapters in 
The Logic of Collective Action (1965) to their study. 
5 Many labor unions saw a peak in membership around 1892 before experiencing stagnant or declining growth for 
the next several years. This stagnant growth was followed by another large growth spurt around the turn of the 
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labor unions: the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (AA), the Cigar Maker’s 
International Union (CMIU), the Granite Cutters’ National Union of the United States (Granite 
Cutters), the International Association of Machinists (IAM), the Iron Molders’ Union of North 
America (IMU), the International Typographical Union (ITU), the National Union of United 
Brewery Workmen (Brewery Workmen), the United Brotherhood of Leather Workers on Horse 
Goods (Leather Workers), the United Garment Workers of America (UGWA), and the United 
Mine Workers (UMW). These ten unions accounted for well over one-third of all national labor 
union membership in the late nineteenth century.6 My second measure of collective action is 
county-by-industry level data on strikes taken from Currie and Ferrie (2000) and Naidu and 
Yuchtman (2016), which were also used by Card and Olson (1995). 
I combine these two measures of collective action with newly digitized county-by-
industry level data on the number of workers and the number of establishments in 1880 from the 
Report on the Manufactures of the United States (1883) and the 1880 complete count census.7 
These data allow me to accurately measure the size of groups taking collective action by 
calculating the average number of workers per establishment in a county-by-industry cell. I also 
combine these data with other county-by-industry level variables that, as previously mentioned, 
have been hypothesized to affect collective action and the formation of unions: average wages, 
ethnic fractionalization, percentage black, and percentage urban. 
The identification of the relationship between group size and collective action relies on 
four components. First, the county-by-industry level observations allow me to difference out all 
unobserved county and industry level characteristics that might affect unionization. Second, I 
measure all independent variables of interest in 1880, before the dramatic acceleration in the 
American labor movement that is shown in Figure 1. This allows me to eliminate a major source 
of endogeneity: establishment sizes might reflect employers’ efforts to prevent unionization.8 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
century, resulting in another peak around 1902. This chapter can, therefore, be thought of as examining unionization 
when it was at its pre-World War I peak. See Figure 1 for a time-series of membership for six national labor unions. 
6 Based on the sources used in Figure 1 the membership of the AA, the CMIU, the IMU, the ITU, the Brewery 
Workmen, the UGWA, and the UMW was 194,067 in 1899. Friedman (1999) estimates that there were 595,865 
national union members in 1899. Thus, the lower bound of the percentage of union members that are represented by 
the unions I examine is 32.6%. Since there is no membership data available for three of the unions I examine, the 
percentage of all union members represented by the unions I examine is likely closer to 40%.  
7 The Report on the Manufactures uses the term “establishment” as opposed to “firm” because there could be multi-
establishment firms. 
8 I am thankful to Miles Kimball for pointing out that an employer changing their establishment’s size to prevent 
unionization only reinforces the claim that establishment size matters for collective action. 
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Third, my dataset contains a rich set of control variables for establishment profits, efficiency, 
wealth, and political influence. These variables allow me to control for the fact that larger 
establishments might have larger profits and are more able to buy political influence to combat 
workers’ attempts at organizing. Finally, I exploit variation in the fixed cost of forming a union 
and find that more workers are needed to form a union if the fixed costs of forming a union are 
high; a result that aligns with the predictions of my model. The four components of my 
identification strategy eliminate most sources of endogeneity and suggest that the estimated 
relationship between group size and collective action is likely reflective of the costs and benefits 
discussed in my model. 
I find broad quantitative support for the theoretically predicted hump-shaped relationship 
between group size and collective action. Workers in county-by-industry cells with intermediate 
sized establishments are more likely to have chartered a local union branch and are more likely 
to have gone on strike than workers in cells with small and large establishments. Assigning all 
cells the workers per establishment at the maximum probability of collective action would have 
increased unionization from 44% to 56% (a 27% increase) and would have increased the 
incidence of strikes from 5% to 6.6% (a 32% increase). In contrast, assigning all cells the racial 
make-up with the maximum probability of collective action (i.e. no black workers) would have 
increased unionization from 44% to 45% (a 2% increase) and would have increased strike 
occurrence from 5% to 5.8% (a 16% increase). Similarly, assigning all cells the average wage 
per worker with the maximum probability of collective action (i.e. $530 a workers) would have 
increased unionization from 44% to 45% (a 2% increase) and would have increased strike 
occurrence from 5% to 5.3% (a 6% increase). Accordingly, industrial structure, in particular 
establishment size, is a stronger predictor of union formation in the United States than many 
previously considered explanations. 
This study provides several contributions to the existing literature. First, this study 
furthers our understanding of the factors that contributed to and hindered the emergence of the 
American labor movement. This is of particular interest since, as previously mentioned, the 
United States is often viewed as exceptional in the lack of collective action that its labor 
movement generated. While the focus of this chapter is the origins of the American labor 
movement, the results of my analysis suggest that the relative weakness of unions in the United 
States might partially be rooted in differences in industrial structure between the United States 
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and Europe at the onset of the labor movement. The available data show that, for comparable 
industries around the turn of the century, the average establishment size in the United States was 
approximately 13 workers, while it was 15 workers in Denmark, 24 workers in Norway, and 28 
workers in Sweden. My empirical estimates show that these differences in average establishment 
size would have resulted in large differences in the likelihood of union formation. In particular, 
the likelihood of union formation in the United States (at 13 workers per establishment) would 
have been 47%, whereas it would have been 48% in Denmark (at 15 workers per 
establishments), 52% in Norway (at 24 workers per establishment), and 53% in Sweden (at 28 
workers per establishment). Furthermore, if average establishment size in the United States had 
been similar to Norway the unionization rate gap between the two countries would have closed 
by 16%.9 
The second contribution of this chapter is to study how labor unions developed in the era 
of at-will employment. Fishback (1998) argues that turn of the century labor markets were 
largely unregulated and, therefore, provide an ideal setting to test economic theories. 10  By 
focusing my attention at the onset of the American labor movement the relationship between 
group size and collective action should be unaffected by changes to the costs and benefits of 
organization that accompanied the passage of the Wagner Act (1935) and the Taft-Hartley Act 
(1947). 
Finally, this is one of the first papers to empirically exam the relationship between group 
size and collective action outside of the laboratory setting.11 Pertaining to labor movements, 
Friedman (1998) finds that union strikes were more successful in large American cities than in 
small American cities and finds the opposite relationship in France. He argues that this was the 
result of the centralization of government in the two countries: in the United States a 
decentralized state led local craft unions to form alliances with local politicians, however, in 
France a centralized state led workers to rely on central government figures who did not 
                                                        
9 Estimates of unionization rates come from Friedman (2008). 
10 There were, however, a series of state laws passed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that 
dealt with labor unions. Some of these laws were pro-union (legalizing the union label/trademark, making labor 
unions exempt from anti-trust laws, etc.) and some of these laws were anti-union (no trespassing by union leaders 
without employer consent, etc.). See Fishback et al. (2009) for complete details on these state laws. In addition, 
Naidu and Yuchtman (2016) argue that, in the absence of codified laws, there were many de facto labor market 
institutions in the late nineteenth century, such as police, militias, and courts, which prevented rents in the labor 
market from being competed away. 
11 Studies of the relationship between group size and collective action in a lab setting include: Chamberlin (1978), 
Isaac and Walker (1988), Isaac et al. (1994), and Marwell and Ames (1979) among many others. 
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intervene on the side of labor in large cities due to fears of militancy. Friedman also finds that 
increasing establishment size in state-by-industry cells (in the United States) does decrease the 
striker rate, but the effects are very small. 
Beyond the American labor movement, Zhang and Zhu (2011) test the relationship 
between group size and collective action using Chinese Wikipedia. In 2005, Chinese Wikipedia 
was blocked in Mainland China, providing an exogenous shock to the number of Wikipedia 
contributors. They find a 43% reduction in contributions from non-blocked contributors and 
attribute this to social effects: contributors receive social benefits from writing and editing 
articles and the reduction in group size decreased these benefits. Spilerman (1970) finds that the 
only predictor of whether a city experienced racial unrest during the 1960s was the size of the 
black population in the city. Similarly, Scott and El-Assal (1969) find that the size of the student 
body is the only significant predictor of college campus protests. Neither of these studies claim 
to test the relationship between group size and collective action, but Oliver and Marwell (1988) 
interpret both of these findings as contradicting Olson’s hypothesis. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 develops a theoretical 
framework of labor union formation and reviews the literature on collective action and labor 
unions. Section 1.3 describes the data sources and empirical strategy. Section 1.4 presents the 
results and Section 1.5 concludes. 
 
 
1.2 COLLECTIVE ACTION AND LABOR UNION FORMATION 
 
 
1.2.a. A model of labor union formation and activity  
 
A labor union, is a group of workers whose goal is to achieve better working conditions at their 
establishment and in their industry. Similarly, workers strike to put pressure on employers to 
provide higher wages and better working conditions. To receive the benefits that a union or a 
strike provides, however, workers must exert effort, pay union fees and dues, sacrifice pay, and 
potentially endanger the relationship they have with their employer. To explore the trade-off 
between these benefits and costs, I develop a simple model of collective action and examine the 
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implications of this model as it relates to group size. This model is a modified version of the 
model presented in Esteban and Ray (2001). Their model is heavily influenced by the ideas of 
Mancur Olson and the free-rider problem. However, their model is more general than the one 
proposed by Olson in the fact that it allows for the benefits of collective action to have both 
public and private characteristics.12 My model maintains this particularly realistic attribute. 
Suppose the workers of a establishment form a group and there are a finite number of 
other groups in the economy. These groups could include, but are not limited to, employers, 
government officials, workers in other establishments, employers in other industries, etc. Each 
one of these groups has a preferred outcome and only one of these outcomes will occur (e.g. the 
workers’ preferred outcome might be to form a union, while the employers’ preferred outcome is 
to prevent their workers from unionizing). Let 𝑁𝑖 denote the total number of workers in group i. 
All individuals in a group are assumed to have identical preferences of the form: 
 𝑢(𝑏, 𝑓, 𝑒) = 𝑏 − 𝑓 − 𝛾𝑒  (1) 
where 𝑏 is the per-capita benefit from the preferred outcome, 𝑓 is the per capita fixed cost of the 
preferred outcome, 𝑒 is the level of effort contributed by each member of the group, and 𝛾 > 0 is 
the marginal cost of effort. The per-capita benefit from the preferred option is given by: 
 
𝑏 =  
𝐵
𝑁𝑖
𝛼  
(2) 
where 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1. The per-capita benefit, 𝑏, represents a good with characteristics that can be 
private, public, or anything in-between. If 𝛼 = 0, then the benefit is a public good; all group 
members receive 𝐵 regardless of how many members are in the group. A classic example of a 
public good in the context of the labor movement is the eight-hour workday. If, on the other 
hand, 𝛼 = 1 then the benefit is a private good; the benefit is (evenly) distributed among all 
members of the group. This benefit would usually be monetary, but it does not necessarily have 
to be; for example a establishment has a finite amount of rents that can be extracted by workers. 
Even if workers are able to extract all rents from the establishment these rents must then be 
divided among the workers. For any value of 𝛼 between 0 and 1 the benefit has characteristics 
that are both public and private; the benefit decreases with group size, but at a rate slower than 
1 𝑁𝑖⁄ . In reality, unions bargain over benefits that have both public and private characteristics. 
                                                        
12 Olson’s model only allowed the benefits of collective action to be private. 
 8 
 
The per-capita fixed cost from the preferred outcome is given by: 
 
𝑓 =  
𝐹
𝑁𝑖
 
(3) 
The fixed cost of collective action, 𝐹, is usually monetary and can be evenly divided among the 
members of the groups. Examples of fixed costs include the price a union charges to charter a 
local branch and the rent for a meeting location. Finally, assume that if the preferred option is 
chosen, the benefit from that option to the group members is greater than the fixed cost, 𝐵 > 𝐹. 
 The outcome that is chosen is based on the effort exerted by each group. Let 𝐸𝑖 denote 
the effort exerted by the members of group i and let 𝐸 be the total effort exerted by all groups.13 I 
define the probability of success for group i as: 
 
 𝜋𝑖 =
𝐸𝑖
𝐸
 
(4) 
The utility maximization problem for a member of group i can be obtained by substituting (2), 
(3), and (4) into (1): 
 
max
{𝑒}
𝐸𝑖
𝐸
(
𝐵
𝑁𝑖
𝛼 −
𝐹
𝑁𝑖
) − 𝛾𝑒  
 
Every individual takes the effort of everyone else as given and chooses 𝑒 to maximize their 
expected utility. The first order condition is given by: 
 1
𝐸
[
𝐵
𝑁𝑖
𝛼 −
𝐹
𝑁𝑖
] −
𝜋𝑖
𝐸
[
𝐵
𝑁𝑖
𝛼 −
𝐹
𝑁𝑖
] − 𝛾 = 0 
(5) 
Equilibrium, therefore, consists of a vector of individual efforts that satisfy equation (5) for every 
worker in every group. It is easy to verify that this equilibrium exists and is unique using a 
similar proof to Esteban and Ray (2001). 
Next, and most importantly, I examine the relationship between the probability of 
success, 𝜋𝑖, and group size, 𝑁𝑖.  
 
 
                                                        
13 𝐸𝑖 is the sum off the efforts contributed by each member of group i and 𝐸 is the sum of the efforts contributed by 
all individuals. 
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Proposition: For 0 < 𝛼 < 1  the relationship between the probability of successfully taking 
collective action and group size is hump-shaped. If 𝛼 = 0, the probability of successfully taking 
collective action is increasing in group size (a complete rejection of Olson’s hypothesis). Finally, 
if 𝛼 = 1, the probability of successfully taking collective action is decreasing in group size (the 
Olson hypothesis is confirmed). 
Proof: First, solve equation (5) for 𝜋𝑖: 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 1 −
𝛾𝐸𝑁𝑖
𝐵𝑁𝑖
(1−𝛼) − 𝐹
 
(6) 
The easiest way to demonstrate the result is to keep 𝐸 unchanged at its equilibrium value and 
assume that 𝑁𝑖 is continuous, which allows me to differentiate (6) with respect to 𝑁𝑖. This leads 
to the following expression: 
 𝑑𝜋𝑖
𝑑𝑁𝑖
=
𝛾𝐸[𝐹 − 𝛼𝐵𝑁𝑖]
[𝐵𝑁𝑖
1−𝛼 − 𝐹]2
 
 
If 𝛼 = 0 then 𝑑𝜋𝑖 𝑑𝑁𝑖⁄  is always positive and if 𝛼 = 1 then 𝑑𝜋𝑖 𝑑𝑁𝑖⁄  is always negative. Finally, 
for 0 < 𝛼 < 1 it can be shown that 𝜋𝑖 obtains a unique extreme value at:  
 
𝑁𝑖 = (
𝐹
𝛼𝐵
)
1
1−𝛼
 
(7) 
It can then be shown that 𝑑𝜋𝑖 𝑑𝑁𝑖⁄  is positive if 𝑁𝑖 < (𝐹 𝛼𝐵⁄ )
1 1−𝛼⁄  and 𝑑𝜋𝑖 𝑑𝑁𝑖⁄  is negative if 
𝑁𝑖 > (𝐹 𝛼𝐵⁄ )
1 1−𝛼⁄  demonstrating that the extreme value is, indeed, a maximum.                 
Q.E.D. 
 
This proposition demonstrates that as long as the per-capita benefit to collective action has both 
public and private characteristics, which is true of the benefits that unions bargain over, than the 
probability of taking collective action is hump-shaped. I use the predictions from this model to 
motivate my empirical analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
1.2.b. Explanations of labor union formation from history 
 
Labor historians have, of course, written much about early labor union formation in the United 
States. These studies and theories often ignore individual incentives and focus, instead, on 
finding explanations for the weakness of American labor unions by comparing the United States 
to Western Europe.14 These studies have important implications for collective action since they 
attempt to explain why the level of collective action among workers in the United States is lower 
than in Europe. Among the most prominent of these explanations are: the relative prosperity of 
the American worker, the racial and ethnic heterogeneity of the United States, and the nature of 
political institutions in the United States. 
The idea that the American labor movement is weak because of the success of American 
capitalism was most prominently advocated by Werner Sombart who famously concluded, “All 
Socialist utopias came to nothing on roast beef and apple pie” (Sombart 1976 [1906], pg. 106). 
To back up his point that a higher standard of living translated into fewer grievances and, 
therefore, less reason to organize, Sombart collected data on wages and cost of living. He 
concluded that “the American worker receives a money-wage which is twice or three times that 
received by his German counterpart, but the procurement of the same quantity of the necessary 
means of sustenance is not really any more expensive than in Germany” (Sombart 1976 [1906], 
pg. 93). Brown and Browne (1968) have confirmed these numbers and Shergold (1982) finds 
that real wages were also higher in the United States than in Great Britain. Archer (2007) 
questions this literature and writes, “the standard of living in other countries was not the only, or 
even the most important, comparative reference point against which Americans judged their 
economic circumstances. For most workers, internal reference points, like the living standards of 
wealthier members of their society...were all more important” (Archer 2007, pg. 47). Another, 
perhaps more relevant, internal reference point is the standard of living of other workers in the 
same industry. If this line of thinking is correct, workers in establishments that provide a low 
standard of living should be more likely to take collective action than workers in establishments 
that provide a higher standard of living within the same industry. I, therefore, take steps to 
control for standard of living in my empirical analysis. 
                                                        
14 See Foner (1984) and Karabel (1979) for good reviews of the literature on American exceptionalism. 
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Another, much written about, cause of American exceptionalism emphasizes the racial 
and ethnic heterogeneity of the United States compared.15 Most of these studies point to the 
barriers, both formal and informal, that were enacted by many labor unions to exclude blacks. 
Marshall (1967) writes, “The general pattern seems to have been for local unions to exclude 
Negroes wherever they could” (Marshall 1967, pg. 43). Booker T. Washington goes even farther 
and states, “several attempts have been made by the members of labor unions…to secure the 
discharge of Negroes employed in their trades” (Washington 1913, pg. 757). Some mining 
companies even attempted to prevent unionization by staffing “their mines with ‘judicious 
mixtures’ of native whites, recent immigrants, and Negroes” (Northrup (1943), pg. 318). Race 
was still a major issue facing labor unions well into the twentieth century. In 1930 there were 26 
national unions that barred entry to black members; in 1943 there were still 14 national unions 
that barred entry to blacks (Marshall 1967). The literature is, therefore, fairly consistent in its 
conclusion that racial and ethnic heterogeneity impeded collective action in the American labor 
movement. 16 
 Finally, there is the argument that the electoral system and other political institutions of 
the United States hindered the labor movement.17 Oestreicher (1988) argues that there was class-
consciousness among American workers from the 1870s until the 1930s, but they were not able 
to politically mobilize this class-consciousness due to the political power structure of America. 
Indeed, America’s winner-take-all electoral system, the federal system of government, and the 
entrenched two-party system have often been pointed to as causes of American exceptionalism. 
Friedman (2000) argues that American exceptionalism was really Southern exceptionalism and 
he finds that much of the weakness in the Southern labor movement was the result of political 
variables, especially wide election margins.18 Democratic candidates often won elections by such 
wide margins in the South that they did not depend on workers for their votes. These Democratic 
officials would almost always support employers, who could pay them handsomely, over 
                                                        
15 Some of the papers written on this topic include: Archer (1997), Archer (2007), Cayton and Mitchell (1939), 
Jacobson (1968), Halpern (1994), Marshall (1967), Miller (1984), Northrup (1943), Reid (1930), Washington 
(1913), and Wolfe (1912). 
16 It should be noted that racial heterogeneity does not, necessarily, have to impede labor union formation. Archer 
(2007) argues that racial heterogeneity actually helped labor union formation in Australia by generating a white 
racial consciousness that helped to break down class barriers between skilled and unskilled workers. 
17 Some of the papers written on this topic include: Archer (2007), Currie and Ferrie (2000), Friedman (1998), 
Friedman (2000), Marks (1989), Oestreicher (1988), Perlman (1928), and Schattschneider (1942). 
18 Friedman (2000) also finds that percent black had a negative and significant impact on labor union strength in the 
South. 
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workers. Elections were significantly more competitive in the Northeast and Midwest, which 
made politicians solicit the vote of workers and even resulted in legislation favorable to labor.19 
My county fixed effects will absorb county election margins, but given this literature I take steps 
to control for an establishments’ ability to buy political protection and influence. 
 This brief review of the labor history literature is far from comprehensive as there are 
almost as many explanations for American labor union formation as there are labor historians. 
However, the above explanations are some of the most prominent and are the ones that I directly 
test in my empirical analysis. 
 
 
1.3 DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
1.3.a. Dependent variables 
 
I use two different dependent variables to measure collective action among workers. My first 
dependent variable is an indicator for whether the workers in a county-by-industry cell had 
chartered a local branch of a national labor union by 1882, 1892, and 1902. I will refer to this 
variable as unionization. To generate the unionization variable I collect data on local branch 
locations for ten of the largest labor unions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 
1882 I only have branch locations for the (1) Cigar Maker’s International Union (CMIU). In 
1892 I have branch locations for the CMIU and five additional labor unions: (2) the 
Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (AA), (3) the Iron Molders’ Union of North 
America (IMU), (4) the International Typographical Union (ITU), (5) the National Union of 
United Brewery Workmen (Brewery Workmen), and (6) the United Garment Workers of 
America (UGWA). In 1902 I have branch locations for the six previously mentioned labor 
unions along with four additional labor unions: (7) the Granite Cutters’ National Union of the 
United States (Granite Cutters), (8) the International Association of Machinists (IAM), (9) the 
                                                        
19 Holmes (2003) and Fishback et al. (2009) record labor laws in effect in states from 1877-1924. 
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United Brotherhood of Leather Workers on Horse Goods (Leather Workers), and (10) the United 
Mine Workers (UMW).20  
These data were collected from union periodicals. The periodicals typically provide the 
name of each city that has chartered a local branch of the national union, and additional 
information is sometimes provided such as: branch membership, union number, condition of 
trade in the area (good, fair, poor, etc.), names of new members, names of deceased members, 
etc. Because my independent variable of interest is only observed at the county-by-industry level 
I geo-reference the city of each local branch to obtain the latitude and longitude for that city. 
These latitudes and longitudes were then mapped to an 1880 county map of the United States to 
obtain the county that each local branch was located in during the 1880 census. More details on 
the exact periodicals, dates, and the data collection process are provided in Appendix B.  
My second dependent variable is an indicator for whether the workers in a county-by-
industry cell went on strike anytime during the period 1881-1894. I will refer to this variable as 
strikes. The strikes variable comes from reports issued by the Commissioner of Labor that were 
digitized and provided by Currie and Ferrie (2000) and Naidu and Yuchtman (2016).21 These 
data provide information on the city where the strike took place, the industry in which the strike 
took place, the duration of the strike, average wages before and after the strike, number of 
employees striking, whether the strike was ordered by a union, etc. These data classify industries 
into 15 categories. I, again, geo-reference the city of each strike to obtain the latitude and 
longitude and then map this to the 1880 county map of the United States. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
20 I was not able to obtain branch locations for the other nine unions in 1882 for several reasons. First, the Brewery 
Workmen, Leather Workers, UGWA, and UMW did not exist in 1882. Of the remaining unions, I could only find a 
periodical with a list of local branch locations for the CMIU. Similarly, in 1892 the Leather Workers did not exist. I 
was able to obtain periodicals in 1892 for the Granite Cutters’ National Union and the UMW, but these periodicals 
did not contain any systematic list of branch locations. Finally, I was not able to obtain a periodical in 1892 for the 
IAM. 
21 Currie and Ferrie (2000) collected and digitized reports from six states: Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. The strikes recorded in these six states account for 90% of all strikes that 
occurred over the period 1881 to 1894. Naidu and Yuchtman (2016) collected and digitized the remaining state 
reports, which filled in the final 10% of strikes. These remaining strikes occurred in Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
and Ohio. 
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1.3.b. Independent variable: workers per establishment 
 
My independent variable of interest is the size of the group that is taking collective action. Most 
collective action among workers began at the establishment level. Therefore, I collect county-by-
industry level data on the number of establishments and the number of workers. I then divide the 
number of workers by the number of establishments to obtain a measure of the average number 
of workers per establishment.  
The number of establishments in a county-by-industry cell were collected from Table V 
of the Report on the Manufactures of the United States at the Tenth Census (1883).22 This table 
reports all industries except the mining industry. Data on the number of establishments for the 
mining industry come from Tables 27 (anthracite coal) and 29 (bituminous coal) of the Report on 
the Mining Industries of the United States (1886).23 The industry classification scheme used in 
the Report on the Manufactures was then assigned to the industry classification scheme used by 
my two dependent variables. Assignments between industries in the Report on the Manufactures 
and labor unions is reported in Table A3 of Appendix B. Assignments between industries in the 
Report of the Manufactures and the 15 category industry classification scheme used in the strikes 
data is reported in Table A4 of Appendix B. 
In the specifications using unionization as the dependent variable I measure the number 
of workers from the 1880 complete count United States Census. Measuring the number of 
workers from the 1880 census provides several advantages over using the number of workers 
provided in the Report on the Manufactures. First, most of the unions I study are organized by 
craft and the 1880 census classifies workers by craft as opposed to the Report on the 
Manufactures, which classifies workers by industry. For example, the International Association 
of Machinists (IAM) was a union comprised primarily of machinists. There is no corresponding 
“machinist” industry listed in the Report on the Manufactures. However, a valid occupational 
                                                        
22 These data were collected with much help from Rick Hornbeck. 
23  Additionally, the number of establishments in the printing industry does not include establishments for the 
newspaper and periodical press, and newspaper printers made up a large membership group in the ITU. For instance, 
Barnett (1909) claims that “The employing book and job printers complain that the newspaper printers control the 
unions in the larger cities” (Barnett 1909, pg. 42-43). I obtained the number of establishments for newspapers from 
Appendix B of The Newspaper and Periodical Press (1884), which contains a catalogue of all periodicals published 
in a county. I counted each periodical as one establishment and added the number of periodicals to the number of 
establishments from the Report on the Manufactures. 
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category using the 1880 complete count census is “machinist.”24 The second advantage of using 
the 1880 census is that it allows me to accurately count the number of workers who would have 
been eligible for membership in a particular labor union. For example, the National Union of 
United Brewery Workmen was a union whose members were almost exclusively German.25 
Therefore, my measure of the number of workers is the number of Germans who list their 
occupation as being a brewer or maltster. Table A3 of Appendix B shows the matches between 
occupations in the 1880 census and labor unions. Finally, when strikes are the dependent variable 
I use the number of workers from the Report on the Manufactures, but I still must use the 1880 
complete count census to calculate several control variables such as the racial and ethnic make-
up of workers. Table A5 of Appendix B shows matches between the 15 category industry 
classification scheme used in the strikes data and occupations in the 1880 census.  
Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of my data and identifies 784 counties that 
contain at least one industry for which I have corresponding union data. Counties colored in red 
are counties that contain one industry for which I have union data. Counties colored in yellow 
are counties that contain two or more industries for which I have corresponding union data. 
Finally, counties colored in blue are counties that contain two or more industries for which I 
have union data, but these counties also have large variation in the number of workers per 
establishment. Specifically, counties in blue have one industry that is in the top 75th percentile 
and another industry that is in the bottom 25th percentile of workers per establishment within 
that industry. The counties in blue, therefore, are going to aid in the identification of the 
relationship between group size and collective action because county fixed effects are included 
in my model.  
 
1.3.c. Control variables  
 
I use the both the Report on the Manufactures and the 1880 complete count census to generate 
several control variables. From the Report on the Manufactures I am able to compute the profit 
to cost ratio, the profit to revenue ratio, the average amount of capital owned by an 
                                                        
24 Note that the number of establishments comes from the Report on the Manufactures. By using establishments 
from the Report on the Manufactures and workers from the 1880 census I am assuming that, for example, all 
brewers work in a brewery and all machinists work in a machine shop. 
25 The publications of the Brewery Workmen were entirely in German until 1903. 
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establishment, and the average wage per worker at the county-by-industry level. I control for all 
of these variables and their squares to allow for the variables to affect the likelihood of collective 
action in non-linear ways. I interpret the profit ratios as controlling for the amount of rents that 
can be extracted by workers and the relative efficiency of establishments. The average amount of 
capital owned by establishments is a measure of the establishments’ wealth, and the average 
wage per worker measures the relative grievances of workers in a county-by-industry cell. 
 From the 1880 complete count census I construct the following variables at the county-
by-industry level: percentage of workers that are black, ethnic fractionalization, and the 
percentage of workers living in an urban designated area. The percentage of workers that are 
black and the ethnic fractionalization measure the extent to which racial and ethnic heterogeneity 
affected collective action. Again, I control for the square of these variables to allow for non-
linear effects. Finally, the percentage of workers living in an urban designated area controls for 
the fact that urban areas were the center of union organization in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Appendix A Figure A5, Appendix A Figure A6, and Appendix A Figure A7 
are maps that are analogous to Figure 2, but now provide graphical depictions of the county-level 
variation in wages, percentage of workers that are black, and ethnic fractionalization. Of note is 
the fact that there is very little variation in the percentage of workers that are black. 
 
1.3.d. Baseline regression specification  
 
Taking into consideration the predictions of the model in Section 1.2.a., I adopt the following 
empirical specification to examine the relationship between group size and collective action:  
 𝑃𝑟 [𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1]𝑖𝑐
= 𝛼 + 𝑓[𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒]𝑖𝑐 +  𝛽
′[𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠]𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐  
(8) 
where i indexes industry and c indexes county. 𝑃𝑟[𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1]𝑖𝑐  represents the 
probability of workers in industry i in county c taking collective action and is measured using 
either the unionization or strikes variable discussed in Section 1.3.a. 𝑓[𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒]𝑖𝑐 is a non-
linear function of the average number of workers per establishment in industry i in county c in 
1880 as described in Section 1.3.b. I estimate this non-linear function using both OLS and 
Robinson’s (1988) semiparametric estimator. In the OLS specifications I approximate the 
function with a quadratic in group size. [𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠]𝑖𝑐  is a vector of control variables that are 
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described in Section 1.3.c. 𝛽𝑖 are industry-specific fixed effects that control for any unobserved 
industry wide characteristics that might affect the likelihood of unionization. 𝛽𝑐 are county fixed 
effects that control for any unobserved, industry invariant, characteristics of a county that might 
affect the likelihood of unionization. Finally, when the dependent variable is unionization I 
include a year fixed effect to indicate whether the observation is from 1882, 1892, or 1902. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county-level.26 
The identification of the relationship between group size and collective action in 
Equation (8) relies on four components. First, the nature of my data allow me the ability to 
difference out all unobserved county and industry level characteristics that might affect 
collective action. Differencing out these unobserved characteristics allows me to eliminate two 
main sources of endogeneity. First, an alternative explanation for my finding (that intermediate 
sized establishments maximize the probability of collective action) is that employers that wish to 
prevent collective action selectively locate their establishments where economies of scale are 
either large or small. If this occurred, my results would be driven by some unobserved county-
level characteristics that determine economies of scale.27 Secondly, I eliminate the concern that 
the entire effect is coming from industries with either extremely large (e.g. steel-making) or 
extremely small (e.g. saddle-making) economies of scale where perhaps workers are less likely 
to take collective action for reasons unrelated to group size. 
The second component of my identification strategy relies on the fact that all of my 
independent variables of interest are measured in 1880 before the dramatic growth in the national 
labor movement that is shown in Figure 1. There were few unions in the United States prior to 
1880 and the membership in the unions that did exist was low. At the start of the decade local 
trade societies had an estimated membership of 170,000 workers. By 1890 there were an 
estimated 822,000 workers in labor unions (Friedman 1999). In 1886 and 1887 alone, nineteen 
new national unions, each composed of numerous local branches, were formed (Commons et al. 
1921, pg. 396). By measuring establishment size in 1880 and by measuring collective action later 
(1892 and 1902 for unionization; 1881-1894 for strikes) I am able to eliminate a chief source of 
endogeneity: establishment sizes might reflect employers’ efforts to prevent unionization. Under 
                                                        
26 Equation (8), as it is written, is a linear probability model. A well-known issue with linear probability models is 
that they often result in predicted probabilities that are greater than one or less than zero. Accordingly, I also 
estimate the logistic regression equivalent of Equation (8) and report the estimates in Appendix A.  
27 It should, again, be noted that an employer locating where economies of scale are large or small to prevent 
unionization only reinforces the claim that establishment size matters for collective action. 
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this set-up, biased estimates would only occur if employers were able to anticipate the collective 
action of their workers years in advance and, as a result, altered their establishment size by 1880. 
The third component of my identification strategy relies on the rich set of control 
variables described in Section 1.3.c. These variables allow me to control for the fact that an 
establishment’s size might affect their ability to prevent unions and strikes through multiple 
channels. For example, perhaps intermediate-sized establishments are wealthier and, therefore, 
more able to buy political influence in the form of court ordered injunctions. 28 Alternatively, 
perhaps intermediate sized establishments are more efficient. Since these establishments are 
efficient in all they do they are able to effectively suppress unions and strikes. In both of these 
examples, the hump-shaped relationship between establishment size and collective action would 
not be driven by the costs and benefits of collective action that are described in Section 1.2.a. 
Therefore, as described in Section 1.3.c., I control non-linearly for measures of establishments’ 
wealth and efficiency.  
The final component of my identification strategy exploits variation in the fixed costs of 
forming a union and speaks directly to the mechanism causing the hump-shaped relationship 
between establishment size and collective action. It is an immediate implication of the model that 
the number of workers per establishment that maximizes the probability of workers forming a 
union will increase as the fixed cost increases (see Equation (7)). Using the Reports on the 
Industrial Commission on Labor Organizations (1901), I was able to obtain information on the 
fixed cost of chartering a union in 1901 for eight of the ten unions that I study. I break these 
unions into two groups: those unions with low fixed costs and those unions with high fixed costs, 
and estimate equation (8) separately for each of these groups. From these estimates I am able to 
conclude that costs are a driver of whether or not workers take collective action. The four 
components of my identification strategy eliminate most sources of endogeneity and imply that 
the hump-shaped relationship between establishment size and collective action is likely reflective 
of the costs and benefits of taking collective action.  
 Before conducting my analysis I make several sample restrictions. When the dependent 
variable is unionization I remove the top 2.5% percent of observations in terms of workers per 
establishment and the top 1% of observations in terms of county population. I remove the top 
2.5% of observations in terms of workers per establishment because the distribution of workers 
                                                        
28 See Naidu and Yuchtman (2016) for the impact of judicial labor injunctions that were used to suppress strikes. 
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per establishment is highly skewed, as shown in Figure 3. This skewed distribution results in 
extremely noisy estimates at the top-end of the distribution. The line drawn in Figure 3 is at 132 
workers per establishment, which is the 97.5th percentile of the distribution. I also remove any 
observations that have an average establishment size of less than one worker.29 This leaves me 
with a total of 4,325 unique county-by-industry cells representing 784 counties. When the 
dependent variable is strikes I simply remove the top 2.5% of observations in terms of workers 
per establishment. This leaves me with 5,947 unique county-by-industry cells representing 1,550 
counties.  
Table 1 displays the sample means of independent variables of interest, broken down by 
industries for which I have unionization data. The iron and steel industry had the largest number 
of average workers per establishment (44 workers), while the brewing industry had the smallest 
number of workers per establishment (4 workers). Mining and iron and steel were the most 
racially diverse and had the some of the lowest wages per worker. The most ethnically diverse 
industries were granite cutting and textiles. Finally, the most profitable industry was mining. The 
last column of Table 1 reports summary statistics when the dependent variable is strikes.30 Note 
that strikes are a rare event compared to chartering a local branch of a union. Local unions are 
chartered in 44% of county-by-industry cells, whereas strikes take place in only 5% of county-
by-industry cells. 
 
 
1.4 RESULTS 
 
 
1.4.a. Unionization results  
 
Table 2 presents the estimated results of equation (8) when the dependent variable is 
unionization. In columns (1)-(5) I approximate the function between unionization and group size 
using a quadratic. In column (6) I estimate the function semiparametrically using Robinson’s 
                                                        
29 Recall this can happen because the number of workers is from the 1880 census and the number of establishments 
is from the Report on the Manufactures.  
30 Summary statistics for the strikes data, broken down by the 15 industry categories used in these data, are available 
upon request.  
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double residual estimator. Column (1) tests the main hypothesis that industrial structure, 
particularly average establishment size, matters for unionization. Both the linear and quadratic 
term in average workers per establishment are in the expected direction and highly significant. 
The percentage of workers living in an urban designated area is, also, positive and significant. In 
the last row of the table is the estimate of the average workers per establishment that maximizes 
the probability of unionization, which is about 55 workers.  
Column (2) adds in controls for the average wage of workers, which are not significant.31 
Column (3) adds in the racial and ethnic heterogeneity controls. As shown in Appendix A Figure 
A6, there is little within-county variation in the percentage of workers that are black and, 
accordingly, I drop the county fixed effects and estimate the equation using state fixed effects in 
column (3). Average workers per establishment and its square remain highly significant, but the 
percentage of workers that are black also appears to be significant and have an inverse hump-
shape. In particular, the probability of workers forming a union is maximized around 0% black 
workers or 100% black workers and is minimized around 50% of the workers being black. This 
result is in-line with the theory that workers have difficulty organizing with members of different 
racial groups. Ethnic fractionalization also appears to have a hump-shape affect on the 
probability of unionizing. Column (4) repeats the specification of column (3), but now uses 
county fixed effects. Finally, column (5) includes all other county-level controls. Not 
surprisingly, when county fixed effects are included, the coefficient of percent black and its 
square are reduced in magnitude and significance. Nevertheless, average workers per 
establishment and its square remain highly significant in all specifications. The specification in 
column (5) is the preferred OLS specification since it absorbs all unobserved county and 
industry-specific characteristics that might be associated with unionization and includes all of the 
possible control variables. The estimated average establishment size that maximizes the 
probability of unionization varies from 48 workers in column (5) to 58 workers in column (3). 
Appendix A Table A1 reports the corresponding estimates of Table 2 when a logistic regression 
model is used, as opposed to the linear probability model. The significant, hump-shaped 
relationship is still present when using the logistic model. 
The coefficients in column (5) of Table 2 indicate that for the smallest establishment size 
(1 worker) an increase in establishment size by 20 workers (approximately 1 standard deviation) 
                                                        
31 The average wage of workers and the average wage of workers squared are both divided by 100. 
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would increase the likelihood of unionization by 11 percentage points. For an establishment of 
the largest size (132 workers) a decrease in establishment size by 20 workers would increase the 
likelihood of unionization by 23 percentage points. For an establishment size at the maximum 
probability of unionization (48 workers) a 20 worker change in either direction would decrease 
the likelihood of unionization by about 3 percentage points. To assess the magnitude of these 
effects I assign all county-by-industry cells the number of workers per establishment at the 
maximum probability of unionization (48 workers). Doing this would have increased 
unionization in these cells from 44% to 56% (a 27% increase).  
To demonstrate that establishment size is, perhaps, the most important driver of 
unionization I assign each county-by-industry cell the wage, percentage of workers that are black, 
and ethnic fractionalization that maximize the probability of workers forming a union. Using the 
estimated coefficients in column (5), I find that the relationship between wages and the 
probability of workers forming a union is increasing over my entire range of wages (the linear 
term is much larger than the quadratic term). Accordingly, I assign all workers the average wage 
of the highest paying industry, which is $530 a year for printers (see Table 1). Doing this would 
have increased unionization from 44% to 45% (a 2% increase). Similarly, the coefficients on 
percent black and its square in column (5) indicate that the likelihood of unionization is 
maximized around 0% black or 100% black workers.32 Assigning all cells no black workers 
increases unionization in these cells from 44% to 45% (a 2% increase). Finally, the coefficients 
on ethnic fractionalization and its square indicate that the likelihood of unionization is 
maximized at a fractionalization of 0.47. Assigning all cells this fractionalization increases 
unionization in these cells from 44% to 47% (a 7% increase). Therefore, establishment size has a 
larger effect on unionization than the other theories of union formation, such as the prosperity 
and racial heterogeneity of workers. 
Next, I turn to the semiparametric estimation. Column (6) of Table 2 shows the estimated 
coefficients on the control variables when Robinson’s double residual estimator is used. Figure 4 
graphs the estimated relationships between average workers per establishment and unionization 
from columns (5) and (6) of Table 2. The right-hand-side vertical axis plots a component-plus-
residual graph from the OLS regression in column (5). The left-hand-side vertical axis plots the 
                                                        
32 The linear and quadratic term are almost identical in magnitude, but have opposite signs and the variable is 
bounded between 0 and 1. 
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predicted probability of unionizing from the semiparametric regression in column (6). Both 
estimated curves show the significant hump-shaped relationship between average workers per 
establishment and the probability of unionizing. The figure demonstrates that the quadratic fit is 
a good, but not perfect, approximation for the relationship between group size and unionization. 
Notably, the quadratic fit overestimates the number of workers per establishment at the 
maximum likelihood of unionization because the actual relationship increases more quickly than 
it decreases. The estimated average establishment size that maximizes the probability of 
unionization for the semiparametric estimate is 28 workers, compared to 48 workers in column 
(5) of Table 2. 
While the focus of this chapter is the origins of the American labor movement, I use the 
OLS estimates in column (5) of Table 2 to provide suggestive evidence that industrial structure 
could have led to large differences in unionization across countries. For comparable industries, 
the average establishment size in the United States around the turn of the century was 
approximately 13 workers, while it was 15 workers in Denmark, 24 workers in Norway, and 28 
workers in Sweden.33 The corresponding estimate of the likelihood of union formation in the 
United States (at 13 workers per establishment) would have been 47%, whereas it would have 
been 48% in Denmark (at 15 workers per establishments), 52% in Norway (at 24 workers per 
establishment), and 53% in Sweden (at 28 workers per establishment). This means that if the 
average size of establishments in the United States were the same as in Norway, then 
unionization in my county-by-industry cells would have increased by 11%. This increase in the 
number of cells with unions would have increased the unionization rate in the United States in 
from 10.5% to 11% and closed 16% of the unionization rate gap with Norway.34  
                                                        
33 I use Denmark, Norway, and Sweden for this comparison because they provide data on establishment size around 
the turn of the century. The data for Denmark comes Danmarks Statistik Statistisk Aarbog (1898), the data for 
Norway comes from Statistisk Aarbog for Kongeriget Norge (1890), the data for Sweden comes from Sveriges 
Officiella Statistik (1903), and the data for the United States comes from Table 1 of the Census of Manufactures in 
1900. The industries used for the Denmark comparison are: book printing, brewing, cement, distilling, matches, 
paper, shipbuilding, and tobacco. The industries used for the Norway comparison are: brewing, brick making, 
distilling, leather tanning, matches, shipbuilding, and tobacco. The industries used for the Sweden comparison are: 
baking, bookbinding, book printing, brewing, brick making, carriage making, cement, cooperage, distilling, 
matches, paper, shipbuilding, and tobacco. 
34 To perform this calculation I estimate that the ten unions I study account for approximately 40% of unionized 
workers around the turn of the century; 34 or approximately 4.2% of the 10.5% unionization rate in the United States 
in 1914 (Friedman 2008). Assuming that all local branches have the same number of members, I estimate that the 
11% increase in county-by-industry cells with chartered local branches would have increased the unionization rate in 
the United States from 10.5% to 11% (0.063 + 0.042[1 + 0.11]). This 0.5% percentage point increase in the 
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1.4.b. Strike results  
 
Table 3 presents the estimated results of equation (8) when the dependent variable is strikes and 
is set-up analogously to Table 2. Since very few counties ever experienced a strike, I use state 
fixed effects instead of county fixed effects in Table 3.35 Columns (1)-(4) display the significant 
hump-shaped relationship between average establishment size and strikes. The estimated 
establishment size at the maximum probability of striking varies from 38 in column (4) to 60 in 
columns (1) and (2). The percent of workers living in an urban designated area is, again, positive 
and highly significant. There also appears to be a significant inverse hump-shape between the 
percent of workers that are black and the probability of workers striking, similar to the 
relationship found in column (3) of Table 2. Wages do not have a significant relationship with 
the probability of workers going on strike and the square term of ethnic fractionalization is 
positive and significant. Appendix A Table A2 reports the corresponding estimates of Table 3 
when a logistic regression model is used. The significant, hump-shaped relationship is still 
present when using this model. 
The coefficients in column (4) of Table 3 indicate that for the smallest establishment size 
(1 worker) an increase in establishment size by 20 workers (approximately one standard 
deviation) would increase the likelihood of striking by 2 percentage points. For an establishment 
of the largest size (132 workers) a decrease in establishment size by 20 workers would increase 
the likelihood of striking by 5.5 percentage points. For an establishment size at the maximum 
probability of striking (38 workers) a 20 worker change in either direction would decrease the 
likelihood of striking by approximately 0.7 percentage points. Finally, if I assign all cells the 
number of workers per establishment at the maximum probability of striking, I find that the 
incidence of strikes would have increased from 5% to 6.6% (a 32% increase). 
Once again, I assign each county-by-industry cell the wage, percentage of workers that 
are black, and ethnic fractionalization that maximize the probability of workers going on strike to 
demonstrate that establishment size is an important driver of strikes. Using the estimated 
coefficients in column (4), I find that the relationship between wages and the probability of 
workers going on strike is increasing over my entire range of wages (the linear term is much 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
unionization rate would have closed 16% of the unionization rate gap between the United States and Norway, which 
was 3.1 percentage points (the unionization rate in Norway was 13.6% in 1914). 
35 Only 45 of the 1,550 counties in my strikes sample experienced a strike. 
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larger than the quadratic term). Accordingly, I assign all workers the average wage of the highest 
paying industry, which is $530 a year for printers. Doing this would have increased strikes from 
5% to 5.3% (a 6% increase). Similarly, the coefficients on percent black and its square in column 
(4) indicate that the likelihood of striking is maximized around 0% black or 100% black workers. 
Assigning all cells no black workers increases strikes in these cells from 5% to 5.8% (a 16% 
increase). Finally, I find that the probability of workers going on strike is maximized with an 
ethnic fractionalization of around 0.13. If I assign all cells this fractionalization then the 
occurrence of strikes increases dramatically from 5% to 27%. However, this effect goes away 
when the percent of workers that are from Europe is added to the regression, indicating that 
ethnic fractionalization might be a proxy for European immigrants who are, perhaps, more likely 
to go on strike. Regardless, Table 3 provides convincing evidence that establishment size has a 
large effect on the probability of striking when compared to competing theories. 
Column (5) of Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients on the control variables when 
Robinson’s double residual estimator is used. Figure 5 graphs the estimated relationships 
between average workers per establishment and strikes from columns (4) and (5) of Table 3. The 
right-hand-side vertical axis plots the component-plus-residual graph from the OLS regression in 
column (4). The left-hand-side vertical axis plots the predicted probability of unionizing from the 
semiparametric regression in column (5). Again, both estimated curves show the significant 
hump-shaped relationship between average workers per establishment and the probability of 
striking. The quadratic fit, again, overestimates the number of workers per establishment at the 
maximum likelihood of striking because the actual relationship increases more quickly than it 
decreases. The estimated average establishment size that maximizes the probability of striking in 
the semiparametric estimate is 27 workers, while it is 38 workers in column (4) of Table 3. 
 
1.4.c. Fixed cost results 
 
The model presented in Section 1.2.a. asserts that the fixed costs of chartering a union and 
benefits from the union are drivers of union formation. As such, we should see a change in the 
relationship between workers per establishment and the probability of forming a union when the 
fixed costs and benefits of a union change. As mentioned in Section 1.3.d., it is an immediate 
implication of the model that the number of workers per establishment that maximizes the 
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probability of workers forming a union will increase as the fixed cost increases. As such, in this 
section, I exploit variation in fixed costs across unions to test if this is the case.36 Using the 
Reports on the Industrial Commission on Labor Organizations (1901), I was able to obtain 
information on the fixed cost of chartering a union in 1901 for eight of the ten unions that I study. 
I break these unions into two groups, those unions with low fixed costs and those unions with 
high fixed costs, and estimate equation (8) separately for each of these groups. Low fixed cost 
unions are the CMIU, IMU, ITU, and UGWA, which each had a chartering fee of $5. High fixed 
cost unions are the AA ($25), Brewery Workers ($10), Leather Workers ($12), and 
UMW($15).37  
 The results from this procedure are displayed in Table 4. Columns (1) and (3) repeat the 
specification from column (5) of Table 2 for the respective high and low fixed cost industries. 
Both the linear and quadratic terms on average workers per establishment are not significant, 
likely due to the reduction in sample size. Most importantly, the number of workers per 
establishment at the maximum probability of forming a union is 34 for the low fixed cost unions, 
while it 54 for the high fixed cost unions. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 display the 
corresponding semiparametric estimates. Again, the number of workers per establishment at the 
maximum probability of forming a union is 34 for the low fixed cost unions, while it 45 for the 
high fixed cost unions. The semiparametric estimates are displayed graphically in Figure 6. Both 
the low fixed cost unions and the high fixed cost unions display a notable hump-shaped 
relationship, despite the fact that the corresponding OLS coefficients were not significant in 
columns (1) and (3). The most important thing to note in Figure 6 is that in the low fixed cost 
unions fewer workers are needed to overcome the costs. Once these costs are overcome, the 
probability of unionizing plateaus, before decreasing. In contrast, in the high fixed cost unions 
more workers are needed to initially overcome the costs. The results in Table 4 and Figure 6 are 
in perfect alignment with the prediction of the model that more workers are needed to take 
collective action when the fixed costs increase. 
 
 
                                                        
36 I could also exploit variation in the benefits unions provide, however, the benefits of local unions may be non-
pecuniary and these benefits vary across different local unions that are the members of the same national union. 
These two facts make it difficult to obtain data on the benefits provided by a local union. 
37 If the fixed costs are inflated by wages, a cost of $5 in 1900 is about $700 in 2015 and a cost of $25 in 1900 is 
about $3,500 in 2015. The wage index was obtained from www.measuringworth.com. 
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1.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
What caused the large growth in the American labor movement from 1880 to 1900? When the 
labor movement is thought of, it is often imagined as a large, nationwide movement when 
workers suddenly gained class-consciousness. In reality, the labor movement was made up of 
individual workers who decided how much of their own effort (time, money, etc.) to commit to 
improving labors’ prospects in their communities. Thus, to answer this question in a meaningful 
way one must examine the building blocks of the labor movement: the chartering of local union 
branches and the decision of local workers to strike.  
 In this chapter, I argue that when deciding whether to charter a local union branch or go 
on strike, workers weighed the costs and benefits of these options. I demonstrate that there is a 
hump-shaped relationship between the probability of collective action and group size as long as 
the benefits to collective action have characteristics of both public and private goods and there is 
a fixed cost to collective action. In the empirical section of this chapter I explore if this hump-
shaped relationship exists. To do this I compile a new county-by-industry level dataset 
containing information on local union locations, strike locations, and accurate measures of group 
size for the largest industries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. My empirical 
analysis confirms the intuition of the theoretical predictions; there is, indeed, a hump-shaped 
relationship between the likelihood of collective action and group size. This result holds across 
two independent measures of collective action (unionization and strikes), two different 
estimation techniques (quadratic and semiparametric), and is robust to many potential 
confounding influences. 
 The findings of this chapter suggest that the industrial structure of the United States had 
an important role to play in the level of collective action that was generated in the early years of 
the American labor movement. In particular, if more establishments had an intermediate size, as 
opposed to being small or large, it is possible that more unions would have formed and more 
strikes would have occurred. The conclusion of this chapter is that the industrial structure of the 
United States might partially explain the weakness of the American labor movement. I estimate 
that 16% of the unionization rate gap between the United States and Norway could have been 
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eliminated if establishment size in the United States had been more conducive to labor union 
formation. Additionally, the size of the average establishment in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
was closer to the size that I estimate has the maximum probability of forming a union and 
striking. 
This chapter does not rule out alternative theories of collective action in the United 
States. In fact, my empirical analysis finds some support for these alternative hypotheses, such as 
racial heterogeneity making it more difficult for workers to organize. Instead, this chapter is 
designed to call attention to a theory that has received little attention, and even fewer formal 
tests, in the literature on the origins of the American labor movement. 
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1.6 FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
Figure 1: Labor union membership 
 
 
         
Notes: Number of members in the Brewery Workmen comes from Schlüter (1910). The numbers 
for 1886, 1888, and 1889 are estimated from the text. The Brewery Workmen were founded in 
1886 and page 131 of the text states that “the associations of brewery workmen which was thus 
called into life had a membership of 2,700.” Accordingly, I estimate 2,700 for the number of 
members in 1886. The estimate for 1889 comes from page 175 of the text, which notes that in 
1890 “the organization lost 400 members, and its numbers had now dwindled down to 1,300.” 
This leads me to estimate membership in 1889 at 1,700. Finally, page 171 notes that “the years 
1888 and 1889 were the hardest which the United Brewery Workmen ever had.” As such, I 
estimate the number of members at 1,700 for the year 1888 as well. CMIU membership for 
1869-1881 comes from The Cigar Makers’ Official Journal 29(10), pg. 9. Cigar Makers’ 
Official Journal  CMIU membership for 1881-1900 comes from Wolman (1924), pg. 32. CMIU 
membership from 1901-1905 comes from Perkins (1912), pg. 11. IMU membership comes from 
Stockton (1922), pg. 23. ITU membership comes from Barnett (1909), pg. 375-376. AA/Sons of 
Vulcan membership comes from Robinson (1920), pg. 20-21. UGWA data comes from Reports 
of the Industrial Commission (1901), pg. 59.  
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Figure 2: Geographic variation in average workers per establishment 
 
 
 
Notes: The data used generate the above figure comes from Table V of Walker and Seaton 
(1883). The industries that are used are detailed in Appendix B Table A3.  
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Figure 3: Kernel density of average workers per establishment 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 3 depicts the kernel density estimate of the average workers per establishment 
distribution using an Epanechnikov kernel function and a rule-of-thumb kernel bandwidth. The 
dashed-line, at 132 workers per establishment, denotes the 97.5th percentile of the distribution. 
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Figure 4: Relationship between workers per establishment and unionization 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 4 depicts the hump-shaped relationship between unionization and average workers 
per establishment. The left-hand side vertical axis plots the component-plus-residual from a 
regression using the specification in column (5) of Table 2, where the component is average 
establishment size and its square. The right-hand-side vertical axis plots the predicted likelihood 
of unionization from a semiparametric regression using Robinson’s double residual estimator. 
The semiparametric regression line is estimated using local second-degree polynomial smoothing 
based on an Epanechnikov kernel function and a rule-of-thumb kernel bandwidth that minimizes 
the conditional weighted mean integrated squared error (in this case the bandwidth is 12.73). The 
dashed-red lines are 95% confidence intervals for the semiparametric regression line. Note that 
the scale of the right-hand-side vertical axis is, essentially meaningless, because the predicted 
values are relative to the omitted county and industry dummies. 
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Figure 5: Relationship between workers per establishment and strikes 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 5 depicts the hump-shaped relationship between strikes and average workers per 
establishment. The left-hand side vertical axis plots the component-plus-residual from a 
regression using the specification in column (4) of Table 3, where the component is average 
establishment size and its square. The right-hand-side vertical axis plots the predicted likelihood 
of unionization from a semiparametric regression using Robinson’s double residual estimator. 
The semiparametric regression line is estimated using local second-degree polynomial smoothing 
based on an Epanechnikov kernel function and a rule-of-thumb kernel bandwidth that minimizes 
the conditional weighted mean integrated squared error (in this case the bandwidth is 14.74). The 
dashed-red lines are 95% confidence intervals for the semiparametric regression line. Note that 
the scale of the right-hand-side vertical axis is, essentially meaningless, because the predicted 
values are relative to the omitted county and industry dummies. 
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Figure 6: Relationship between workers per establishment and unionization by fixed costs 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 6 depicts the relationship between unionization and average workers per 
establishment for low fixed cost and high fixed cost unions. The vertical axis plots the predicted 
likelihood of unionization from a semiparametric regression using Robinson’s double residual 
estimator. The semiparametric regression line is estimated using local second-degree polynomial 
smoothing based on an Epanechnikov kernel function and a kernel bandwidth of 25. Note that 
the scale of the vertical axis is, essentially meaningless, because the predicted values are relative 
to the omitted county and industry dummies. Low fixed cost unions are the CMIU, IMU, ITU, 
and UGWA, which each had a chartering fee of $5. High fixed cost unions are the AA ($25), 
Brewery Workers ($10), Leather Workers ($12), and UMW($15). 
 34 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
             Industry: Brewing Cigar-
making 
Coal 
Mining 
Granite 
cutting 
Iron and 
steel 
Iron 
molding 
Machine 
products 
Printing Saddlery 
and 
harness 
Textile All Strikes 
data 
             Workers per 
establishment 
3.97 9.33 27.96 12.13 43.87 10.43 18.54 5.53 4.36 18.08 13.45 13.57 
(3.57) (13.86) (30.81) (14.01) (36.62) (13.46) (14.73) (3.97) (2.51) (18.25) (19.41) (18.77) 
             
Number of 
workers 
22.2 173 421 97 214 108 167 141 45.3 188 146 103 
(49.4) (382) (1226) (134) (289) (277) (326) (221) (51.2) (422) (415) (260) 
             
Number of 
establishments 
5.07 19.89 12.49 7.91 4.88 8.74 8.5 21.55 10.92 10.07 11.61 9.62 
(5.21) (37.50) (17.11) (6.74) (4.97) (13.19) (12.89) (23.17) (8.25) (17.76) (20.27) (12.41) 
             
Percent black 0 0.018 0.055 0.013 0.068 0.015 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.016 0.058 
(0) (0.078) (0.123) (0.053) (0.169) (0.070) (0.032) (0.023) (0.032) (0.038) (0.072) (0.141) 
             
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
0 0.401 0.53 0.577 0.467 0.403 0.386 0.216 0.347 0.546 0.372 0.378 
(0) (0.181) (0.208) (0.164) (0.204) (0.197) (0.187) (0.135) (0.197) (0.196) (0.237) (0.198) 
             
Percent urban 0.672 0.768 0.101 0.663 0.414 0.618 0.602 0.799 0.415 0.618 0.603 0.326 
 (0.371) (0.296) (0.220) (0.300) (0.382) (0.370) (0.347) (0.246) (0.308) (0.320) (0.366) (0.344) 
             
Wage per 
worker 
431 409 293 444 361 476 474 530 407 354 424 335 
(84.8) (143) (255) (107) (149) (454) (441) (392) (277) (159) (300) (210) 
             
Profit to cost 
ratio 
0.451 0.552 0.838 0.48 0.579 0.373 0.38 0.382 0.396 0.301 0.45 0.339 
(0.203) (1.10) (2.54) (0.316) (1.86) (0.323) (0.324) (0.876) (0.265) (0.316) (0.954) (0.682) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
             
Capital per 
establishment 
37183 3761 37805 5863 182552 27831 26344 5372 2589 5392 26932 16307 
(65334) (7810) (99615) (6855) (114808) (29781) (27954) (5004) (3146) (6498) (62516) (32457) 
             
Chartered union 175 427 168 41 73 341 214 330 62 68 1899  
Did not charter 
union 
283 224 75 114 203 375 165 98 359 530 2426  
Total 
observations 
458 651 243 155 276 716 379 428 421 598 4325  
Percentage 
unionized 
38% 73% 69% 26% 26% 48% 57% 77% 15% 11% 44%  
             
Workers went 
on strike 
           296 
Workers did not 
go on strike 
           5651 
Total 
observations 
           5947 
Percentage 
experiencing 
strike 
           5% 
Notes: This table displays the sample means of independent variables of interest, broken down by industries for which I have unionization data. 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Unionization and average establishment size 
       
 
Pr(union in county-industry cell = 1) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Semi - 
parametric 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Average workers per establishment 0.858*** 0.865*** 1.107*** 0.862*** 0.743***  
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.136) (0.171) (0.174)  
       
Average workers per establishment sqaure -0.00784*** -0.00793*** -0.00961*** -0.00781*** -0.00782***  
(0.00172) (0.00173) (0.00136) (0.00169) (0.00174)  
       
Percent urban 0.246*** 0.242*** 0.308*** 0.233*** 0.236*** 0.229*** 
 (0.0594) (0.0593) (0.0288) (0.0602) (0.0607) (0.0609) 
       
Average wage per worker  0.118 0.148** 0.105 0.0796 0.0633 
  (0.0833) (0.0584) (0.0827) (0.0803) (0.0776) 
       
Average wage per worker square  -0.0000170 -0.0000216*** -0.0000148 -0.0000112 -0.00000975 
  (0.0000103) (0.00000745) (0.0000103) (0.0000101) (0.00000981) 
       
Percent black   -0.962*** -0.780** -0.695* -0.697* 
   (0.284) (0.376) (0.377) (0.383) 
       
Percent black square   1.154*** 0.847* 0.699 0.808 
   (0.378) (0.491) (0.491) (0.515) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
       
Ethnic fractionalization   0.570*** 0.495*** 0.499*** 0.431*** 
   (0.138) (0.167) (0.166) (0.167) 
       
Ethnic fractionalization sqaure   -0.283* -0.514** -0.526*** -0.461** 
   (0.164) (0.199) (0.197) (0.198) 
       
County FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes No No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-by-industry controls No No No No Yes Yes 
       
Observations 4325 4325 4325 4325 4325 4325 
Counties 784 784 784 784 784 784 
       
Workers per establishment at maximum 
probability of unionization 
54.74*** 54.59*** 57.58*** 55.16*** 47.52*** 27.5 
(3.819) (3.793) (2.995) (3.870) (3.982)  
Notes: The table reports OLS and semiparametric estimates from equation (8) in the text. The semiparametric estimation is performed using 
Robinson’s double residual estimator with local second-degree polynomial smoothing based on an Epanechnikov kernel function. The unit of 
observation is a county-by-industry cell. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county level. See Section 1.3 of the text for 
details on the dependent and independent variables. County-by-industry controls include: average profit to revenue ratio and its square, average 
profit to cost ratio and its square, average capital per establishment and its square, and the total number of workers in county by industry cell. 
* p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
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Table 3: Strikes and average establishment size 
      
 
Pr(strike in county-industry cell = 1) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Semi - 
parametric 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
     Average workers per establishment 0.301*** 0.299*** 0.231*** 0.127**  
 (0.0690) (0.0688) (0.0587) (0.0596)  
      
Average workers per establishment 
sqaure 
-0.00253*** -0.00251*** -0.00202*** -0.00167***  
(0.000665) (0.000664) (0.000588) (0.000548)  
      
Percent urban 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.141*** 0.132*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0262) (0.0205) (0.0198) (0.0353) 
      
Average wage per worker  0.0382 0.00669 0.0188 0.0176 
  (0.0266) (0.0236) (0.0233) (0.0222) 
      
Average wage per worker square  -0.00000651* -0.00000226 -0.00000341 -0.00000319 
  (0.00000378) (0.00000327) (0.00000309) (0.00000300) 
      
Percent black   -0.252*** -0.234*** -0.226** 
   (0.0902) (0.0889) (0.106) 
      
Percent black sqaure   0.240** 0.224** 0.213* 
 
  (0.103) (0.102) (0.120) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
      
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.119 -0.0863 -0.0837 
   (0.0916) (0.0815) (0.0654) 
      
Ethnic fractionalization sqaure   0.416*** 0.338** 0.331*** 
   (0.154) (0.135) (0.114) 
      
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-by-industry controls No No No Yes Yes 
      
Observations 5947 5947 5947 5947 5947 
Counties 1550 1550 1550 1550 1550 
      
Workers per establishment at maximum 
probability of striking 
59.56*** 59.65*** 57.09*** 38.13*** 26.87 
(4.802) (4.860) (5.468) (8.732)  
Notes: The table reports OLS and semiparametric estimates from equation (8) in the text. The semiparametric estimation is 
performed using Robinson’s double residual estimator with local second-degree polynomial smoothing based on an 
Epanechnikov kernel function. The unit of observation is a county-by-industry cell. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are 
clustered at the county level. See Section 1.3 of the text for details on the dependent and the independent variables. County-by-
industry controls include: average profit to revenue ratio and its square, average profit to cost ratio and its square, average capital 
per establishment and its square, and the total number of workers in county by industry cell. 
* p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01  
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Table 4: Unionization and average establishment size by fixed costs 
     
 
Pr(union in county-industry cell = 1) 
 
Low fixed cost unions High fixed cost unions 
 
OLS Semiparametric OLS Semiparametric 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Average workers per establishment 0.331  0.600  
 (0.298)  (0.497)  
     
Average workers per establishment 
sqaure 
-0.00487*  -0.00550  
(0.00289)  (0.00406)  
     
Percent urban 0.267** 0.285** 0.256** 0.246** 
 (0.123) (0.122) (0.128) (0.123) 
     
Average wage per worker -0.0527 -0.0481 0.457 0.510 
 (0.131) (0.126) (0.477) (0.464) 
     
Average wage per worker square 0.00000787 0.00000668 -0.0000648 -0.000116 
 (0.0000163) (0.0000156) (0.000285) (0.000293) 
     
Percent black -1.335* -1.141 0.0802 0.284 
 (0.794) (0.838) (0.906) (0.883) 
     
Percent black sqaure 1.510 1.216 -0.149 -0.519 
 
(1.124) (1.190) (1.848) (1.687) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
     
Ethnic fractionalization 0.322 0.158 0.701 0.599 
 (0.292) (0.289) (0.637) (0.625) 
     
Ethnic fractionalization sqaure -0.344 -0.202 -0.608 -0.505 
 (0.310) (0.303) (0.745) (0.727) 
     
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2393 2393 1398 1398 
Counties 490 490 676 676 
     
Workers per establishment at maximum 
probability of striking 
34.04*** 34.5 54.55*** 45.36 
(13.21)  (15.52)  
Notes: The table reports OLS and semiparametric estimates from equation (8) in the text. The semiparametric 
estimation is performed using Robinson’s double residual estimator with local second-degree polynomial smoothing 
based on an Epanechnikov kernel function. The unit of observation is a county-by-industry cell. Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county level. See Section 1.3 of the text for details on the dependent and 
the independent variables. County-by-industry controls include: average profit to revenue ratio and its square, average 
profit to cost ratio and its square, average capital per establishment and its square, and the total number of workers in 
county by industry cell. Low fixed cost unions are the CMIU, IMU, ITU, and UGWA, which each had a chartering fee 
of $5. High fixed cost unions are the AA ($25), Brewery Workers ($10), Leather Workers ($12), and UMW($15). 
* p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
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1.7 APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Figure A1 displays the collective bargaining rate in OECD countries and Figure A2 displays the 
union density in OECD countries. These data were gathered from International Labour 
Organization Database ILOSTAT. The collective bargaining rate is defined as the number of 
employees whose pay or conditions of employment are determined by at least one collective 
agreement as a percentage of the total number of employees. Union density is defined as the 
number of union members who are employees as a percentage of the total number of employees. 
A union is defined as a “workers’ organization constituted for the purpose of furthering and 
defending the interests of workers” (ILOSTAT; trade union density rate). Both variables are for 
the year 2013. For countries that do not report data in 2013 I use the value of the measure in 
2012.  
Figure A3 displays an index of labor union rights, developed by Kucera (2004), that 
ranges from 0 (the least rights) to 10 (the maximum possible rights). The index is based on 37 
total criteria that are listed in Table 1 of Kucera (2004). The index is mainly created from textual 
analysis of legislation, but it also incorporates other measures of trade union rights, such as 
whether members are arrested for union activity. Figure A4 displays an index of employment 
protection legislation, reported by Nicoletti et al. (1999), that ranges from 0 (no employment 
protection) to 4 (the maximum possible employment protection). 
Figure A5 is a map displaying geographic variation in ethnic fractionalization, Figure A6 
displays geographic variation in the percentage of workers that are black, and Figure A7 displays 
geographic variation in average wage per worker. There is certainly enough variation in ethnic 
fractionalization and average wage per worker to identify any effect these might have on union 
formation when county fixed effects are included in the regression. However, there is clearly not 
as much variation in the percent of workers that are black, which is why Tables 2 and 3 of the 
main text include a specification with only state fixed effects, instead of county fixed effects. 
As mentioned in Section 1.3.d. of the chapter, a well-known problem with the linear 
probability model is that the predicted probabilities are often not bounded between 0 and 1. 
Accordingly, Tables A1 and A2, displayed below, report the corresponding estimates of Tables 2 
and 3 in the text, but use a logistic regression model as opposed to a linear probability model. 
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The significant, hump-shaped relationship between average establishment size and collective 
action remains intact when using the logistic regression model.  
 44 
Figure A1: Collective bargaining in OECD countries 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Union density in OECD countries 
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Figure A3: Trade union rights in OECD countries 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Employment protection legislation in OECD countries 
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Figure A5: Geographic variation in workers’ wages 
 
 
 
Notes: The data used to generate the above figure comes from Table V of Walker and Seaton 
(1883). The industries that are used are detailed in Appendix B Table A3.  
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Figure A6: Geographic variation in percent black 
 
 
 
Notes: The data used to generate the above figure comes from Table V of Walker and Seaton 
(1883). The industries that are used are detailed in Appendix B Table A3.  
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Figure A7: Geographic variation in ethnic fractionalization 
 
  
 
Notes: The data used to generate the above figure comes from Table V of Walker and Seaton 
(1883). The industries that are used are detailed in Appendix B Table A3.  
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Table A1: Unionization and average establishment size (logistic regressions) 
      
 
Pr(union in county-industry cell = 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Average workers per establishment 1.045*** 1.060*** 0.985*** 1.039*** 0.794*** 
 (0.176) (0.176) (0.161) (0.171) (0.184) 
      
Average workers per establishment 
sqaure 
-0.00914*** -0.00926*** -0.00866*** -0.00899*** -0.00837*** 
(0.00172) (0.00171) (0.00162) (0.00166) (0.00180) 
      
Percent urban 0.217*** 0.210*** 0.223*** 0.201*** 0.213*** 
 (0.0577) (0.0577) (0.0330) (0.0582) (0.0571) 
      
Average wage per worker  0.120 0.196*** 0.116 0.0921 
  (0.0856) (0.0706) (0.0844) (0.0799) 
      
Average wage per worker square  -0.0000170* -0.000026*** -0.0000157 -0.0000123 
  (0.0000103) (0.00000864) (0.0000102) (0.00000972) 
      
Percent black   -1.007*** -0.495 -0.282 
   (0.360) (0.394) (0.402) 
      
Percent black square   1.457** 0.368 -0.304 
   (0.602) (0.652) (0.680) 
      
Ethnic fractionalization   0.630*** 0.581*** 0.599*** 
   (0.181) (0.190) (0.186) 
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Table A1 (continued) 
      
Ethnic fractionalization sqaure   -0.402* -0.648*** -0.641*** 
   (0.212) (0.235) (0.227) 
      
County FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-by-industry controls No No No No Yes 
      
Observations 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 
Counties 387 387 387 387 387 
      
Workers per establishment at 
maximum probability of unionization 
57.21*** 57.22*** 56.87*** 57.81*** 47.45*** 
(3.599) (3.511) (4.099) (3.595) (3.948) 
Notes: The table reports estimates from the logistic regression equilvalent to equation (8) in the text. The unit of observation is 
a county-by-industry cell. The reported coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the independent variable. 
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county level. See Section 1.3 of the text for details on the 
dependent and independent variables. County-by-industry controls include: average profit to revenue ratio and its square, 
average profit to cost ratio and its square, average capital per establishment and its square, and the total number of workers in 
county by industry cell. 
* p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
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Table A2: Strikes and average establishment size (logistic regressions) 
     
 
Pr(strike in county-industry cell = 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    Average workers per establishment 0.361*** 0.353*** 0.300*** 0.253*** 
 (0.0853) (0.0810) (0.0700) (0.0775) 
     
Average workers per establishment sqaure -0.00336*** -0.00327*** -0.00287*** -0.00310*** 
(0.000912) (0.000878) (0.000773) (0.000757) 
     
Percent urban 0.425*** 0.404*** 0.305*** 0.303*** 
 (0.0475) (0.0427) (0.0320) (0.0316) 
     
Average wage per worker  0.641*** 0.408*** 0.347*** 
  (0.152) (0.125) (0.132) 
     
Average wage per worker square  -0.000478*** -0.000271*** -0.000221** 
  (0.000133) (0.000103) (0.000112) 
     
Percent black   0.744 0.793* 
   (0.499) (0.456) 
     
Percent black sqaure   -2.360 -2.140* 
   (1.498) (1.208) 
     
Ethnic fractionalization   0.262 0.248 
   (0.249) (0.237) 
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Table A2 (continued) 
     
Ethnic fractionalization sqaure   0.0478 0.00319 
   (0.252) (0.235) 
     
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County-by-industry controls No No No Yes 
     
Observations 2907 2907 2907 2907 
Counties 508 508 508 508 
     
Workers per establishment at maximum 
probability of striking 
53.65*** 53.94*** 52.25*** 40.80*** 
(5.055) (5.077) (5.010) (6.628) 
Notes: The table reports estimates from the logistic regression equilvalents to equation (8) in the text. The unit of 
observation is a county-by-industry cell. The reported coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the mean of 
the independent variable. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county level. See Section 
1.3 of the text for details on the dependent and independent variables. County-by-industry controls include: 
average profit to revenue ratio and its square, average profit to cost ratio and its square, average capital per 
establishment and its square, and the total number of workers in county by industry cell. 
* p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
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1.8 APPENDIX B: DATA SOURCES AND ASSIGNMENTS 
 
 
As described in Section 1.3.a. one of my dependent variables is an indicator for whether the 
workers in a county-by-industry cell had chartered a local branch of a national labor union by 
1892 or 1902. To generate this variable I collected data on local branch locations for ten of the 
largest labor unions in late nineteenth and early twentieth century America. In 1892 I have 
branch locations for six national labor unions: (1) Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel 
Workers (AA), (2) the Cigar Maker’s International Union (CMIU), (3) the Iron Molders’ Union 
of North America (IMU), (4) the International Typographical Union (ITU), (5) the National 
Union of United Brewery Workmen, and (6) the United Garment Workers of America (UGWA). 
In 1902 I have branch locations for the six previously mentioned national labor unions along 
with four additional national labor unions: (7) the Granite Cutters’ National Union of the United 
States, (8) the International Association of Machinists (IAM), (9) the United Brotherhood of 
Leather Workers on Horse Goods, and (10) the United Mine Workers (UMW). These data were 
collected from union periodicals, which are described in detail below. 
 
A. The Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers (AA) 
 
Data on local branch location and membership for the AA for 1892 comes from the Journal of 
the Seventhteenth Annual Convention of the National Lodge of the Amalgamated Association of 
Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in June 1892. Data on local branch 
location for the AA in 1902 comes from the Journal of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention 
of the National Lodge of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers held in 
Wheeling, West Virginia from April 15 to May 2, 1902. The data on local branch location are 
located in the appendix of this journal, in the section entitled “Names and Addresses of 
Corresponding Representatives of Subordinate Lodges” (pg. 4168-4183 in 1892; pg. 6487-6496 
in 1902). This section provides the name of the local branch, the branch number, and the name 
and street address of the secretary of each local branch. I record the city from the address of the 
secretary of each local branch. The data on membership in 1892 are, also, located in the 
appendix of this journal, in the section entitled “Abstract from the Quarterly Reports of 
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Subordinate Lodges”. This section provides the name of the local branch, the branch number, the 
number of taxable members as of April 30, 1892 and average membership during the year. I 
record the average membership of each local branch during the year.  
 
B. The National Union of United Brewery Workmen (Brewery Workmen) 
 
Data on local branch location and membership for the Brewery Workmen for 1894 comes from 
the Protokoll der Achten Jahres-Convetion des National Verbandes der Vereinigten Brauerei 
Arbeiter held in Cleveland, Ohio from September 16-22, 1894. The data are located on page 56, 
in the section entitled “Mitgliederzahl der einzelnen Local-Unions”. This section provides the 
city of the local branch, the branch number, and the membership of each local branch. I record 
the city that each local branch is located in and the branch membership. 
Data on the local branch location for the Brewery Workmen in 1902 comes from the 
Protokoll der Dreizehnten Convention des National Verbandes der Vereinigten Brauerei 
Arbeiter held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania from September 8-20, 1901. The data are located on 
pages 109-119, in the section entitled “Adressen der Sekretäre der Local-Unions”. This section 
provides the city of the local branch, the branch number, and the name and street address of the 
secretary of each local branch. I record the city that each local branch is located in. 
 
C. The Cigar Makers International Union (CMIU) 
 
Data on the local branch location for the CMIU for 1892 comes from the Cigar Maker’s Official 
Journal, December 1892. Data on the local branch location for the CMIU in 1902 comes from 
the Cigar Maker’s Official Journal, December 1902 (Volume 28, No. 3). The data in 1892 are 
located in the section entitled “List of Corresponding and Financial Secretaries”. The data in 
1902 are located on pages 15-16, in the section entitled “List of Secretaries”. These sections 
provide the branch number and the name and street address of the secretary of each local branch. 
I record the city from the address of the secretary of each local branch. 
 Data on local branch membership for the CMIU in 1892 comes from the “Annual 
Financial Report of Cigar Makers’ International Union of America For the Year 1892” published 
in the Cigar Maker’s Official Journal, April 1893. This report provides the city of the local 
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branch, the branch number, the membership of each local branch, as well as a significant amount 
of information on the finances of each local branch. I record the membership of each local 
branch. 
 
D. The Granite Cutters International Association of America (Granite Cutters) 
 
Data on the local branch location for the Granite Cutters for 1902 comes from the Granite 
Cutters Journal, February 1902-January 1903. The data each month are located in the section 
entitled  “National Union Income”. Each month this section provides the locations of local 
branches that the national union received income from, as well as the amount of income 
received. For every month I record the cities that the national union reports receiving income 
from. Thus, my data for the Granite Cutters represent the location of all local branches that paid 
money to the national union during the year 1902. 
 
E. The International Association of Machinists (IAM) 
 
Data on the local branch location for the IAM for 1902 comes from the Monthly Journal of the 
International Association of Machinists (Machinists’ Monthly Journal), December 1902 (Vol. 
14, No. 12). The data are located in the section entitled “Roster of Lodges.” This section 
provides the name of the local branch, the branch number, and the name and street address of the 
secretary of each local branch. For some branches the name and street address of other branch 
officers as well as meeting times and locations are provided. I record the city from the address of 
the secretary of each local branch. 
 
F. The Iron Molders Union of North America (Iron Molders) 
 
Data on the local branch location for the Iron Molders in 1895 comes from the Iron Molders’ 
Journal, January 1896 (Vol. 32, No.1). Data on the local branch location for the Iron Molders in 
1902 comes from the Iron Molders’ Journal, December 1902 (Vol. 38, No. 12). The data are 
located in the section of this journal entitled “Local Unions. Reports for the Month.” This section 
provides the city of the local branch, the branch number, the type of work performed by each 
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local branch (e.g. machinery and jobbing, stove-plate, heater worker, brass molding, etc.), 
meeting times and locations, the name and street address of the secretary of each local branch, 
the name of new members, the names of members who died, and the overall state of trade (e.g. 
good, fair, poor, etc.). I record the city that each local branch was located in. 
 
G. The International Typographical Union of North America (ITU) 
 
Data on local branch location for the ITU in 1892 comes from The Typographical Journal, 
December 1892 (Vol. 4, No. 12). Data on local branch location for the ITU in 1902 comes from 
The Typographical Journal, December 1902 (Vol. 21, No. 12). The data are located in the 
section entitled “Subordinate Unions.” This section provides the name of the local branch, the 
branch number, and the name and street address of the secretary of each local branch. For some 
branches the name and street address of other branch officers (president, vice president, etc.) are 
provided. I record the city from the address of the secretary of each local branch. 
For the ITU I also address an issue regarding the number of establishments recorded in 
the Report on the Manufactures. The “Printing and Publishing” category in the Report on the 
Manufactures only reports the number of printing establishments that are not involved in the 
printing and publishing of newspapers. This is problematic for measuring average establishment 
size because newspaper printers made up a large membership bloc in the ITU. For example, 
Barnett (1909) reports that the “book and job printers complain that the newspaper printers 
control the unions in the larger cities” (Barnett, 1909, pg. 474-475). To deal with this problem, I 
add the number of daily and weekly newspapers in each county, reported in Appendix B of the 
The Newspaper and Periodical Press (1884), to the number of printing establishments reported 
in the Report on the Manufactures. I do not record the number of daily and weekly newspapers 
for counties that do not contain non-newspaper printing establishments. 
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H. United Brotherhood of Leather Workers on Horse Goods (Leather Workers) 
 
Data on local branch locations for the Leather Workers for 1902 comes from The Leather 
Workers Journal, December 1902 (Volume 5, No. 12). The data are located in the section 
entitled “Roster of Local Secretaries.” This section provides the branch number as well as the 
name and street address of the secretary of each local branch. I record the city from the address 
of the secretary of each local branch. 
 
I. United Garment Workers of America (UGWA) 
 
Data on the local branch locations for the UGWA for 1893 come from The Garment Worker, 
April 1893 (Vol. 1, No. 1). The data are located in the section entitled “Directory of Local 
Unions.” This section provides the city of the local branch, the branch number, the type of work 
performed by each local branch (e.g. pants makers, overall workers, clothing cutters, tailors, etc.) 
as well as the name and street address of the secretary of each local branch. I record the city that 
each local branch was located in.  
Data on the local branch locations for the UGWA for 1902 come from The Weekly 
Bulletin of the Clothing Trades, December 1902 (Vol. 2, No. 9). The data are located in the 
section entitled “List of Local Unions.” This section provides the city of the local branch, the 
branch number, the type of work performed by each local branch (e.g. pants makers, overall 
workers, clothing cutters, tailors, etc.) as well as the name and street address of the secretary of 
each local branch. I record the city that each local branch was located in. 
 
J. United Mine Workers of America (UMW) 
 
Data on the local branch locations for the UMW for 1902 come from Minutes of the Fourteenth 
Annual Convention of the United Mine Workers of America held in Indianapolis, Indiana from 
January 19-27, 1903. The data are located in the section entitled “Amount Received From Each 
Local Union For Per Capita Tax And Assessment For The Year 1902.” This section provides the 
city of the local branch, the branch number, the amount of tax paid, and the amount of 
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assessment received from each local branch. I record the city that each local branch was located 
in. 
 
K. Assignment of Unions and Strikes to Industries and Occupations 
 
In order to perform the empirical analysis the dependent variables must be matched to the 
independent variables, which are measured at the county-by-industry level. When the dependent 
variable is unionization I first assign the variable to the relevant industry in the Report on the 
Manufactures. This provides me with a measure of the number of establishments in each county-
by-industry cell. I also assign the unionization variable to certain occupations in the 1880 
complete count census. This provides me with a measure of the number of eligible union workers 
in each county-by-industry cell. These matches are displayed below in Appendix B Table A3. To 
construct my independent variable of interest (average workers per establishment in a county-by-
industry cell) I divide the number of workers from the 1880 census by the number of 
establishments from the Report on the Manufactures. 
When the dependent variable is strikes I assign each industry in the Report on the 
Manufactures to one of 15 categorical industry variables recorded in the strikes data. These 
matches are displayed below in Appendix B Table A4. To construct my independent variable of 
interest (average workers per establishment in a county-by-industry cell) I divide the number of 
workers by the number of establishments as recorded in the Report on the Manufactures. 
Additionally, I assign each of the 15 industry categories in the strikes data to an occupational 
category in the 1880 population census. These assignments are displayed in Appendix B Table 
A5.  
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Table A3: Labor unions, corresponding industries, and corresponding occupations 
     
   
  
Union Name   
Industry (Report on the 
Manufactures) 
  Occupations (1880 census) 
     The Amalgamated 
Association of Iron, Steel, 
and Tin Workers (AA) 
Iron and steel Iron and steel works and shops operatives; 
steam boiler makers; not molders, metal 
     The National Union of United 
Brewery Workmen (Brewery 
Workmen) 
Liquors, malt Brewers and malsters; only German 
     The Cigar Makers 
International Union (CMIU) 
Tobacco, cigars and cigarettes Cigar makers; tobacco factory operatives 
     The Granite Cutters 
International Association of 
America (Granite Cutters) 
Marble and stone work Marble and stone cutters 
  
   The International Association 
of Machinists (IAM) 
 Foundery and machine-shop 
products 
Machinist 
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Table A3 (continued) 
The Iron Molders Union of 
North America (Iron 
Molders) 
 Foundery and machine-shop 
products 
 Molders, metal; agricultural implement 
makers; brass founders and workers; stove, 
furnace, and grate makers 
  
   The International 
Typographical Union of 
North America (ITU) 
 Printing and publishing Printers, lithographers, and stereotypers 
     United Brotherhood of 
Leather Workers on Horse 
Goods (Leather Workers) 
Saddlery and harness Harness and saddle makers 
     United Textile Workers of 
America (UTW) 
Clothing, men's Shirt, cuff, and collar makers; tailors and 
tailoresses 
     United Mine Workers of 
America (UMW) 
Anthracite and bituminous 
coal 
Miners 
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Table A4: Industries for strikes and corresponding industries in the Report on the Manufactures 
   
Industry (Strikes data) 
 
Industry (Report of Manufactures) 
   
building trades and transportation equip  bridges 
building trades and transportation equip  cars, street, railroad and repairs 
building trades and transportation equip  shipbuilding 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  belting and hose, leather 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  boot and shoe cut stock 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  boot and shoe findings 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  boot and shoe uppers 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  boots and shoes 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  clothing, men's 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  clothing, women's 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  corsets 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  cotton goods 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  dyeing and finishing textiles 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  gloves and mittens 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  hosiery and knit goods 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  leather goods 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  leather, curried 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  leather, distilled 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  leather, dressed skins 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  leather, patent and enameled 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  leather, tanned 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  linen goods 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  millinery and lace goods 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  mixed textiles 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  saddlery and harness 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  shirts 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  silk and silk goods 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  whips 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  woolen goods 
clothing, textiles, shoes, and leather  worsted goods 
cooperage and wooden goods  boxes, cigar 
cooperage and wooden goods  boxes, wooden, packing 
cooperage and wooden goods  brooms and brushes 
cooperage and wooden goods  carriages and wagons 
cooperage and wooden goods  coffins, burial cases and undertakers' goods 
cooperage and wooden goods  cooperage 
cooperage and wooden goods  furniture 
cooperage and wooden goods  furniture, chairs 
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Table A4 (continued) 
cooperage and wooden goods  handles, wooden 
cooperage and wooden goods  sash, doors and blinds 
cooperage and wooden goods  wood, turned and carved 
cooperage and wooden goods  wooden ware 
food preparation and brewing  baking and yeast powders 
food preparation and brewing  bread and other bakery products 
food preparation and brewing  cake 
food preparation and brewing  cheese and butter 
food preparation and brewing  chocolate 
food preparation and brewing  flouring- and grist-mill products 
food preparation and brewing  food preparations 
food preparation and brewing  fruits and vegetables, canned and preserved 
food preparation and brewing  liquors, malt 
food preparation and brewing  slaughtering and meat-packing, not including retail 
butchering establishments 
glass and pottery  brick and tile 
glass and pottery  glass 
glass and pottery  glass, cut, stained and ornamented 
glass and pottery  looking-glass and picture frames 
glass and pottery  mirrors 
glass and pottery  stone and earthen-ware 
glass and pottery  terra-cotta ware 
machines and machinery  foundery and machine-shop products 
machines and machinery  steam fittings and heating apparatus 
metals and metallic goods  brass and copper, rolled 
metals and metallic goods  brass castings 
metals and metallic goods  brass ware 
metals and metallic goods  bronze castings 
metals and metallic goods  coppersmithing 
metals and metallic goods  crucibles 
metals and metallic goods  cutlery and edge tools 
metals and metallic goods  iron and pipe, wrought 
metals and metallic goods  iron and steel 
metals and metallic goods  iron bolts, nuts, washers and rivets 
metals and metallic goods  iron doors and shutters 
metals and metallic goods  iron doors and shutters, wrought 
metals and metallic goods  iron forgings 
metals and metallic goods  iron nails and spikes, cut and wrought 
metals and metallic goods  iron pipe, wrought 
metals and metallic goods  iron railing, wrought 
metals and metallic goods  plated and britannia ware 
metals and metallic goods  silversmithing 
metals and metallic goods  springs, steel, car and carriage 
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metals and metallic goods  springs, steel, car and sheet-iron ware 
metals and metallic goods  tinware, copperware and sheet-iron ware 
mining  anthracite coal 
mining  bituminous coal 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  belting and hose, rubber 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  boots and shoes, rubber 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  carpets, other than rag 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  carpets, rag 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  clock cases and materials 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  clocks 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  jewelry 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  lapidary work 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  rubber and elastic goods 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  rubber, vulcanized 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  watch cases 
misc: carpet, domestic, rope, rubber, and watches  watches 
miscellaneous  agricultural implements 
miscellaneous  ammunition 
miscellaneous  artificial feathers and flowers 
miscellaneous  awnings and tents 
miscellaneous  axle-grease 
miscellaneous  babbilt metal and solder 
miscellaneous  bagging, flax, hemp and jute 
miscellaneous  bags, other than paper 
miscellaneous  bags, paper 
miscellaneous  baskets, rattan and willow ware 
miscellaneous  bellows 
miscellaneous  bells 
miscellaneous  belting and hose, linen 
miscellaneous  billiard tables and materials 
miscellaneous  blacking 
miscellaneous  bluing 
miscellaneous  bone-ivory and lamp-black 
miscellaneous  boxes, fancy and paper 
miscellaneous  buttons 
miscellaneous  cardboard 
miscellaneous  carpets, wood 
miscellaneous  carriages and sleds, children's 
miscellaneous  carriages and wagon materials 
miscellaneous  celluloid and celluloid goods 
miscellaneous  cement 
miscellaneous  charcoal 
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miscellaneous  cigar molds 
miscellaneous  cleansing and polishing preparations 
miscellaneous  coal-tar 
miscellaneous  coffee and spices, roasted and ground 
miscellaneous  coke 
miscellaneous  collars and cuffs, paper 
miscellaneous  combs 
miscellaneous  confectionery 
miscellaneous  cordage and twine 
miscellaneous  cork cutting 
miscellaneous  cotton compressing 
miscellaneous  cotton ties 
miscellaneous  dentists' materials 
miscellaneous  drain and sewer pipe 
miscellaneous  drugs and chemicals 
miscellaneous  dyestuffs and extracts 
miscellaneous  electric lights 
miscellaneous  electrical apparatus and supplies 
miscellaneous  emery wheels 
miscellaneous  enameled goods 
miscellaneous  enamelting 
miscellaneous  engraving and die-sinking 
miscellaneous  engraving, steel 
miscellaneous  engraving, wood 
miscellaneous  envelopes 
miscellaneous  explosives and fireworks 
miscellaneous  fancy articles 
miscellaneous  felt goods 
miscellaneous  fertilizers 
miscellaneous  files 
miscellaneous  fire extinguishers, chemical 
miscellaneous  fire-arms 
miscellaneous  flavoring extracts 
miscellaneous  flax, dressed 
miscellaneous  foundery supplies 
miscellaneous  fruit-jar trimmings 
miscellaneous  fuel, artificial 
miscellaneous  furnishing goods, men's 
miscellaneous  furs, dressed 
miscellaneous  galvanizing 
miscellaneous  gas and lamp fixtures 
miscellaneous  gas machines and meters 
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miscellaneous  glucose 
miscellaneous  glue 
miscellaneous  gold and silver leaf and foil 
miscellaneous  gold and silver, reduced and refined 
miscellaneous  graphite 
miscellaneous  grease and tallow 
miscellaneous  grindstones 
miscellaneous  gunpowder 
miscellaneous  hairwork 
miscellaneous  hammocks 
miscellaneous  hand-knit goods 
miscellaneous  hand-stamps 
miscellaneous  hardware 
miscellaneous  hardware, saddlery 
miscellaneous  hat and cap materials 
miscellaneous  hats and caps, not including wool hats 
miscellaneous  high explosives 
miscellaneous  hones and whetstones 
miscellaneous  hooks and eyes 
miscellaneous  housefurnishing goods 
miscellaneous  ice, artificial 
miscellaneous  ink 
miscellaneous  instruments, professional and scientific 
miscellaneous  iron work, architectural and ornamental 
miscellaneous  ivory and bone work 
miscellaneous  japanning 
miscellaneous  jute and jute goods 
miscellaneous  kaolin and ground earths 
miscellaneous  labels and tags 
miscellaneous  lamps and reflectors 
miscellaneous  lard, refined 
miscellaneous  lasts 
miscellaneous  lead, bar, pipe, sheet and shot 
miscellaneous  leather board 
miscellaneous  lightning rods 
miscellaneous  lime 
miscellaneous  lime and cement 
miscellaneous  liquors, distilled 
miscellaneous  liquors, vinous 
miscellaneous  lumber, planed 
miscellaneous  lumber, sawed 
miscellaneous  malt 
miscellaneous  mantels, slate, marble and marbleized 
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miscellaneous  matches 
miscellaneous  mats and matting 
miscellaneous  mattresses and spring beds 
miscellaneous  millstones 
miscellaneous  mineral and soda waters 
miscellaneous  models and patterns 
miscellaneous  musical instruments and materials 
miscellaneous  musical instruments and materials, not specified 
miscellaneous  musical instruments, organs and materials 
miscellaneous  musical instruments, pianos and materials 
miscellaneous  needles and pins 
miscellaneous  nets and seines 
miscellaneous  oil, castor 
miscellaneous  oil, cottonseed and cake 
miscellaneous  oil, essential 
miscellaneous  oil, illuminating 
miscellaneous  oil, illuminating, not including petroleum refining 
miscellaneous  oil, lard 
miscellaneous  oil, linseed 
miscellaneous  oil, lubricating 
miscellaneous  oil, neat's-foot 
miscellaneous  oil, resin 
miscellaneous  oilcloth, enameled 
miscellaneous  oilcloth, floor 
miscellaneous  oleomargarine 
miscellaneous  paints 
miscellaneous  paper 
miscellaneous  paper patterns 
miscellaneous  paperhangings 
miscellaneous  patent medicines and compounds 
miscellaneous  paving materials 
miscellaneous  pencils, lead 
miscellaneous  pens, gold 
miscellaneous  pens, steel 
miscellaneous  perfumery and cosmetics 
miscellaneous  photographic apparatus 
miscellaneous  photographing materials 
miscellaneous  pickles, preserves and sauces 
miscellaneous  pipes, tobacco 
miscellaneous  plastering 
miscellaneous  pocket-books 
miscellaneous  postal cards 
miscellaneous  printing materials 
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miscellaneous  pumps, not including steam pumps 
miscellaneous  refrigerators 
miscellaneous  regalia and society banners and emblems 
miscellaneous  rice cleaning and polishing 
miscellaneous  roofing and roofing materials 
miscellaneous  rules, ivory and wood 
miscellaneous  safes, doors and vaults, fire-proof 
miscellaneous  salt 
miscellaneous  salt, ground 
miscellaneous  sand and emery paper and cloth 
miscellaneous  saws 
miscellaneous  scales and balances 
miscellaneous  screws 
miscellaneous  sewing machines and attachments 
miscellaneous  sewing-machine cases 
miscellaneous  shoddy 
miscellaneous  show-cases 
miscellaneous  silverware 
miscellaneous  smelting and refining 
miscellaneous  soap and candles 
miscellaneous  soda-water apparatus 
miscellaneous  spectacles and eyeglasses 
miscellaneous  sporting goods 
miscellaneous  stamped ware 
miscellaneous  starch 
miscellaneous  stationery goods 
miscellaneous  stencils and brands 
miscellaneous  straw goods 
miscellaneous  sugar and molasses, beet 
miscellaneous  sugar and molasses, refined 
miscellaneous  surgical appliances 
miscellaneous  tar and turpentine, not including farm products 
miscellaneous  taxidermy 
miscellaneous  thread, linen 
miscellaneous  tobacco stemming 
miscellaneous  tobacco, chewing, smoking and snuff 
miscellaneous  tools 
miscellaneous  toys and games 
miscellaneous  trunks and valises 
miscellaneous  umbrellas and canes 
miscellaneous  upholstering 
miscellaneous  upholstering materials 
miscellaneous  varnish 
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miscellaneous  vault lights and ventilators 
miscellaneous  veneering 
miscellaneous  vinegar 
miscellaneous  washing-machines and clothes-wringers 
miscellaneous  watch and clock materials 
miscellaneous  whalebone and rattan 
miscellaneous  wheelbarrows 
miscellaneous  windmills 
miscellaneous  window blinds and shades 
miscellaneous  wire 
miscellaneous  wirework 
miscellaneous  wood preserving 
miscellaneous  wood pulp 
miscellaneous  wool hats 
miscellaneous  zinc 
printing, publishing, and telegraph  bookbinding and blank-book making 
printing, publishing, and telegraph  electrotyping 
printing, publishing, and telegraph  lithographing 
printing, publishing, and telegraph  printing and publishing 
printing, publishing, and telegraph  stereotyping and electrotyping 
printing, publishing, and telegraph  telegraph and telephone apparatus 
printing, publishing, and telegraph  type founding 
stone quarries  marble and stone work 
tobacco  tobacco, cigars and cigarettes 
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Industry (Strikes data) 
 
Occupations (1880 census) 
   
building trades and trans. equip  Boat makers 
building trades and trans. equip  Bridge builders and contractors 
building trades and trans. equip  Builders and contractors (not specified) 
building trades and trans. equip  Car makers 
building trades and trans. equip  Carpenters and joiners 
building trades and trans. equip  Carriage and wagon makers 
building trades and trans. equip  Masons (brick and stone) 
building trades and trans. equip  Painters and varnishers 
building trades and trans. equip  Plasterers 
building trades and trans. equip  Plumbers and gasfitters 
building trades and trans. equip  Railroad builders and contractors 
building trades and trans. equip  Roofers and slaters 
building trades and trans. equip  Ship carpenters, caulkers, riggers, and smiths 
building trades and trans. equip  Whitewashers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Boot and shoemakers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Button-factory operatives 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Corset makers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Cotton-mill operatives 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Flax dressers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Fur workers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Galloon, gimp, and tassel makers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Glove makers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Harness and saddle makers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Hat and cap makers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Hosiery and knitting mill operatives 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Lace makers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Leather case and pocket-book makers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Leather curriers, dressers, finishers, and tanners 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Milliners, dressmakers, and seamstresses 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Shirt, cuff, and collar makers 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Silk mill operatives 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Tailors and tailoresses 
clothing textiles shoes leather  Woolen mill operatives 
cooperage and wooden goods  Basket makers 
cooperage and wooden goods  Blind, door and sash makers 
cooperage and wooden goods  Box factory operatives 
cooperage and wooden goods  Broom and brush makers 
cooperage and wooden goods  Cabinet makers 
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cooperage and wooden goods  Coopers 
cooperage and wooden goods  Copper workers 
cooperage and wooden goods  Lumbermen and raftsmen 
cooperage and wooden goods  Pianoforte makers and tuners 
cooperage and wooden goods  Saw and planing mill operatives 
cooperage and wooden goods  Sawyers 
cooperage and wooden goods  Trunk, valise, and carpet-bag makers 
cooperage and wooden goods  Upholsterers 
cooperage and wooden goods  Wheelwrights 
cooperage and wooden goods  Wood choppers 
cooperage and wooden goods  Wood turners, carvers, and woodenware makers 
food prep and brewing  Bakers 
food prep and brewing  Brewers and maltsters 
food prep and brewing  Butchers 
food prep and brewing  Cheese makers 
food prep and brewing  Confectioners 
food prep and brewing  Dairymen and dairywomen 
food prep and brewing  Distillers and rectifiers 
food prep and brewing  Meat and fruit preserving establishment employees 
food prep and brewing  Meat packers, curers, and picklers 
food prep and brewing  Millers 
food prep and brewing  Sugar makers and refiners 
glass and pottery  Brick and tile makers 
glass and pottery  Britannia and japanned ware makers 
glass and pottery  Glass-works operatives 
glass and pottery  Mirror and picture frame makers 
glass and pottery  Potters 
glass and pottery  Quartz and stamp-mill operatives 
machines and machinery  Machinists 
machines and machinery  Sewing machine factory operatives 
machines and machinery  Sewing machine operators 
machines and machinery  Shingle and lath makers 
metals and metallic goods  Blacksmiths 
metals and metallic goods  Brass founders and workers 
metals and metallic goods  File makers, cutters, and grinders 
metals and metallic goods  Gilders 
metals and metallic goods  Gun- and lock-smiths 
metals and metallic goods  Iron and steel works and shops operatives 
metals and metallic goods  Lead and zinc works operatives 
metals and metallic goods  Nail makers 
metals and metallic goods  Organ makers 
metals and metallic goods  Screw makers 
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metals and metallic goods  Steam boiler makers 
metals and metallic goods  Stove, furnace, and grate makers 
metals and metallic goods  Tinners and tinware makers 
metals and metallic goods  Tool and cutlery makers 
metals and metallic goods  Wire makers and workers 
mining  Miners 
misc  Actors 
misc  Agents (not specified) 
misc  Agricultural implement makers 
misc  Agricultural laborers 
misc  Apiarists 
misc  Architects 
misc  Artificial-flower makers 
misc  Artists and teachers of art 
misc  Auctioneers 
misc  Authors, lecturers, and literary persons 
misc  Bag makers 
misc  Bankers and brokers 
misc  Barbers and hairdressers 
misc  Billiard- and bowling saloon keepers and employees 
misc  Bleachers, dyers and scourers 
misc  Boarding- and lodging-house keepers 
misc  Bone and ivory workers 
misc  Bookkeepers and accountants in stores 
misc  Bottlers and mineral-water makers 
misc  Brokers (commercial) 
misc  Candle, soap, and tallow makers 
misc  Charcoal and lime burners 
misc  Chemists, assayers, and metallurgists 
misc  Clergy 
misc  Clerks and bookkeepers in banks 
misc  Clerks and bookkeepers in companies 
misc  Clerks and bookkeepers in manufacturing estabs. 
misc  Clerks and bookkeepers in offices 
misc  Clerks and copyists 
misc  Clerks in government offices 
misc  Clerks in hotels and restaurants 
misc  Clerks in stores 
misc  Collectors and claim agents 
misc  Commercial travelers 
misc  Dentists 
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misc  Designers, draughtsmen, and inventors 
misc  Domestic servants 
misc  Employees in manufacturing estabs. (not specified) 
misc  Employees in warehouses 
misc  Employees of banks (not clerks) 
misc  Employees of charitable institutions 
misc  Employees of government (not clerks) 
misc  Employees of hotels and restaurants (not clerks) 
misc  Employees of insurance companies (clerks) 
misc  Engineers (civil) 
misc  Farm and plantation overseers 
misc  Farmers and planters 
misc  Fertilizer establishment operatives 
misc  Fishermen and oystermen 
misc  Florists 
misc  Gardeners, nurserymen, and vine-growers 
misc  Gas-works employees 
misc  Hair cleaners, dressers, and workers 
misc  Hostlers 
misc  Hotel keepers 
misc  Hucksters and peddlers 
misc  Hunters, trappers, guides, and scouts 
misc  Janitors 
misc  Journalists 
misc  Keeping house 
misc  Keeping house, logical change 
misc  Laborers (not specified) 
misc  Launderers and laundresses 
misc  Lawyers 
misc  Livery-stable keepers 
misc  Manufacturers 
misc  Mechanics (not specified) 
misc  Messengers 
misc  Midwives 
misc  Milkmen and milkwomen 
misc  Mill and factory operatives (not specified) 
misc  Musicians (professional) and teachers music 
misc  Newspaper criers and carriers 
misc  Nurses 
misc  Oil mill and refinery operatives 
misc  Oil well operatives and laborers 
misc  Others in agriculture 
 73 
Table A5 (continued) 
misc  Others in manufacturing, mechanical, and mining 
industries 
misc  Others in professional and services 
misc  Packers 
misc  Paper mill operatives 
misc  Paperhangers 
misc  Pattern makers 
misc  Photographers 
misc  Physicians and surgeons 
misc  Porters and laborers in stores warehouses 
misc  Pump makers 
misc  Rag pickers 
misc  Restaurant keepers 
misc  Sail and awning makers 
misc  Salesmen and saleswomen 
misc  Saloon keepers and bartenders 
misc  Salt makers 
misc  Scale and rule makers 
misc  Sexton 
misc  Showmen and employees of shows 
misc  Starch makers 
misc  Stave, shook, and heading makers 
misc  Stewards and stewardesses 
misc  Stock-drovers 
misc  Stock-herders 
misc  Stock-raisers 
misc  Straw workers 
misc  Teachers and scientific persons 
misc  Thread makers 
misc  Toll-gate and bridge keepers 
misc  Turpentine farmers and laborers 
misc  Umbrella and parasol makers 
misc  Undertakers 
misc  Veterinary surgeons 
misc  Watchmen (private) and detectives 
misc  Weighers, gaugers, and measurers 
misc: carpet domestic rope rubber watche  Carpet makers 
misc: carpet domestic rope rubber watche  Chemical-works employees 
misc: carpet domestic rope rubber watche  Clock and watchmakers and repairers 
misc: carpet domestic rope rubber watche  Gold and silver workers and jewelers 
misc: carpet domestic rope rubber watche  Rope and cordage makers 
misc: carpet domestic rope rubber watche  Rubber factory operatives 
printing publishing telegraph  Bookbinders and finishers 
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printing publishing telegraph  Engravers 
printing publishing telegraph  Officials and employees of telegraph companies 
printing publishing telegraph  Print-works operatives 
printing publishing telegraph  Printers, lithographers, and stereotypers 
printing publishing telegraph  Publishers of books, maps, and newspapers 
stone quarries  Marble and stone cutters 
stone quarries  Quarrymen 
tobacco  Cigar makers 
tobacco  Tobacco factory operatives 
transportation industries  Boatmen and watermen 
transportation industries  Canalmen 
transportation industries  Clerks and bookkeepers in railroad offices 
transportation industries  Draymen, hackmen, teamsters, etc. 
transportation industries  Employees of railroad companies 
transportation industries  Engineers and firemen 
transportation industries  Officials of railroad companies 
transportation industries  Others in trade and transportation 
transportation industries  Pilots 
transportation industries  Sailors 
transportation industries  Shippers and freighters 
transportation industries  Steamboat men and women 
not asssigned  Apprentices to trades 
not asssigned  At home 
not asssigned  Blank 
not asssigned  Engaged in slave trade 
not asssigned  Enumerated as 'Formerly a slave" or equivalent 
not asssigned  Gentleman 
not asssigned  Institutional inmate 
not asssigned  Mark for allocation 
not asssigned  Officers of the Army and Navy 
not asssigned  Officials and employees of companies (not clerks) 
not asssigned  Officials and employees of street companies 
not asssigned  Officials and employees of telephone companies 
not asssigned  Officials and employees of trade and transportation 
companies (not specified) 
not asssigned  Officials of banks 
not asssigned  Officials of government 
not asssigned  Officials of insurance companies 
not asssigned  Officials of manufacturing and mining companies 
not asssigned  Officials, industry not specified 
not asssigned  Other non-occupational response 
not asssigned  Retired 
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not asssigned  Sick, disabled 
not asssigned  Soldiers, sailors, and Marines (Army Navy) 
not asssigned  Student 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers (not specified) 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in agricultural implements 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in books stationary 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in boots and shoes 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in cabinet ware 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in cigars and tobacco 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in clothing and men's furnishing 
goods 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in coal and wood 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in cotton and wool 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in crockery, china, glass, and 
stoneware 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in drugs and medicines 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in dry foods, fancy foods, and 
notions 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in gold and silverware and 
jewelry 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in groceries 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in hats, caps, and furs 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in ice 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in iron, tin, and copperware 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in junk 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in leather, hides, and skins 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in liquors and wines 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in livestock 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in lumber 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in marble, stone and slate 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in music and musical 
instruments 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in newspapers periodicals 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in oils, paints, and turpentine 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in paper and paper stock 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in produce and provisions 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in real estate 
not asssigned  Traders and dealers in sewing machines 
not asssigned  Without occupation, unemployed 
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2.0 DOES CASH CROPPING ADVERSELY AFFECT NUTRITION? EVIDENCE FROM 
THE RISE AND FALL OF PELLAGRA IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 
 
 
(WITH KAREN CLAY AND WERNER TROESKEN) 
 
Development economists have long believed that cash cropping can adversely affect nutrition. 
To explore this, we exploit the rise and fall of pellagra in the American South during the early 
1900s. Caused by insufficient niacin consumption, pellagra caused more deaths than any other 
nutrition-related disease in American history. Our findings are threefold. First, pellagra resulted 
from Southern agriculture’s heavy emphasis on cotton, which displaced local food production. 
Second, pellagra was eliminated through state-level fortification laws passed during the 1940s 
that broke the correlation between cotton and pellagra. Third, early-life interventions that 
improved nutrition were associated with improved stature and wages. 
 
  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In this chapter, we address an enduring question in economic development: does cash cropping, 
and the commercialization of agriculture more generally, adversely affect nutrition? This 
question has taken on heightened significance in light of three recent developments. First, 
globalization and trade liberalization have left farmers in the developing world today with 
historically-unprecedented levels of access to international markets (Bordo et al. 1999). To the 
extent that this access increases income and expands the choice set, one would expect 
liberalization to improve nutrition. Yet evidence for such improvement is mixed (e.g., Atkin 
2013, Wood et al. 2013). Second, there has been a proliferation of research documenting the 
importance of early-life nutrition for later-life economic outcomes (e.g., Costa 2015, Strauss and 
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Thomas 1998, and Strauss and Thomas 2007). This research suggests that the nutritional impact 
of increased agricultural commercialization and cash cropping could have large and long-lasting 
effects on those exposed to cash crop economies at an early life-stage. Third, a parallel line of 
analysis suggests that NGO and state-sponsored interventions, such as salt iodization (Adhvaryu 
et al. 2015), iron fortification (Niemesh 2015), and hookworm eradication (Bleakley 2007), 
might be used to mitigate whatever nutritional shocks accompany cash cropping and the 
commercialization of agriculture.38 
We revisit the debate over cash crops and nutrition by exploring the rise and fall pellagra 
in the American South. Although largely unheard of in the United States today, no other 
nutrition-related disease in American history has caused as many deaths as pellagra. The by-
product of insufficient niacin consumption, pellagra reached epidemic proportions in the 
American South during the first half of the twentieth century, killing nearly 7,000 Southerners 
annually at its peak in 1928 (Bollet 1992).39 We begin our analysis by exploring a standard, but 
largely untested, explanation for the rise of pellagra in the American South: widespread cotton 
production is thought to have displaced local production of niacin-rich foods and driven poor 
Southern farmers and mill workers to consume milled Midwestern corn, which was relatively 
cheap but also devoid of the niacin necessary to prevent pellagra (Park et al. 2000, Goldberger et 
al. 1920, Rajakumar 2000). Exploiting newly digitized cause of death data at the county-level for 
North Carolina and South Carolina, we find that places with high cotton acreage also had high 
pellagra death rates. Our estimates suggest that if the South did not produce any cotton the 
pellagra death rate would have decreased by 14%. Additionally, if Southern farmers changed 
their land use from cotton production to corn production the pellagra death rate would have 
decreased by about 48%. 
A central concern with these estimates is that they might conflate changes in income with 
changes in food availability: perhaps years of high cotton production were also years of low 
                                                        
38 See, however Banerjee et al. (2016) for a less optimistic assessment. 
39 The Mortality Statistics of the United States report 6,824 deaths from pellagra in the year 1928. Assuming a case 
fatality rate of 3 percent, this suggests there were approximately 230,000 cases of pellagra in the United States in 
1928, which is equivalent to the population of Atlanta at the time. In places where pellagra was endemic, Goldberger 
et al. (1928) estimated that around 20 percent of all households had at least one person sick with the disease, though 
other sources (e.g., Love and Davenport 1920) suggest lower incidence rates. While pellagra was not as pervasive as 
hookworm (which infected around one-third of the Southern population) pellagra is an extreme indicator: one need 
not have developed a full-blown case of pellagra to have been poorly nourished, and according to some observers 
(e.g., Etheridge 1972, Youmans 1964), the high incidence of pellagra is suggestive of broader nutritional deficits.  
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income, and it was the reduction in income, not the reduction in local food production, that drove 
the increase in pellagra. Such concerns are only heightened by the contentious but long-standing 
claim that cotton over-production left farmers much poorer than they otherwise would have been. 
To disentangle these effects we exploit the arrival of the boll weevil in the cotton belt during the 
early 1900s. The boll weevil reduced both income and cotton production, and yet, we find, that 
its arrival was associated with increased food production and reduced pellagra rates. Moreover, 
when cotton production rebounded after the boll weevil receded, pellagra rates returned to their 
pre-boll-weevil levels. 
Having explored cotton’s role in the rise of pellagra, we then turn to an analysis of the 
forces that helped bring an end to the disease in the American South. The raw data reveal two 
sharp drops in the pellagra death rate. The first break occurs during the early 1930s, at the peak 
of the Great Depression and at a nadir in international cotton demand. The second sharp drop in 
the pellagra death rate is permanent and takes place during the late 1930s and 1940s. Because 
this drop happens at around the same time as the passage of state and federal laws encouraging 
and mandating that breads and grains be enriched with niacin, historical observers have long 
hypothesized a causal connection between the laws and the reduction in pellagra, but that 
hypothesis has not been formally tested. Using a panel of state-level data and a standard 
difference-in-differences set up, we exploit the interstate variation in the timing of niacin-
fortification laws to identify their effects on pellagra and other nutrition-related diseases. The 
results suggest fortification laws significantly reduced pellagra related mortality. 
 In the final part of our analysis, we look at the long-term effects of early life exposure to 
high pellagra (low-niacin consumption) environments. Using a difference-in-differences 
estimation strategy, we first study how the arrival of the boll weevil, and the subsequent increase 
in local food production, affected the heights (a now common barometer of early-life health and 
nutrition) of World-War II army recruits and the incomes of individuals exposed to the boll 
weevil during early childhood. The results suggest that the arrival of the boll weevil gave rise to 
wealthier and taller individuals in the long run, despite the short-run reductions in farm income 
likely associated with the abandonment of cotton production. The results are, moreover, most 
pronounced in counties with high cotton acreage per capita and in states with high pre-boll 
weevil pellagra rates. Following Niemesh (2015), we also explore how early-life exposure to 
state-level niacin-fortification laws affected wages in the long-term. We find that fortification 
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increased wages by approximately 3% among Southerners born after a state passed a fortification 
law. As with the heights experiment, the results are larger for states that had higher levels of pre-
fortification pellagra and pre-fortification cotton acres per capita. 
 Taken together, our results contribute to three literatures. First, the observation that 
malnutrition can emerge in poor agricultural societies that rely heavily on cash crops is not 
unique to the American South; development economists and colonial historians offer similar 
arguments for other parts of the world (e.g, National Academy of Sciences 1978, p. 44; and 
Bhatia 1963). More recently, Atkin (2013) develops and tests a model of how tastes for food 
emerge and become persistent, and in the process, identifies a clear channel through which 
increased openness to trade might impair nutrition in poor agricultural economies. Second, the 
American South has long lagged behind the North in economic performance, and only after 
World War II did incomes begin to converge. Standard explanations for these patterns fall into 
one of three categories: institutional, technological, and disease-related. 40  The results here 
suggest a fourth possible mechanism: improved nutrition.  
 Third, there is a large and developing literature exploring how exposure to poor nutrition 
and parasitic diseases early in life adversely affect later life outcomes in terms of income, health, 
and educational attainment (e.g., Bleakley 2007, 2010; Strauss and Thomas 1998, 2007). To 
achieve identification, the current literature often focuses on negative shocks that adversely 
affect both nutrition and income (Lumey et al. 2011). The results here complement and extend 
this literature. Of particular interest is our use of the boll weevil shock, which breaks the usual 
correlation between nutrition and income. Most shocks that reduce nutrition also reduce income, 
and it is difficult to disentangle the two effects as they are mutually reinforcing. The boll weevil, 
however, forced farmers to abandon a profitable crop (cotton) for less profitable crops (local 
food) and yet historical observers believed the arrival of the boll weevil promoted better nutrition 
because of this shift. The data bear out this hypothesis. 
 
 
 
                                                        
40 Institutional explanations consider national labor standards (Wright 1987); Civil Rights legislation (Wright 2013, 
Collins 2003); and the decline of paternalism and other institutions hostile to black economic progress (Alston and 
Ferrie 1993, 1999). Technological explanations focus on air-conditioning (Biddle 2008, 2011), electrification 
(Downs 2014), and the mechanization of agriculture (Alston and Ferrie 1993, 1999). Disease-based explanations 
consider the eradication of hookworm and malaria (Bleakley 2007, 2010; Kitchens 2013). 
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2.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
 
 
Physicians and public health experts have long characterized pellagra by the four D’s: dermatitis, 
diarrhea, dementia, and death. Other symptoms include: sensitivity to sunlight; aggression; 
emotional disturbances; edema; inflammation of the tongue; skin lesions; insomnia; weakness; 
mental confusion; ataxia (loss of coordination) and paralysis in the extremities; and enlarged 
heart. Much like smallpox, which gave rise to a distinctive rash unique to the disease, the 
dermatitis and skin discoloration associated with severe cases of pellagra facilitated a proper 
diagnosis. That said, for less severe cases, where the pathognomonic features of the disease were 
less pronounced pellagra would have been harder to distinguish from other ailments and may 
well have been underreported. These observations have clear implications for our empirical 
analysis. In short, death rates for pellagra are probably well estimated because of the 
distinctiveness of the disease in severe cases, but incidence rates likely understate the prevalence 
of the disease. 
 Today the causes of pellagra are well understood. As noted above, the primary cause of 
the disease is inadequate niacin consumption, and secondary causes include a deficiency in 
tryptophan (which is found in meat, fish, and eggs, and the body converts into niacin) and excess 
leucine (which inhibits niacin metabolism). Historically, however, the causes of pellagra were 
poorly understood. During the early 1900s, Southerners steadfastly rejected any claim that the 
disease might be associated with poverty and poor diets. They saw such claims as an indictment 
of Southern culture and habits, and instead argued that pellagra was spread by flies or spoiled 
corn (Mooney et al. 2014, Siler et al. 1914, 1915). The first person to effectively argue that 
pellagra was a nutritional disease was Joseph Goldberger, who worked for the United States 
Public Health Service in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Through a series of detailed studies of 
diets in orphanages, sanitariums, and mill towns, Goldberger and his colleagues documented a 
tight correlation between diet and pellagra (Goldberger et al. 1915, 1920, 1929). However, it was 
not until 1937 that Conrad Elvehjem showed definitively that pellagra was caused by inadequate 
niacin consumption (Elvehjem et al. 1937). 
 The first reported case of pellagra in the United States occurred in Georgia in 1902 and 
reached broader proliferation around 1906 (Bollet 1992). Historical observers have attributed the 
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emergence of pellagra to changes in the milling of Midwestern corn. Previous milling technology 
had removed less of the germ, retaining some niacin. Newer technology removed the germ more 
completely, leading to a finer cornmeal with a longer shelf life, but much less niacin and other 
micronutrients. Expansion of large-scale milling and movements of goods by railroad meant that 
this corn reached the South in increasing quantities. Bollet (1992, p. 219) notes that “in the 
textile mill towns, surrounded by cotton fields, food was shipped in by railroad, and the cornmeal 
that could be purchased in the company stores was processed in the Midwest, where it had been 
degerminated.” In addition, a survey conducted by the Thompson-McFadden Pellagra 
Commission of residents in six mill towns in South Carolina revealed that almost 60% of 
residents consumed shipped cornmeal on a daily basis and only 10% of residents never 
consumed shipped cornmeal. In contrast, locally produced cornmeal was consumed by only 12% 
of residents on a daily basis, while 80% of residents never consumed locally produced cornmeal. 
The complete results from the survey are shown in Table 5 (Siler et al. 1915). 
 Figure 7 maps the regional variation in pellagra rates and shows that this change in corn 
milling and the subsequent emergence of pellagra hit the South particularly hard. While there 
was some pellagra in the border states and the Southwest, the disease reached its peak in the deep 
South, particularly, Alabama, the Carolinas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Tennessee. 
 Why did the change in corn milling hit the South so hard? Aside from salt pork and 
molasses (neither of which was particularly high in niacin), the Southern diet was based mostly 
on corn. Niacin rich foods, such as fish, lamb, and poultry, were expensive and were not 
regularly consumed by poor Southern households (Hilliard 1969). Table 6 documents the 
Southern proclivity to eat corn. This table is based on The Study of Consumer Purchases in the 
United States, 1935-1936, which collected data on food purchases from a large sample of 
households including Southern households in both urban and rural areas. The table reports 
significant differences in the average amounts of cornmeal, hominy grits, and white bread 
consumed by Southern households compared to non-Southern households. While rural 
households in the South ate less white bread than non-Southerners, they consumed far more 
cornmeal and hominy grits (which are made from corn; column (3)). In particular, Southern rural 
households consumed 4.25 pounds of cornmeal and hominy and 1.13 pounds of white bread per 
week. Non-Southern households consumed 0.09 pounds of cornmeal and hominy and 4.33 
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pounds of white bread per week. These differences are all highly significant. Column (2) shows 
that Southern urban households also relied heavily on cornmeal and hominy grits, although there 
consumption of white bread was similar to non-Southern households. 
 The introduction of degerminated Midwestern corn probably would not have mattered as 
much had Southerners produced more corn for local consumption. Corn that was grown and 
marketed for local consumption would have been consumed relatively quickly and the incentives 
to preserve it through milling and degermination would have been relatively small. Locally 
sourced corn could also be used to make hominy grits. If prepared correctly, hominy grits 
contained more niacin than ordinary corn, cornmeal, or corn bread. Along these lines, while 
corn-based diets are generally correlated with pellagra, many Indian societies with corn-based 
diets have managed to avoid pellagra because of their heavy reliance on hominy grits which 
involved soaking the corn in a lime/alkali solution that catalyzed the grain’s potential niacin and 
tryptophan (Carpenter 1983). (Note that because milled Midwestern corn had already been 
degerminated this process would have little or no beneficial effect in terms of mobilizing the 
niacin.) In addition, Southerners tended to plant and harvest sweet corn, which contained 
relatively high levels of niacin, while the corn varieties grown in the Midwest contained 30 to 50 
percent less niacin than sweet corn (Burkholder et al. 1944; Ayer 1895, p. 12-13). The upshot of 
all this is that as long as Southerners were consuming fresh, locally-grown corn that was not 
milled they would have been consuming more niacin than they did with imported Midwestern 
corn. 
One of the central themes of the extent literature on pellagra is that the disease stemmed 
directly from the South’s cotton monoculture. In his study of South Carolina, Walter Edgar 
(1992) argues that a high debt burden forced many farmers to plant cotton, a cash crop with 
higher expected returns than other crops such as foods for the local market. In 1910, one of every 
five cultivated acres was devoted to cotton; by 1919 one of every two cultivated acres was 
devoted to cotton. Furthermore, despite the population of South Carolina tripling from 1850 to 
1935, the amount of food production remained about the same. As a result, South Carolina “had 
to import $70-$100 million worth of food annually. For poverty-stricken tenant farmers with 
little ready cash, this meant that there was less to eat. The consequent increased dependence on a 
diet of pork, cornbread, and molasses made poor Carolinians more susceptible to disease” (Edgar 
1992, pg. 47).  
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A more general way to state this argument is the following: the production of cotton 
displaced local food production, and prompted poor Southern cotton farmers and laborers to 
import and consume corn from the Midwest, which though cheap, was also degerminated and 
devoid of niacin. If so, one would expect a strong positive correlation with cotton production and 
pellagra. In years when cotton production was high (and crowded-out the harvesting of food for 
local markets) pellagra rates should have risen, while in years of low cotton production (and by 
implication, relatively high rates of local food production) pellagra rates should have fallen. 
Formal econometric evidence, to be presented later, supports this notion, but we begin by 
presenting graphical evidence of the relationship between pellagra and cotton. 
Panel A of Figure 8 (top left) plots two time-series: the pellagra death rate in the 
American South from 1910 to 1950 and cotton-acres harvested from 1880 to 1950. These data 
suggest that pellagra erupted in the American South after two decades of steady growth in the 
amount of Southern farmland dedicated to cotton production. The explosive growth in pellagra 
stops during the late 1910s at around the same time that the cotton economy stagnates with the 
penetration of the boll weevil. Pellagra rebounds during the late 1920s, shortly after the effects of 
the boll weevil begin to recede and the cotton economy recovers. Pellagra plummets again 
during the late 1920s and early 1930s, with the onset of the Great Depression and a sharp decline 
in cotton-acres harvested. It is only after the discovery of niacin in 1937, marked by the dashed-
horizontal line in the graph, and the passage of laws mandating the fortification of grains and 
breads with niacin, that the correlation between cotton production and pellagra seems to break 
down. Panels B, C, and D of Figure 8 plot similar graphs for North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Louisiana. Because North Carolina and South Carolina are the only states that report pellagra 
deaths at the county level during this time period, they will prove particularly important to our 
empirical analysis to follow. 
 Plotting the pellagra death rate directly against annual cotton acres harvested, Figure 9 
highlights the correlation between pellagra and cotton production more clearly. What remains 
unclear, however, is the extent to which one might attribute causality to this relationship. One 
obvious concern is the large number of potentially confounding events during the 1900-1950 
period. In particular, there is a well-developed literature documenting the long-term economic 
significance of the events like the Great Influenza Pandemic (Almond 2006, Clay et al. 2015, and 
Noymer 2010); iron enrichment (Niemesh 2015); the Great Migration (Black et al. 2015); 
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various New Deal programs, particularly those aimed at agriculture (Depew et al. 2013) the 
eradication of malaria and hookworm (Bleakley 2007, 2010); milk fortification; and salt 
iodization (Adhvaryu et al. 2015, Feyrer et al. 2013). Any of these events might confound the 
time series above and/or interact with pellagra in important ways.  
Hence, in the empirical analysis that follows, we take several steps to control for these 
and other potential confounders. We believe that many of the confounders will be differenced 
out with year and state/county fixed effects. We will also control for the malaria death rate.41 
Finally, for interventions like milk fortification, migration, and salt iodization to drive our results 
they would have to work through very specific channels. For instance, for migration to be 
driving our results it must be the case that people sick with pellagra migrate out of an area, but 
other unhealthy individuals (e.g., those sick with typhoid or tuberculosis) do not. Similar stories 
would need to be told for milk fortification and salt iodization, whereby adding vitamin D to 
milk and iodine to salt somehow leads people to consume more niacin. 
 Building on an older literature, one might also argue that the South was over-producing 
cotton, and that as a result, years of high cotton production were also years of low income.42 In 
this case, pellagra would not have been the result of cotton displacing local food production (and 
raising the price of such food). Instead, the disease would have stemmed from the fact that cotton 
production was driving down income and the reduction in income, not the displacement of local 
food, caused families in the cotton South to consume less food. As explained in the introduction, 
and further below, we exploit the arrival of the boll weevil to address this possibility. 
 
 
2.3 A SIMPLE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
 
 
In this section, we sketch out a simple economic framework that can explain how the South’s 
reliance on cotton might have promoted higher pellagra rates in particular, and poor nutrition 
                                                        
41 Hookworm infection rates are not available for many counties in South Carolina (see Thoman 2009) so we do not 
control for the hookworm infection rate in our main analyses since it would dramatically reduce our sample size. 
Results controlling for the hookworm infection rate are available upon request. 
42 See Mcguire and Higgs (1977) and Mcguire (1980) for evidence on the profitability of cotton. 
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more generally construed. One of the central messages of this framework is that cash cropping 
does not necessarily result in poor nutrition; it only does so under certain conditions. 
Consider, then, a largely agricultural economy, where farmers are deciding how to 
allocate their land, labor, and capital: they can either plant, harvest, and sell a cash crop in an 
international market (in this case, cotton); or they can deploy their resources to produce food for 
the local market. In deciding how to allocate resources, farmers look toward expected prices.43 
To the extent expected cotton prices are relatively high, farmers would allocate their land and 
resources to planting and selling cotton and produce little, if any, food for the local market. This 
would decrease the supply of locally produced foods, driving up the relative price. Consumers in 
this economy would then substitute away from local foods and begin importing degerminated 
corn from the Midwest, which as noted above, was niacin deficient. As an empirical matter, we 
cannot observe the expected price of cotton or the price of locally produced foods. However, we 
can observe acres dedicated to cotton and food production, which is perhaps an even better 
indicator of farmers’ beliefs about the expected relative profitability of food and cotton. In 
addition, we will also discuss and exploit situations were expected prices do not drive planting 
decisions, such as the arrival of the boll weevil, which left farmers no choice but to shift away 
from cotton. 
For the process above to have yielded high rates of pellagra, two conditions need to be 
satisfied. First, it must be the case that there are, in fact, nutritional differences between imported 
corn and locally-sourced foods. While we cannot directly test this proposition, there is anecdotal 
evidence to suggest this was the case. In the case of corn, locally-produced corn did not require 
degermination to extend shelf life and so it is thought to have been healthier and richer in niacin. 
There is also evidence (discussed below) that aside from corn, Southern farmers would switch to 
growing sweet potatoes when cotton prices were low or when cotton production was not feasible. 
Sweet potatoes were rich in niacin and other micronutrients. Second, it must the case that the 
price effect dominates any income effect. More precisely, if demand for nutrition grows with 
income and higher cotton prices, it is possible that consumers in the region might begin 
importing relatively expensive niacin-rich foods, rather than degerminated corn. Put another 
                                                        
43 Risk might also enter such considerations but in the case of the American South, cotton not only exhibited higher 
average profitability; it also had lower variance and was a relatively low risk crop. See McGuire and Higgs (1977) 
and McGuire (1980). 
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way, if cash cropping generates sufficiently high wages and income, and nutrition is a normal 
good, cash cropping need not imply poor nutrition.  
 
 
2.4 DATA 
 
 
2.4.a. Dependent variables 
 
To document the relationship between cotton and the rise and fall of pellagra in the American 
South our main dependent variable is the pellagra death rate, which we collect at both the county 
and state levels. Consistent reporting of pellagra deaths at the county level during our study 
period (circa 1900-1950) are, to our knowledge, only available for North Carolina and South 
Carolina. Pellagra deaths for counties in North Carolina from 1915-1949 come from The Annual 
Report of the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the North Carolina State Board of Health.44 We have 
also collected county-level deaths for malaria, measles, pneumonia, typhoid, and tuberculosis 
from 1915-1925. We use these diseases as placebo tests in our analysis. The North Carolina State 
Board of Health did not issue a Vital Statistics report for the years 1918 and 1919; accordingly 
we do not have data on deaths for these years. Pellagra deaths for counties in South Carolina 
from 1915-1929 come from Annual Report of the State Board of Health of South Carolina.  
Because our county analysis is limited to North Carolina and South Carolina we also 
collect pellagra deaths at the state level for Southern states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Virginia. Texas did not report state level pellagra deaths until 1933 and is, 
therefore, excluded from our analyses. These data are taken from the Mortality Statistics of the 
United States (1900-1936) and the Vital Statistics of the United States (1937-1949). To calculate 
yearly pellagra death rates at the county and state levels we perform a linear interpolation of the 
county and state populations in-between decennial censuses. 
                                                        
44 In 1920 and 1921 these reports are found in The Health Bulletin published by the North Carolina State Board of 
Health. 
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To study the long-run effects of nutrition on health we use height as a dependent variable. 
Height data is taken from the World War II Army Enlistment Records 1938-1946 provided by the 
National Archives and Records Administration. These micro-level data provide height for 
approximately 8.5 million World War II soldiers. We make restrictions to obtain a sample that is 
likely to be representative for each cohort. We restrict to white men who were born between 
1915 and 1922, enlisted between 1940 and 1946, were drafted, had a height between 5 and 6.5 
feet, and were living in a county that was invaded by the boll weevil between 1915 and 1922. 
Since we do not observe county of birth, we further restrict to soldiers that were living, at the 
time of enlistment, in the same state they were born in. For these soldiers we assume that at the 
time of enlistment they were living in their county of birth. 
Finally, to study the long-run effects of nutrition on socioeconomics status we use 
measures of income from the Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS; Ruggles et al. 2015) 
as a dependent variable. To study the impact of the boll weevil on income we use the 1% IPUMS 
for the 1940 and 1950 United States Censuses, and the 5% IPUMS sample for the 1960 census. 
In this analysis we restrict to men between the ages of 35 and 55 who lived in the same state they 
were born in and lived in a county that was invaded by the boll weevil. Finally, to study the 
impact of state-level fortification laws on income we use the 1% IPUMS for the 1970, 1980, and 
1990 censuses. We now restrict to individuals between the ages of 35 and 55 who lived in the 
same state they were born in and lived in a cotton producing state. When studying the long-run 
effects of nutrition on income we, again, assume that individuals are living in their county of 
birth. 
 
2.4.b. Independent variables 
 
Our independent variable of interest, in most specifications, is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of one after the boll weevil arrived in a county or an indicator variable that takes a value of 
one after a state passed a fortification law. Data on the year the boll weevil first arrived in a 
county are taken from Lange et al. (2009), which originally came from USDA boll weevil maps. 
The year of state fortification law passage was taken from Park et al. (2001).  
We interact these indicator variables with a measure of the pellagra death rate prior to the 
treatment or a measure of cotton acreage per capita prior to treatment. Data on pellagra death 
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rates is described in Section 2.4.a., while data on crop acreage at the county-level comes from 
Haines et al. (2015) United States Agriculture Data, 1840-2010. These data are digitized 
versions of data originally provided in publications from the United States Bureau of the Census 
and provide county-level crop production for years in which the Census of Agriculture was 
performed (1889, 1909, 1919, 1924, and 1929 are the ones used in this chapter). Specifically, we 
use data on cotton, corn, peanut, sweet potato, and tobacco acreage per capita. 
 
 
2.5 COTTON AND THE RISE OF PELLAGRA 
 
 
2.5.a. Relationship between cotton and pellagra 
 
Although the existing literature on pellagra posits a causal relationship between cotton 
production and pellagra, there is a dearth of systematic data establishing even a correlation 
between the two. Accordingly, in this section, we use county-level data to formally explore the 
relationship between cotton production, local food production, and pellagra. To do this we 
estimate the following model: 
 𝑙𝑛[𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎]𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃 ∗ 𝑙𝑛[𝑐𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑐]𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡  (1) 
In equation (1), 𝑙𝑛[𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎]𝑐𝑡 is the log of the pellagra death rate in county c in year t, where 
county c is a county either in North Carolina or South Carolina. The variable 
𝑙𝑛[𝑐𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑐]𝑐𝑡 is the log of cotton acres per capita. 𝜃𝑡 are year fixed effects to control 
for any unobserved shocks in a particular year that might effect the pellagra death rate. We 
estimate equation (1) on the years 1919, 1924, and 1929 since there is good reason to believe that 
the relationship between cotton acres per capita and pellagra changes during the Great 
Depression and after the discovery of niacin in 1937. Finally, we restrict to counties that had at 
least 100 acres of farmland devoted to cotton production in 1889. These give us 103 counties 
during three census years, for a total of 309 observations. Standard errors are clustered at the 
county level. 
The results from estimating equation (1) are given in Table 7. In column (1), an increase 
in cotton acres per capita by 10% increases the pellagra death rate by 1.4% [p-value = 0.19]. 
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Columns (2)-(4) show that when counties use their land to produce local food, instead of cotton, 
the pellagra death rate is significantly lower. For instance, in column (2) a 10% increase in corn 
acres per capita reduces the pellagra death rate by 4.5%. Finally column (5) includes all crop 
variables and shows that cotton acres per capita continues to have a positive and significant 
effect on the pellagra death rate, while corn and peanut acres per capita continue to have a 
negative and significant effect on the pellagra death rate. We use the estimates in column (5) to 
predict what would happen to the pellagra death rate if the South did not produce any cotton. 
Predicting the pellagra death rate in the South with cotton acres per capita set to zero for every 
county would have resulted in a decrease in the pellagra death rate by 14% (the pellagra death 
rate would have decreased from 0.88 log points to 0.76 log points). This calculation is assuming 
that the land used for cotton production is left in fallow. If we, instead, assign that land to be 
used to produce corn the pellagra death rate would have decreased by 48% (from 0.88 log points 
to 0.46 log points).45  
Table 7 provides evidence consistent with the historical narrative that one of the primary 
causes of the rise of pellagra in the United States was the South’s cotton monoculture and lack of 
crop diversity. In the pre-niacin fortification period, the pellagra death rate increased when land 
devoted to cotton production increased, and decreased when the land devoted to local food 
production increased. Since land is fixed, if farmers decide to dedicate more land to cotton 
production they, necessarily, must dedicate less land to the production of locally grown foods. 
The decline in local food production resulted in individuals consuming more imported food, 
which had lower nutritional value. 
Despite the results in Table 7 there is still the potential concern that high cotton 
production is associated with unobserved factors that increase the pellagra death rate. For 
example, perhaps high cotton production actually decreases income (an older historical literature 
suggests cotton overproduction reduced cotton prices and agricultural income), which leads to 
worse diets and increases in pellagra. To deal with these concerns, we next turn our attention to 
an exogenous shock to cotton production that was brought about by the arrival of the boll weevil. 
 
 
                                                        
45 This is found by predicting the pellagra death rate with cotton acres per capita set to zero and corn acres per capita 
set to the average number of acres devoted to cotton + corn production in the counties, which 1.26 log acres per 
capita. 
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2.5.b. The boll weevil 
 
The boll weevil, a beetle that feeds on cotton leaves, squares (flower buds), and bolls, appeared 
in Texas in 1892. Figure 10 shows its progression through the cotton belt. By 1922, the boll 
weevil had infected the entire cotton region. The arrival of the weevil had significant impacts on 
agriculture. Lange et al. (2009) show that the arrival of the boll weevil reduced county cotton 
production, yields, and land values. They also find evidence that farmers shifted crops after the 
arrival of the boll weevil (p. 710): “The decline in cotton acreage raises the question of what 
southern farmers did with the released land…Overall, the corn results indicate a greater 
movement to alternative crops than suggested in the literature, which has downplayed the boll 
weevil’s effects on diversification.” They also write in a footnote that (p. 710): “Based on the 
census data, we also find production of hay, Irish potatoes, peanuts, rice, and sweet potatoes; 
sugar cane, among other crops, showed statistically significant increases after the arrival of the 
weevil.” 
The invasion of the boll weevil allows us to exploit an exogenous change in crop mix that 
arguably affected health. We first examine the effects of the boll weevil on crop diversification 
in North Carolina and South Carolina using a specification similar to Lange et al. (2009): 
 𝑙𝑛[𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑐]𝑐𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝜃1 ∗ [𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑙]𝑐𝑡×[𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑐 + 𝜃2 ∗ 𝑡𝑆𝑐 + 𝜃3
∗ 𝑡2𝑆𝑐 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡  
(2) 
In equation (2), 𝑙𝑛[𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑐]𝑐𝑡 is the log of per capita acres dedicated to cotton, corn, 
peanuts, sweet potatoes, or tobacco. [𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑙]𝑐𝑡 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 
one after the boll weevil has arrived in a county. We interact this variable with a county level 
measure of the intensity of the treatment: [𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑐. Our intensity measure is an indicator 
variable if county c was in the top 20% of the distribution of cotton acres per capita in North 
Carolina and South Carolina in 1909. We include a quadratic time trend, 𝑡 and 𝑡2, interacted 
with the share of cotton in total acres harvested in 1889, 𝑆𝑐. Finally, we include county fixed 
effects to control for unobserved time invariant county characteristics and year fixed effects to 
control for any unobserved shocks in a particular year that might affect the pellagra death rate. 
We, again, restrict to counties that had at least 100 acres of farmland devoted to cotton 
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production in 1889. This leaves us with 102 counties during six census years, for a total of 612 
observations. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
 Table 8 displays the results from estimating equation (2). In column (1) the dependent 
variable is the log of cotton acres per capita. The first row, (1), displays the coefficient on the 
post boll weevil indicator. The second row, (2), displays the coefficient on the interacted 
variable. Finally, row (3) displays the sum of the coefficients in columns (1) and (2) and is 
interpreted as the effect of the boll weevil in high cotton acreage counties. In column (1), the 
coefficient in row (3) indicates that cotton acreage per capita in North Carolina and South 
Carolina actually increased by 10% after the arrival of the boll weevil. However, the coefficient 
in row (3) of column (2) indicates that cotton yields fall by approximately 4% after the arrival of 
the boll weevil. North Carolina and South Carolina were among the last Southern states to be 
invaded by the boll weevil and the increase in cotton acreage coupled with the fall in cotton yield 
are consistent with farmers switching to earlier maturing, lower yielding varieties of cotton, 
which was one of the few mitigation methods available to combat the beetle.46 Despite the 
increase in cotton acreage per capita, columns (3) and (5) suggest that the arrival of the boll 
weevil in North Carolina and South Carolina was associated with a diversification of crops and 
an expansion in acreage per capita dedicated to food crops. High cotton acreage counties saw a 
15% increase in corn acres per capita and a 1.5% increase in sweet potato acres per capita after 
the arrival of the boll weevil. Finally, column (6) suggests that high cotton acreage counties saw 
a decrease in per capita tobacco acres by 5.5% after the boll weevil. The results in Table 8 
confirm the results from Lange et al. (2009). Namely, cotton yields decreased after the arrival of 
the boll weevil and acres per capita devoted to food production significantly increased. 
Next, we examine the impact the boll weevil had on pellagra through crop diversification. 
To study this relationship we estimate the following equation: 
 𝑙𝑛[𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎]𝑐𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝜃1 ∗ [𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑙]𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃2
∗ [𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑙]𝑐𝑡×[𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑐 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡  
(3) 
In equation (3), 𝑙𝑛[𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎]𝑐𝑡 is the log of the pellagra death rate in county c in year t. The rest 
                                                        
46 We replicate the findings of Lange et al. (2009) when using the entire South. These findings suggest that cotton 
acreage per capita significant decreases after the arrival of the boll weevil. These regressions for the entire South are 
available upon request. 
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of equation (3) is similar to equation (2), but we no longer control for the quadratic time trend 
and we now use two different variables to measure intensity of treatment. Our first intensity of 
treatment variable is the average pellagra death rate in 1915 and 1916, just before the boll weevil 
arrived in North Carolina and South Carolina. The idea is that places with higher pre-boll weevil 
pellagra death rates likely had worse baseline nutrition and, therefore, had more to gain from the 
arrival of the boll weevil. This variable is normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. Our second intensity of treatment variable is the same as the variable used in 
Table 8: an indicator if county c was in the top 20% of the distribution of cotton acres per capita 
in North Carolina and South Carolina in 1909. Standard errors are clustered at the county-level. 
Since the boll weevil invaded North and South Carolina from 1917-1922, we use the sample 
period 1915-1925 (or 1915-1929). We have pellagra death data for 98 counties in North Carolina 
and 43 counties in South Carolina over this time period, giving us a sample of 141 counties and 
1353 observations.47 
 As mentioned in Section 2.2 there are a number of factors that might confound our 
analysis. We believe that most of these factors will be differenced out as a result of our 
difference-in-differences approach. For example, if the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 
interacts with pellagra, than this should only be true in the year 1918 and will be differenced out 
in our year fixed effects. According to Bleakley (2010) the malaria intervention in the American 
South occurs almost concurrently with the arrival of the boll weevil in North and South Carolina. 
Again, the malaria intervention might interact with pellagra and confound our results. 
Accordingly, we control for a time trend interacted with the county-level malaria death rate in 
1915, just prior to the arrival of the boll weevil. We also control for a time trend interacted with 
the percent of the county population living in an urban area during the 1910 census. Finally, a 
valid potential confounder would involve migration out of counties that were hit by the boll 
weevil. We discuss this type of selection after we conduct our placebo tests below. 
Table 9 shows the impact the boll weevil had on pellagra death rates in North and South 
Carolina. Columns (1)-(3) use the treatment period 1915-1925. The coefficient on the post boll 
weevil variable in column (1) indicates that the pellagra death rate decreased by 27% after the 
                                                        
47 Recall that we do not have data on pellagra deaths in North Carolina for 1918 and 1919 (see Section 2.4), 
resulting in 882 observations for North Carolina (98 counties in 9 years). Additionally, we are missing data for 
Calhoun County and Laurens County South Carolina in the year 1915 meaning that we have 471 observations for 
South Carolina (43 counties in 11 years). 
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arrival of the boll weevil in a county. Column (2) indicates that for counties with the average 
amount of pellagra prior to the arrival of the boll weevil, the pellagra death rate decreased by 
26% (the coefficient on Post boll weevil in column (2)). A one standard deviation increase in the 
pre-boll weevil pellagra death rate is associated with an additional decrease in the pellagra death 
rate of approximately 18%. The coefficients in column (3) show that pellagra decreased by 22% 
after the arrival of the boll weevil in a county, and pellagra decreased by an additional 22% in 
counties that had high pre-boll weevil cotton acreage per capita. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the 
analysis of columns (1)-(3), but use an extended treatment period, 1915-1929. The results using 
this extended treatment period remain similar. 
In Table 10 we explore the robustness of these results by showing the effect of the boll 
weevil on diseases that are not caused by nutritional deficiencies.48 We, again, estimate equation 
(3), but we only have county-level data on other diseases for the state of North Carolina. All 
columns of Table 10 control for a time trend interacted with the county-level malaria death rate 
in 1915 and a time trend interacted with the percent of the county population living in an urban 
area during the 1910 census. Column (1) displays the baseline effect of the boll weevil on 
pellagra in North Carolina. The arrival of the boll weevil is associated with a 19% decrease in the 
pellagra death rate. Columns (2)-(5) examine the effect of the arrival of the boll weevil on 
typhoid fever, tuberculosis, measles, and pneumonia, respectively. The boll weevil is not 
associated with significant decreases in the death rate of any of these non-nutrition related 
diseases. These placebo tests demonstrate that the arrival of the boll weevil was only associated 
with nutritional improvements and not short-run improvements in overall health. 
As mentioned above, a potentially valid confounder of our boll weevil analysis involves 
migration out of counties that were hit by the boll weevil. Indeed, Lange et al. (2009, p. 715) find 
“the weevil appears to have unleashed a wave of internal migration, leading to local population 
gains before contact and substantial losses after the onset of significant crop damage.” The 
placebo tests in Table 10 show that the least healthy members of the population are not 
selectively leaving a county after the arrival of the boll weevil. Therefore, for selective migration 
to be driving our results it must be the case that only individuals who are sick with pellagra 
                                                        
48  It is possible that improved nutrition might improve immunity leading to long-run gains in overall health. 
However, we believe that the short-run effects of improved nutrition would be most evident in nutritional diseases, 
like pellagra, not non-nutritional diseases. 
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migrate out of the county after the arrival of the boll weevil, while other unhealthy individuals 
stay put. 
 
 
2.6 NIACIN AND THE FALL OF PELLAGRA 
 
 
2.6.a. Voluntary fortification 
 
Shortly after September 1937, when niacin was identified as the cause of pellagra, voluntary 
fortification of cereal-grain products began (Park et al. 2000, 2001). In 1939, the Council on 
Foods and Nutrition of the American Medical Association encouraged “with some qualification, 
fortification of certain staple foods with vitamins and minerals, specifically the restorative 
additions of thiamine, niacin, riboflavin, iron, and calcium to white flour and white bread” 
(Wilder 1956, pg. 1540). In 1941 the FDA established standards for the fortification of bread, 
which are displayed in Table 11. Up to January of 1943, fortification was increasingly common, 
but remained voluntary. Further, it was primarily restricted to bread and flour. Fortification was 
briefly required at the national level, due to War Food Order No. 1. When federal war powers 
ended, regulation devolved to the states, at which point, several states passed mandatory 
fortification laws. 
To analyze the effect that voluntary fortification had on pellagra we estimate equation 
(3), but [𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑙]𝑐𝑡 is replaced with a dummy variable that takes a value of one starting in 
1938. We run this regression on county-level for North Carolina and state-level pellagra data. 
See Section 2.4.a. for details on the states used in the analysis. We again use two intensity of 
treatment variables. The first is the pellagra death rate in 1928, prior to the discovery of niacin 
(when pellagra was at its peak). This variable is standardized to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. The second intensity of treatment variable is an indicator variable if 
county c was in the top 20% of the distribution of cotton acres per capita in North Carolina in 
1909. When performing the state level analysis the second intensity of treatment variable is the 
state-level cotton acres per capita in 1909. We chose to use the continuous measure of cotton 
intensity for the state-level analysis, however, it makes little difference if we use a indicator 
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variable instead of the continuous variable. The state-level cotton intensity measure is 
standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
Table 12 provides the estimates from the specification described above. Columns (1)-(3) 
examine the county-level impact of voluntary fortification in North Carolina. In column (1), a 
one standard deviation increase in the pre-niacin pellagra death rate is associated with a decrease 
in the pellagra death rate by 24%. In column (2), counties with high cotton acreage per capita 
saw a decrease in the pellagra death rate by 16% after voluntary fortification. Column (3) 
identifies both intensity of treatment terms: a one standard deviation increase in the pre-niacin 
pellagra death rate is associated with a decrease in the pellagra death rate by 24% and counties 
with high cotton acreage per capita see a decrease in the pellagra death rate by 8% after 
voluntary fortification. 
Columns (4)-(6) examine the state-level impact of voluntary fortification. Southern states, 
on average, experienced a 5% decrease in pellagra mortality after voluntary fortification began 
(column (4)). The coefficient on the intensity variable in column (5) is negative, but small in 
magnitude, indicating a decrease in the pellagra death rate of 1% after voluntary fortification. 
Column (6) identifies both intensity of treatment measures. The coefficient on the pellagra 
intensity measure is large and negative, while the coefficient on cotton intensity measure is 
positive, but small in magnitude. The results in columns (4)-(6) indicate that states with poor 
baseline nutrition, as measured by the pellagra death rate, gain the most from voluntary 
fortification, whereas having a lot of cotton acres per capita is not predicative of improvements 
in nutrition.  
 
2.6.b. Mandatory fortification laws 
 
As shown in Figure 8, pellagra rates plummeted during the 1940s, and by the 1950s, the disease 
was largely eliminated from the United States. In this section, we explore the role that mandatory 
fortification laws played in the elimination of pellagra. Twenty-eight states passed some type of 
mandatory fortification law over the decade 1940-1949. Figure 7 shows the states and years in 
which fortification laws were passed. Most of these laws required bread and flour to be enriched 
with thiamine, niacin, riboflavin, iron, and calcium, however, many laws in Southern states also 
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pertained to cornmeal and hominy grits.49 As a result, major producers of cornmeal and grits in 
the Midwest began fortifying their products. A 1957 survey found that nearly all hominy grits 
sold were enriched, and that cornmeal was generally enriched, except in Florida and Virginia, 
where enrichment was less typical (Park et al. 2001, National Research Council 1958). 
 We again, estimate equation (3), but [𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑙]𝑐𝑡 is replaced with a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one starting in the year a state enacted a mandatory fortification law. 
Intensity of treatment variables are they same as in Section 2.6.a. Table 13 displays the results 
from the previously described specification. Columns (1) and (2) examine the county-level 
impact of the North Carolina fortification law, which was passed in 1945. In column (1), a one 
standard deviation increase in the pre-niacin pellagra death rate is associated with a decrease in 
the pellagra death rate by 17%. In column (2), counties with high cotton acreage saw a decrease 
in the pellagra death rate by 15% after mandatory fortification. Column (3) identifies both 
intensity of treatment coefficients, and the results remains similar. Columns (4)-(7) examine the 
state-level impacts of mandatory fortification laws. In column (4), the passage of a law is 
associated with a 3% decrease in the pellagra death rate. This decrease is almost entirely 
concentrated in states with high pre-niacin pellagra death rates as is shown in column (5). 
Column (6) and (7) again find little support for differential treatment based on the pre-niacin 
cotton acres per capita. Table 13 demonstrates that the passage of mandatory fortification laws 
were associated with significant decreases in the pellagra death rate. The passage of these laws 
were also associated with the virtual elimination of pellagra in the American South by 1950 as 
shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
2.7 LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF NUTRITION 
 
 
We conclude our empirical analysis by turning our attention to the long-run effects of nutrition 
on height and socioeconomic status. To do this we adopt the following model:  
                                                        
49 States that passed laws pertaining to cornmeal and hominy grits were: Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. 
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 [𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒]𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃1 ∗ [𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒]𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃2 ∗ [𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒]𝑐𝑡×[𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑐
+ 𝜃𝑐 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡  
(4) 
In equation (4), [𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒]𝑖𝑐𝑡 is either the height or the income of individual i born in 
county c in year t. [𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒]𝑐𝑡 is the childhood exposure of an individual born in county c in 
year t to either the boll weevil or the mandatory fortification laws. To calculate this exposure 
variable, we follow Bleakley (2007) and define an exposure function, which is displayed in 
Figure 11. Individuals born anytime after the treatment (either the arrival of the boll weevil or 
the passage of a mandatory fortification law) are considered to be fully exposed and receive an 
exposure value of 1. Individuals born one year prior to the treatment receive an exposure value 
of 0.75, individuals born two years prior to the treatment receive an exposure value of 0.5 and 
individuals born three years prior to the treatment receive an exposure value of 0.25. Finally, 
individuals born more than three years before the treatment are considered not exposed and 
receive an exposure value of 0. We select this definition for the exposure function because there 
is strong evidence that the long-run effects of nutrition on health and socioeconomic status 
accrue mainly during the first three years of life.50 In some specifications, we restrict the sample 
to individuals who are either fully exposed (exposure value of 1) or not exposed at all (exposure 
value of 0). 
Table 14 estimates equation (4) when the dependent variable is the height of World War 
II enlistees. In columns (1)-(3) we restrict to enlistees that were either completely exposed to the 
boll weevil during early childhood (exposure value of 1) or not exposed to the boll weevil at all 
(exposure value of 0). In columns (4)-(6) we include individuals who were partially exposed to 
the boll weevil during early childhood. The intensity of treatment variables are the pellagra death 
rate in the state of birth in 1928 (standardized) and an indicator variable if county c was in the 
                                                        
50 One of the most important studies to show this took place between 1969 and 1977 in four rural villages in 
Guatemala. Two villages were randomly selected to receive a high-energy, high-protein nutrition supplement (atole) 
and two villages were selected to receive a low-energy, no-protein nutrition supplement (fresco). Supplements were 
provided freely to pregnant and lactating mothers and children under the age of seven. Schroeder et al. (1995) find 
that children receiving the nutritious supplement were taller and weighed more during the first three years of life. 
Rivera et al. (1995) find that children receiving the nutritious supplement were taller and weighed more during 
adolescence. Hoddinott et al. (2008) find that exposure to the nutritious supplement during the first three years of 
life significantly increased wages by approximately 46%. Finally, Haas et al. (1995) finds that consuming the 
nutritious supplement during the first three years of life increased physical work capacity (VO2max). Results using 
alternative definitions of exposure (exposure lasts until age 5 or exposure lasts until age 10) are available upon 
request. 
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top 20% of the distribution of cotton acres per capita (1909) for counties that were invaded by 
the boll weevil during the period 1915-1922.51 
Column (1) of Table 14 indicates that enlistees who were completely exposed to the boll 
weevil during early childhood were about 0.1 inches taller than enlistees who were not exposed 
to the boll weevil. Column (2) shows that enlistees who were born in states with the average 
pellagra death rate and were exposed to the boll weevil were about 0.08 inches taller than 
enlistees not exposed (the coefficient on Boll weevil exposure in column (2)). A one standard 
deviation increase in the pellagra death rate caused an additional 0.05-inch increase in height [p-
value = 0.18]. In column (3), individuals from counties that are in the top 20% of the distribution 
of cotton acres per capita in 1909 were an additional 0.07 inches taller. When partially exposed 
individuals are included in the analysis the results remain largely unchanged, but the interaction 
between the boll-weevil indicator and the pre-boll weevil pellagra death rate is now significant. 
Also, the interaction between the boll-weevil indicator and the high cotton acres per capita 
indicator has a p-value of 0.17. 
Table 15 examines the impact of the boll weevil on income. As stated in Section 2.4.a. 
we do this by using the 1940-1960 IPUMS samples. County of residence if available for all 
individuals in the 1940 census, however, county of residence is only available for publicly 
identifiable areas in the 1950 and 1960 IPUMS samples. Therefore, individuals that do not have 
a county of residence in the 1950 or 1960 IPUMS samples are dropped from our analysis. In 
addition to county fixed effects and cohort fixed effects, we also control for census year fixed 
effects, age fixed effects, educational attainment, and race. Table 15 if set-up analogously to 
Table 14 and the intensity of treatment measures are the same as the measures used in Table 14. 
Column (1) shows that individuals who were completely exposed to the boll weevil during early 
childhood had incomes that were about 4% higher than individuals who were not exposed to the 
boll weevil. In column (2), a one standard deviation increase in the pellagra death rate in 1928 
does not bring any additional increases in income. In column (3), individuals who were 
completely exposed to the boll weevil during early childhood had incomes that were about 3% 
higher than individuals who were not exposed to the boll weevil, and individuals from high 
                                                        
51 We use the 1928 state of birth pellagra death rate because we do not have county-level measures of the pellagra 
death rate for any states prior to 1915 and only North Carolina and South Carolina after 1915. 
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cotton producing counties saw an additional 7% increase in income (p-value = 0.101). The 
results in columns (4)-(6) closely resemble the results in columns (1)-(3). 
 Finally, we examine the impact of mandatory fortification laws on income. To do this we 
use the 1970-1990 IPUMS. Once again, county of residence is only available for publicly 
identifiable areas in the 1970-1990 IPUMS so we use two state-level intensity of treatment 
variables, rather than county-level intensity of treatment variables. The first is the state pellagra 
death rate in 1928 and the second is the state cotton acres per capita in 1909. Results using 
county-level cotton acres per capita in 1909 for individuals in publicly identifiable areas are 
similar and are available upon request. The results are displayed in Table 16, which is set-up 
analogously to Table 14. In both columns (1) and (4) the passage of an enrichment law is 
associated with a 3% increase in income for individuals completely exposed to the law, although 
this increase is not significant. Columns (2) and (5) show that a one standard deviation increase 
in pre-niacin pellagra death rates are associated with a significant 3% increase in income. 
Finally, columns (3) and (6) show that a one standard deviation increase in pre-niacin cotton 
acres per capita is associated with a 3% increase in income. Taken together, Tables 14, 15, and 
16 show that improved nutrition, brought about by the boll weevil and fortification, had 
significant, long-run effects on the height and income of individuals exposed to these treatments. 
 
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this chapter we have documented the rise and fall of pellagra in the United States. The rise of 
pellagra was associated with increases in cotton production in the American South and the 
substitution of locally grown corn for corn that was milled in the Midwest. The Midwestern 
milled corn was degerminated, which stripped the corn of much of its nutritional value. We show 
econometric evidence that pellagra is positively associated with the amount of land devoted to 
cotton production. 
 To establish the causal relationship between cotton acreage and pellagra we exploit an 
exogenous shock in cotton production that occurred from the arrival of the boll weevil. Farmers 
diversified crops after the arrival of the boll weevil, which led to improved nutrition and 
 100 
reductions in the pellagra death rate. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the arrival of the 
boll weevil was not associated with overall improvements in health. The death rates for typhoid, 
tuberculosis, measles, and pneumonia experienced no significant changes after the arrival of the 
boll weevil. This implies that the boll weevil’s only short-run impact on health was through 
improved nutrition. 
 The fall of pellagra in the American South was the result of the discovery of niacin as an 
anti-pellagrant in 1937. Shortly after this discovery, bakeries and mills began to voluntarily 
fortify their products with thiamine, niacin, riboflavin, iron, and calcium. Pellagra was virtually 
eliminated in the United States with the passage of state-level mandatory cereal-grain 
fortification laws from 1940-1949. We show that both voluntary and mandatory fortification 
significantly decreased the pellagra death rate and led to pellagra’s elimination around 1950. 
 Finally, we demonstrate that the improvements in nutrition brought about by the arrival 
of the boll weevil and mandatory fortification laws resulted in significant increases in height and 
income. These results are consistent with the fact that nutrition in early life leads to permanent, 
long-run effects on health and economic productivity. We conclude that cash crop in the 
American South did, indeed, adversely affect nutrition.  
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2.9 FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of pellagra (1930) and year of fortification law passage 
 
 
Notes: Pellagra deaths at the state-level for the year 1930 come from the Mortality Statistics of 
the United States, 1930. 
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Figure 8: Pellagra and cotton acreage in the South and three southern states 
 
 
 
Notes: Pellagra deaths come from the Mortality Statistics of the United States, 1900-1936 and the Vital Statistics of the United States, 
1937-1950. The South is defined as: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. Cotton acres harvested were taken from the United States Department of Agriculture’s 
National Agricultural Statistics Service Database (Quick Stats 2.0). 
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Figure 9: Relationship between cotton acres and pellagra in the American South 
 
Notes: Pellagra deaths come from the Mortality Statistics of the United States, 1900-1936 and 
the Vital Statistics of the United States, 1937-1950. The South is defined as: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas and Virginia. The fitted line and corresponding 95% confidence interval is the result of a 
linear regression through the plotted points. 
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Figure 10: The progression of the boll weevil 
 
 
Source: Hunter and Coad (1923) The Boll weevil Problem.  
 
Figure 11: Exposure function to boll weevil or mandatory fortification 
Generated for Schm ick, Ethan Jam es (University of Pit tsburgh) on 2015-04-21 20:41 GMT  /  ht tp://hdl.handle.net /2027/uiug.30112019281614
Public Dom ain, Google-digit ized  /  ht tp://www.hathit rust .org/access_use# pd-google
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Table 5: Corn consumption in six South Carolina mill towns 
    
  
Shipped cornmeal 
(percent) 
Local cornmeal 
(percent) 
    Consumed daily 
 
58% 12% 
Consumed habitually 
 
22% 6% 
Consumed rarely 
 
10% 2% 
Never consumed 
 
10% 80% 
Observations 
 
5151 5089 
 
 
 
 Source: Siler et al. (1914) pg. 21 and pg. 34. 
 
 
Table 6: Southern Diets 1935 - 1936 
     
 
All Southern 
households 
Southern 
urban 
households 
Southern 
rural 
households 
Non-Southern 
households 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pounds of cornmeal used in past 
week 
2.81*** 1.42*** 3.67*** 0.07 
     
Pounds of hominy grits used in past 
week 
0.62*** 0.68*** 0.59*** 0.02 
     
Pounds of cornmeal and hominy 
grits used in past week 
3.43*** 2.1*** 4.25*** 0.09 
     
Pounds of white bread used in past 
week 
2.31*** 4.21 1.13*** 4.33 
     
Observations 1473 564 909 2740 
          
Source: Study of Study of Consumer Purchases in the United States, 1935-1936.  Consumer 
Purchases in the United States, 1935-1936 accessed on ICPSR. Significant differences in column 
means relative to column (4) are reported.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Relation between crop acreage and pellagra 
      
 log pellagra death rate 
Geographic level: Counties in NC and SC (1919, 1924, 1929) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
     
Log cotton acres per capita 0.139    0.188* 
 (0.107)    (0.107) 
      
Log corn acres per capita  -0.442*   -0.511** 
  (0.228)   (0.234) 
      
Log peanut acres per capita   -0.628***  -0.593*** 
   (0.203)  (0.192) 
      
Log sweet potato acres per capita    -1.166** -0.132 
    (0.487) (0.507) 
      
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 309 309 309 309 309 
States or counties 103 103 103 103 103 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (1) in the text. The unit of observation is county-years. Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county-level. See Section 2.4 of the text for details on the dependent and independent 
variables. All columns restrict to counties that harvested over 100 acres of cotton in 1889. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: The boll weevil and crops 
       
 
Log cotton 
acres per 
capita 
Log cotton 
yield 
Log corn acres 
per capita 
Log peanut 
acres per 
capita 
Log sweet 
potato acres 
per capita 
Log tobacco 
acres per capita 
Geographic level: Counties in NC and SC (1889, 1899, 1909, 1919, 1924, 1929) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
(1): Post boll weevil 0.136*** -0.0127 0.0281 0.00476 0.00256 0.0141 
 (0.0227) (0.0166) (0.0199) (0.00650) (0.00439) (0.0149) 
       
(2): Post boll weevil * high county pre-
boll weevil cotton acres per capita 
(1909) 
-0.0339 -0.0264 0.120*** -0.0209 0.00970** -0.0693** 
(0.0379) (0.0189) (0.0307) (0.0148) (0.00429) (0.0329) 
       
(3): Linear combination: (1) + (2)  0.102*** -0.0391*** 0.148*** -0.0161 0.0123** -0.0552 
 (0.0292) (0.0135) (0.0287) (0.0143) (0.00479) (0.0343) 
       
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic time trend interacted with 
share of cotton in total acres harvested in 
1889 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 612 612 612 612 612 612 
Counties 102 102 102 102 102 102 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (2) in the text. The unit of observation is county-years. Standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are clustered at the county-level. See Section 2.4 of the text for details on the dependent and independent variables. All columns 
restrict to counties that harvested over 100 acres of cotton in 1889. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 9: The boll weevil and pellagra 
 
      
 
log pellagra death rate 
Geographic level: Counties in NC and SC (1915-1925) Counties in NC and SC (1915-1929) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
   
   
Post boll weevil -0.269*** -0.256*** -0.219*** -0.233*** -0.234*** -0.212*** 
 (0.0477) (0.0487) (0.0505) (0.0449) (0.0458) (0.0470) 
       
Post boll weevil * county pre-boll weevil 
pellagra death rate (1915-1916 average) 
 -0.184***   -0.138***  
 (0.0311)   (0.0281)  
       
Post boll weevil * high county pre-boll 
weevil cotton acres per capita (1909) 
  -0.224***   -0.108* 
  (0.0682)   (0.0647) 
       
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1353 1353 1353 1917 1917 1917 
Counties 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (3) in the text. The unit of observation is county-years. Standard errors, reported 
in parentheses, are clustered at the county-level. See Section 2.4 of the text for details on the dependent and independent variables. 
Other controls include: county specific time trends in the malaria death rate and county specific time trends in the percent of the county 
population living in an urban area. The county pre-boll weevil pellagra death rate is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. High county pre-boll weevil cotton acres per capita is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for counties that 
are in the top 20% of the distribution of cotton acres per capita in North Carolina and South Carolina in 1909. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 10: Placebo tests 
      
 
log pellagra 
death rate 
log typhoid 
death rate 
log tuberculosis 
death rate 
log measles 
death rate 
log pneumonia 
death rate 
Geographic level: Counties in NC (1915-1925) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Post boll weevil -0.187*** 0.0497 0.0323 -0.00504 0.0355 
 (0.0611) (0.0685) (0.0454) (0.0563) (0.0427) 
      
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 882 882 882 882 882 
Counties 98 98 98 98 98 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (3) in the text. The unit of observation is county-years. Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county-level. See Section 2.4 of the text for details on the dependent and independent 
variables. Other controls include: county specific time trends in the malaria death rate and county specific time trends in the percent 
of the county population living in an urban area. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 11: Bread enrichment standards proposed by FDA (1941) 
    
  
Minimum (mg) Maximum (mg) 
    Thiamine 
 
1.1 1.8 
Riboflavin 
 
0.7 1.6 
Niacin 
 
10 15 
Iron 
 
8 12.5 
Optional Ingredients: 
Vitamin D 
 
150 750 
Calcium 
 
300 800 
        
Source: Food and Bread Enrichment 1949-1950; National Research Council 
Committee on Cereals. 
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Table 12: Voluntary fortification and pellagra 
   
 
  
 
 
log pellagra death rate 
Geographic level: Counties in NC (1925-1949) State (1925-1949) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Post voluntary fortification * county pre-niacin pellagra 
death rate (1928) 
-0.240***  -0.235***    
(0.0121)  (0.0132)    
       
Post voluntary fortification * high county pre-niacin 
cotton acres per capita (1909) 
 -0.163* -0.0759**    
 (0.0839) (0.0376)    
       
Post voluntary fortification * state pre-niacin pellagra 
death rate (1928) 
   -0.0510***  -0.0527*** 
   (0.00290)  (0.00393) 
       
Post voluntary fortification * state pre-niacin cotton 
acres per capita (1909) 
    -0.0102 0.00568 
    (0.0143) (0.00462) 
       
State FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 2450 2450 2450 292 292 292 
States or counties 98 98 98 12 12 12 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (3) in the text. The unit of observation in columns (1)-(3) is county-years and the unit of 
observation in columns (4)-(6) is state-years. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county-level in columns (1)-(3) and at 
the state-level in columns (4)-(6). See Section 2.4 of the text for details on the dependent and independent variables. Other controls include: 
county (or state) specific time trends in the malaria death rate and county (or state) specific time trends in the percent of the county population 
living in an urban area. States included in the analysis in columns (4)-(6) are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Texas did not report the state level pellagra death rate in 1928 
and is, therefore, excluded from the analysis. Continuous intensity variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one. High county pre-boll weevil cotton acres per capita is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for counties that are in the top 20% of 
the distribution of cotton acres per capita in North Carolina in 1909. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 13: Fortification laws and pellagra 
   
 
   
 
 
 log pellagra death rate  
Geographic level: Counties in NC (1925-1949) State (1925-1949) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Post fortification law * county pre-niacin 
pellagra death rate (1928) 
-0.172***  -0.166***     
(0.0118)  (0.0113)     
        
Post fortification law * high county pre-niacin 
cotton acres per capita (1909) 
 -0.146** -0.0857***     
 (0.0594) (0.0301)     
        
Post fortification law    -0.0279** 0.00552 -0.0271** 0.00725 
    (0.0118) (0.0136) (0.0110) (0.0113) 
        
Post voluntary fortification * state pre-niacin 
pellagra death rate (1928) 
    -0.0286***  -0.0306*** 
    (0.00595)  (0.00470) 
        
Post voluntary fortification * state pre-niacin 
cotton acres per capita (1909) 
     -0.00941 0.00748 
     (0.0118) (0.00803) 
        
State FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 2450 2450 2450 292 292 292 292 
States or counties 98 98 98 12 12 12 12 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (3) in the text. The unit of observation in columns (1)-(3) is county-years and the unit of 
observation in columns (4)-(7) is state-years. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county-level in columns (1)-(3) and at 
the state-level in columns (4)-(7). See Section 2.4 of the text for details on the dependent and independent variables. Other controls include: 
county (or state) specific time trends in the malaria death rate and county (or state) specific time trends in the percent of the county population 
living in an urban area. States included in the analysis in columns (3)-(5) are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Texas did not report the state level pellagra death rate in 1928 
and is, therefore, excluded from the analysis. Intensity variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. High 
county pre-boll weevil cotton acres per capita is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for counties that are in the top 20% of the 
distribution of cotton acres per capita in North Carolina in 1909. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 14: The boll weevil and height 
       
 
Height (in inches) 
 
Partially exposed individuals not included Partially exposed individuals included 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Boll weevil exposure 0.0959** 0.0788* 0.0909** 0.0795** 0.0549 0.0681* 
(0.0412) (0.0426) (0.0423) (0.0356) (0.0380) (0.0368) 
       
Boll weevil exposure * state pellagra death rate 
(1928) 
 0.0467   0.0578**  
 (0.0350)   (0.0270)  
       
Boll weevil exposure * high county pre-boll 
weevil cotton acres per capita (1909) 
  0.0719   0.135 
  (0.138)   (0.0980) 
       
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Enlistment year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County of residence FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 154482 154482 154482 182369 182369 182369 
Counties of residence 688 688 688 688 688 688 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (4) in the text. The unit of observation is a World War II enlistee. Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county-level. See Section 2.4 of the text for details on the dependent and independent variables. We 
restrict to white men who were born between 1915 and 1922, enlisted between 1940 and 1946, were drafted, were residing in the same state 
they were born in, had a height between 5 and 6.5 feet, and were living in a county that was invaded by the boll weevil in a Southern state: 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. 
Texas did not report the state level pellagra death rate in 1928 and is, therefore, excluded from the analysis. In columns (1)-(3) we restrict to 
individuals who were either completely exposed to the boll weevil or not exposed to the boll weevil at all. See Section 2.7 and Figure 11 for our 
definition of exposure. The state pellagra death rate (1928) is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. High county 
pre-boll weevil cotton acres per capita is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for counties that are in the top 20% of the distribution of 
cotton acres per capita (1909) for counties that were invaded by the boll weevil during the period 1915-1922. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 15: The boll weevil and income in 1940-1960 
   
 
  
 
 
log income 
 
Partially exposed individuals not included Partially exposed individuals included 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
Boll weevil exposure 0.0406* 0.0415* 0.0300 0.0437* 0.0447** 0.0316 
(0.0231) (0.0228) (0.0233) (0.0222) (0.0219) (0.0219) 
       
Boll weevil exposure * state pellagra 
death rate (1928) 
 0.00385   0.00466  
 (0.0142)   (0.0137)  
       
Boll weevil exposure * high county pre-
boll weevil cotton acres per capita 
(1909) 
  0.0740   0.0768* 
  (0.0450)   (0.0435) 
       
Census year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County of residence FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 36174 36174 36174 40869 40869 40869 
Counties of residence 674 674 674 675 675 675 
       
       
       
       
       
 117 
Table 15 (continued) 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (4) in the text. The unit of observation is an individual in the 1940 or 1950 IPUMS 1% 
sample or the 1960 IPUMS 5% sample. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county-level. See Section 2.4 of the text for 
details on the dependent and independent variables. Other controls include: race and education. We restrict to men between the ages of 35 and 
55 who lived in the same state they were born in and were living in a county that was invaded by the boll weevil in a Southern state: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Texas did 
not report the state level pellagra death rate in 1928 and is, therefore, excluded from the analysis. In columns (1)-(3) we restrict to individuals 
who were either completely exposed to the boll weevil or not exposed to the boll weevil at all. See Section 2.7 and Figure 11 for our definition 
of exposure. The state pellagra death rate (1928) is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. High county pre-boll 
weevil cotton acres per capita is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for counties that are in the top 20% of the distribution of cotton 
acres per capita (1909) for counties that were invaded by the boll weevil during the period 1915-1922. Regressions are weighted using the 
IPUMS "perwt" variable. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 16: Fortification and income in 1970-1990 
       
 
log income 
 
Partially exposed individuals not included Partially exposed individuals included 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Enrichment exposure 0.0331 0.0157 0.0233 0.0346 0.0176 0.0251 
(0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0274) (0.0264) (0.0262) (0.0269) 
       
Enrichment exposure * state pre-niacin pellagra 
death rate (1928) 
 0.0301**   0.0297**  
 (0.0113)   (0.0115)  
       
Enrichment exposure * state pre-niacin cotton 
acres per capita (1909) 
  0.0321***   0.0316*** 
  (0.0114)   (0.0116) 
       
Census year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 491752 491752 491752 514792 514792 514792 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (4) in the text. The unit of observation is an individual in the 1970, 1980, or 1990 
IPUMS 1% sample. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the state-level. See Section 2.4 of the text for details on the 
dependent and independent variables. Other controls include: race and education. We restrict to individuals between the ages of 35 and 55 who 
lived in the same state they were born in. In columns (1)-(3) we further restrict to individuals who were either completely exposed to the 
fortification laws or not exposed to the fortification laws at all. See Section 2.7 and Figure 11 for our definition of exposure. Regressions are 
weighted using the IPUMS "perwt" variable. Intensity variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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3.0 THE IMPACT OF EARLY INVESTMENTS IN URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEMS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
(WITH ALLISON SHERTZER) 
 
Urban school systems in the United States increased their per pupil expenditures by nearly two-
thirds over the 1920s, an investment in public education that was unprecedented in American 
history at the time. We compile a novel dataset of city-level school expenditure data from the 
early twentieth century and follow students forward in time using complete count censuses to 
assess the impact of these inputs on the educational attainment and wages of workers in their 
prime earning years. To address the potential endogeneity of schooling inputs, we instrument for 
changes in expenditures using anti-German hysteria around World War I. Increasing per pupil 
spending by 10 percent increased wages by about 5 percent, a finding similar in magnitude to the 
largest estimates from the post-1960 period. 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Urban school systems in the United States dramatically increased their spending after World War 
I. Money spent on each primary and secondary student grew by nearly two-thirds between 1920 
and 1930, dwarfing earlier expansions in public education expenditures. This chapter assesses 
this early investment in urban public schools, asking in particular how exposure to greater school 
resources affected the earnings of workers in the prime of their lives. The magnitude of input 
growth during this decade is similar to those seen in the post-1960 decades, which have been 
extensively (and contentiously) studied by labor economists. A second goal of this study is thus 
to compare the returns to school inputs from the past to the present. 
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The relationship between school resources and student outcomes has been of interest 
since the release of the Coleman Report in 1966. This report found that school spending has little 
effect on student achievement. Subsequent papers have either confirmed or contradicted the 
central findings of the Report for cohorts born between 1920 and 1997.52  However, with a 
number of notable, recent exceptions (Johnson 2011, Lavy 2015, Jackson et al. 2016, Lafortune 
et al. 2016), most studies have treated school resources as exogenously determined, an 
assumption that is false in both principle and practice. In this chapter we explore the impetus 
behind this early expansion in public education inputs, focusing in particular on the importance 
of anti-German sentiment around the time of World War I. We argue that German settlement can 
be used as an instrument for urban investments in public schools. 
To study the impact of school resources on student outcomes during the early twentieth 
century, we construct a new dataset. Using reports from the Commissioner of Education, we 
obtain data on expenditures per pupil, expenditures per teacher, and pupil-teacher ratios for 446 
U.S. cities, located in 338 distinct counties, for the years 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930. To obtain 
outcomes for students who were educated in these schools, we link individuals from the 1920 
and 1930 IPUMS 1% samples (Ruggles et al. 2015) to the 1940 complete count census. Linking 
these micro data allows us to be sure that we assign individuals the level of school resources they 
experienced in their county of education in 1920 or 1930.  
To establish exogeneity in our school resource variables, we instrument for expenditures 
per pupil, expenditures per teacher, and pupil-teacher ratios in 1920 and 1930 using the German-
share of the population in 1910, prior to World War I. The exclusion restriction on our 
instrument is that the German-share of a county population in 1910 effects the outcomes of 
                                                        
52 See Card and Krueger (1996), Hanushek (1996), Hanushek (1997), Hanushek (1998), and Krueger (2003) for 
reviews and overviews of this literature. 
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students educated in that county in 1920 and 1930 only through increases in school resources 
that occurred as a result of the anti-German hysteria and subsequent Americanization efforts that 
accompanied World War I. To establish the validity of our instrument we first examine its 
strength. An increase in the German-share of the population prior to World War I was associated 
with significant increases in expenditures per pupil, expenditures per teacher, and pupil-teacher 
ratios after World War I. This pattern is unique to the German population, as similar patterns do 
not hold for other immigrant groups such as Irish and Italians. We also present evidence that the 
exclusion restriction holds by examining the relationship between the German-share of a county 
population and non-education expenditures. We find that, if anything, high German population 
shares prior to World War I led to lower expenditures on non-education related public goods, 
such as sewers and fire departments, after World War I.  
Having demonstrated the validity of our instrument, we estimate the relationship between 
school resources and student outcomes using two-stage least squares (2SLS). When estimating 
the relationship between expenditures per pupil and the return to education, we find that the 
2SLS estimates are similar in magnitude and significance to the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates. Using an approach developed by Card and Krueger (1992) and extended by Heckman 
et al. (1996) we find that a 10 percent increase in expenditures per pupil or expenditures per 
teacher increased the return to education by 0.4 to 0.5 percent, where the average return to 
education was 7 percent. However, we find insignificant effects for pupil-teacher ratios. Finally, 
we examine the impact of school resources on educational attainment and find only weak 
evidence of an impact of school resources on educational attainment. 
Our contributions to the existing literature are twofold. First, and most importantly, we 
attempt to establish exogenous variation in school resources using a novel instrument based on 
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anti-German hysteria. Second, this is the first paper to study the relationship between local 
schooling inputs and student outcomes during the early twentieth century on a national scale.53 
Much attention has been paid to the relationship between school resources and student outcomes 
later in the century, but there is good reason to believe that this relationship was substantively 
different during the first half of the century.54 Although a range of estimates exist to describe the 
relationship in the late twentieth century, our finding that increasing per pupil spending by 10 
percent in each school year led to an increase in wages of 5 percent is in line with the largest 
estimates from the contemporary period (for instance, Jackson et al. 2016). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we present the 
historical background on schooling expansion during the early twentieth century and the attitude 
toward German immigrants that developed during World War I. We also, briefly, discuss the 
channels through which school resources might impact labor market outcomes. In Section 3.3 we 
discuss the creation of our new dataset, which contains city-level school resources linked to 
student outcomes. Section 3.4 presents the econometric model and the baseline OLS empirical 
results. Section 3.5 introduces the German-share instrument, presents results regarding the 
instruments validity, and uses the instrument in 2SLS estimates of the relationship between 
expenditures per pupil and student outcomes. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                        
53 See Carruthers and Wanamaker 2016 for an analysis of the Jim Crow South. 
54 Hanushek (1998) comments that there might be little observable relationship between school resources and 
student outcomes because if added resources have diminishing effects on student achievement, current school 
operations may be largely ‘on the flat’ of the production function…it is quite possible that the enormous changes in 
educational resources did have an effect on outcomes in the first half of this century, but that more recent studies are 
also correct in finding ‘no effect’ for the sorts of resource changes discussed in current schools - (Hanushek 1998, 
pg. 19-20).  
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3.2 BACKGROUND 
 
3.2.a. Historical background 
 
Economic historians have provided several explanations for the dramatic increase in public 
school inputs and outputs that occurred during the early twentieth century. This time period saw 
a rapid increase in the percentage of Americans graduating from high school. Increased high 
school attendance required local municipalities to increase resources on teachers and, in some 
cases, even build a new high school. Goldin (1998) finds that part of the increase in high school 
graduation was due to increased demand for white-collar workers. This, in turn, increased the 
returns to education, not only for those who changed from blue-collar to white-collar work, but 
also within blue-collar and white-collar work. Goldin and Katz (2008) find that areas with high 
taxable wealth and greater homogeneity in economic and social conditions led the way in 
providing secondary education.  
Another explanation for the dramatic increase in school inputs and outputs during this 
time is the establishment and expansion of many state-level compulsory schooling laws (CSLs). 
Studies of the effectiveness of these laws have found mixed results. Landes and Solmon (1972) 
find no effect of CSLs. Eisenberg (1988) finds modest effects of a 1-2% increase in school 
attendance. Margo and Finegan (1996) find that CSLs significantly increased attendance in states 
that coupled a CSL with comprehensive child labor laws. Clay et al. (2012) find that CSLs 
increased enrollment and attendance. Finally, Lleras-Muney (2002) finds that legally requiring 
children to attend one more year of school increased educational attainment by 5 percent. 
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 To our knowledge there is little direct evidence on the impact of anti-immigrant 
sentiment on public education during this period besides a recent study on the impact of the 
Americanization movement on immigrants themselves (Lleras-Muney and Shertzer 2015). 
World War I, which occurred during this period of generally expanding public schooling, was 
accompanied by a great deal of immigrant scrutiny. After President Wilson’s inflammatory 
declaration of war, antagonism toward enemy aliens was further heightened with the release of 
James W. Gerard’s famous book My Four Years In Germany in 1917. Gerard served as the 
United States Ambassador to Germany from 1913-1917 and his book stressed the hostility of 
German officials towards the United States. Gerard writes that Arthur Zimmermann, the State 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the German Empire, once warned him “The United States does 
not dare to do anything against Germany because we have five hundred thousand German 
reservists in America who will rise in arms against your government if your government should 
dare to take any action against Germany” (Gerard 1917, pg. 237). My Four Years in Germany 
was so popular that Warner Brothers released a film adaptation of the book in 1918.  
Anti-German sentiment reached its peak in April of 1918 when Robert Prager, a German 
immigrant, was hanged by a mob in Collinsville, Illinois.55 Although extreme, this was far from 
the only instance of mob violence toward German immigrants during World War I. There were 
numerous other instances of mob violence in Kansas and Illinois and a plaque in Cincinnati still 
commemorates the “Anti-German Hysteria” that swept the city in 1917 and 1918 (Juhnke 
1977).56 
                                                        
55 See Hickey (1969) for a detailed historical explanation of this event. 
56 For a more complete history of this topic see Frederick C. Luebke’s Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and 
World War I (1974) or Clifton J. Child’s The German-Americans in Politics (1939). Another source is Captain 
Henry Landau’s The Enemy Within: The Inside Story of German Sabotage in America (1937).  
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At the same time that there was mass anxiety about the potential threat enemy aliens 
posed, there were also concerns about training an army of immigrants. Eighteen percent or over 
half a million soldiers in the AEF were immigrants, hailing from 46 different countries (Ford 
2001). Many of these immigrant soldiers could not speak or understand English, which created 
problems when they needed to carry out orders.57 Some immigrant soldiers were given a crash 
course in English, United States history and civics, but elected officials placed their hope in the 
education system to serve as a more permanent solution (Laskin 2014). Russell Kazal, in his 
history of German-Americans, writes that Americanization “lacked mass support until the war, 
when fear of divided immigrant loyalties brought it into the public spotlight” (Kazal 2004, pg. 
166). Thus, the historical narrative paints the following picture: anti-German sentiment during 
World War I fostered the need to Americanize immigrants and led cities with high German-
shares of the population to increase spending on schools. 
 
3.2.b. School resources and labor market outcomes 
 
There are several student outcomes that might be affected by school resources; however, we 
focus on the effect of school resources on labor market outcomes. The relationship between 
school resources (or school quality) and labor market outcomes has been estimated by Card and 
Krueger (1992), Card and Krueger (1992), Card and Krueger (1996), Dustmann et al. (2012), 
Heckman et al. (1995), Heckman et al. (1996), Jackson et al. (2016), Johnson (2011), Johnson 
                                                        
57 The Commissioner of Education Philander P. Claxton wrote in his annual report: “Rumors then began to reach us 
of large numbers of the drafted men who were unable to understand the orders given by their officers, who had no 
knowledge of the reason or purpose of the war, and whom it was impossible to train with the other soldiers. We 
learned that in one camp alone it was necessary to converse with the men through interpreters in 40 different 
languages…All of these factors brought the need for Americanization urgently before the American people, and 
organizations and communities everywhere began to study the problem” (Claxton 1919; Report of the 
Commissioner of Education for 1919, pg. 43-44).  
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and Stafford (1973), Lavy (2015), Mchenry (2011), Strayer (2002), Rizzuto and Wachtel (1980), 
and Wachtel (1976) among other. Most of these studies find that school quality does, indeed, 
improve labor market outcomes, but most of these studies also assume that school quality is 
exogenously determined (exceptions include Dustmann et al. 2012, Jackson et al. 2016, and 
Johnson 2011 which all attempt to achieve exogenous variation in school quality measures).  
Heckman et al. (1995) and Card and Krueger (1996) develop models of the effect of 
school resources, on labor market earnings that we find particularly useful. The basic idea of 
these models is that school resources can impact both the slope and the intercept of the earnings-
education relationship. These effects can be easily visualized in Figure 12. According to the Card 
and Krueger (1996) model, school A would have more resources (i.e. be of higher quality) than 
school B because it has a steeper slope and a lower intercept. As shown in Figure 12, it is not 
necessary for the school with more resources to have a higher return to education across all 
levels of education. This is due to the ability of individuals at lower levels of education in high 
quality schools. For example, imagine individuals who obtain the lowest level of education 
possible given a certain quality of school. If school quality suddenly improves, then individuals 
with the lowest cost to attending school will stay in school an additional year. This will decrease 
the average ability of those who remain at the lowest possible level of schooling, causing the 
intercept of the earnings-education relationship to fall (see Card and Krueger 1996 for a more 
their explanation). In this chapter we examine the effect of school resources on both the slope 
and the intercept of the earnings-education relationship, while establishing exogenous variation 
in school resources by exploiting the increase in school expenditures that accompanied the anti-
German hysteria during and after World War I. Finally, we consider the impact of school quality 
on educational attainment, since higher levels of education lead to higher earnings. 
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3.3 DATA 
 
3.3.a. City school resource data 
 
We construct a new city level dataset on public school resources for the years 1900, 1910, 1920, 
and 1930. These data come from the Report of the Commissioner of Education Volume II (1900 
and 1910) and the Biennial Survey of Education (1920 and 1930). Contained within these reports 
is information on the current expenditures of day schools, expenditures on teachers and 
supervisors, average daily attendance at public schools, and the number of public school 
teachers. These data allow us to compute three measures of school resources: expenditures per 
pupil, expenditures per teacher, and pupil-teacher ratios. Much of our analysis is focused on 
cohorts that were educated in 1920 and 1930 and, therefore, we form a balanced panel of cities 
for which we have all three measures of school resources in the years 1920 and 1930.58 This 
balanced panel provides us with school resource data for 446 U.S. cities. The locations of these 
cities are displayed in Figure 13. 
To provide a more complete picture of the evolution of these school resources in the early 
twentieth century we graph time series of all three variables in Figure 14. Panel A of Figure 14 
(the upper left) shows nominal expenditures per pupil, which are increasing steadily during the 
early twentieth century. However, Panel B (top right) displays real expenditures per pupil and it 
is clear that real expenditures per pupil are fairly flat from 1900 to 1920 and it is only after 1920 
that large real increases are seen. In 1920 real expenditures per pupil were $67 before they 
increased 67% to $112 in 1930. Panel C (lower left) graphs the pupil-teacher ratio, which 
                                                        
58 Balancing the panel to include cities for which we have all three measures in 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 reduces 
the sample size by 71 cities (to 375) and balancing the panel to include cities for which we have all three measures 
in 1910, 1920, and 1930 reduces the sample size by 56 cities. 
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decreased steadily from 1900 to 1920 and then leveled off. Finally, Panel D (lower right) shows 
real expenditures per teacher. Real expenditures per teacher actually decreased until 1920, before 
seeing a dramatic increase from below $1,200 in 1920 to over $1,800 in 1930. 
 
3.3.b. A linked sample 
 
To measure the extent that school resources impact labor market earnings we construct a dataset 
of individuals linked from the 1920 and 1930 IPUMS 1% samples (Ruggles et al. 2015) to the 
1940 complete count census. The goal of our linking algorithm is to match individuals who were 
educated in one of our 446 cities in 1920 or 1930 to their corresponding census record in 1940. 
However, the 1920 and 1930 IPUMS samples only report city of residence for a select number of 
cities, but county or residence in reported for all individuals. As such, we geocode the location of 
each city that we have school resources data for and find the county the city was located in 
during the 1910 census. 59  We focus on individuals who were educated in 1920 and 1930 
because, as already explained, our final goal is to instrument for school resources using the 
German-share of a county population in 1910. Cities with a large German-share of the 
population prior to World War I experienced large, relative increases in school resources after 
World War I (a point which will be shown empirically later).  
Before performing our iterative linking procedure we, first, make several sample 
restrictions. We restrict to white men who were living in one of the 338 counties for which we 
have corresponding county-level school resource data in 1920 and 1930. When linking the 1920 
                                                        
59 Our 446 cities map to 338 different counties. We sum current expenditures on day schools, expenditures on 
teachers and supervisors, average daily attendance, and number of teachers across cities that are located in the same 
county and then compute our measures of school resources. We map to the 1910 census, since that is the census we 
will use to determine the German-share of a county’s population. 
 129 
IPUMS sample we restrict to individuals born between 1905 and 1914 (aged 6 to 15 in 1920 
when we measure school resources), and when linking the 1930 IPUMS sample we restrict to 
individuals born between 1915 and 1924 (aged 6 to 15 in 1930). After making these sample 
restrictions, we are ready to perform the iterative linking procedure. 
First, we standardize given names and surnames according to the NYSIIS Phonetic Code 
and drop all duplicates (in both the IPUMS samples and the 1940 full count census) in terms of 
first name, surname, birthplace, and age. Next, we link records from the IPUMS samples to 
records in the 1940 full count census if they match exactly on first name, surname, birthplace, 
and age. Linked individuals are set aside, and we attempt to link the remaining individuals based 
on first name, surname, birthplace, and now allow for their age to be within one year (plus or 
minus) of the age reported in the IPUMS record. After setting aside these individuals, we 
perform the same procedure, but we now allow an individual’s age to be within two years (plus 
or minus) of the age reported in the IPUMS record. This concludes the record linkage algorithm.  
We next define weekly earnings for our linked sample of individuals. Weekly earnings 
are the amount of money wages or salary an individual earned as an employee in 1939 divided 
by the number of weeks the individual worked in 1939 provided they worked at least 40 weeks. 
We then remove the top and bottom 1% of weekly wage earners. Using this definition, we were 
able to link and obtain weekly earnings for individuals from 323 of the 338 counties in both the 
1920 and 1930 IPUMS samples.60 In the 1920 IPUMS sample we attempted to link 41,776 
individuals and we successfully linked 8,279 of these individuals for a 20% link rank. From the 
1930 IPUMS sample we attempted to link 50,531 individuals and we successfully linked 5,214 
of these individuals for an 11% link rate. The link rate from 1930 to 1940 is half of the link rate 
                                                        
60 That is, we have a panel of 323 counties for which we have linked individuals in both the 1920 and the 1930 
samples. If we were to use just 1920 or just 1930 we would have individuals from slightly more counties. 
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from 1920 to 1940 due to the age of the cohort. The 1930 sample contains individuals aged 6 to 
15 in 1930, meaning that they were 16 to 25 years of age in 1940. Very few 16 and 17 year olds 
report income in the 1940 census and, therefore, they cannot be used to study the relationship 
between school resources and labor market outcomes. 
Table 17 provides a comparison of individuals that we were able to link to the 1940 
census versus individuals we were not able to link for both the 1920 and the 1930 IPUMS 
samples. For the 1920 IPUMS sample the linked individuals look fairly representative of the 
unlinked individuals, with notable exceptions. For example, about 9% of the unlinked sample 
resides Illinois, while over 11% of the linked sample resides in Illinois. Similar differences exist 
for New York and Pennsylvania. We hypothesize that these significant differences are due to the 
large number of individuals in these states that live in an urban area and, as shown in the table, 
urban individuals are almost 3 percentage points more likely to be linked. 61 There are also 
significant differences in literacy, the percentage in school, and the percentage residing in owner 
occupied housing between the linked and unlinked samples, although the magnitude of the 
differences is very small (around 1 percentage point or less). Finally, the average weekly wage of 
an individual in the 1920 linked sample is $28.27 and the average educational attainment is 
10.36 years.  
Many of these same patterns hold for the 1930 IPUMS linked sample although literacy 
and the percentage living in owner occupied housing are no longer significant. Notice that there 
are large and significant differences in the mean and median age of individuals linked from the 
1930 IPUMS sample. This is, again, due to the fact that very few 16 and 17 year olds report 
receiving a money wage or salary in the 1940 census records. The average weekly wage of an 
                                                        
61 Abramitzky et al. (2012) and others find that urban individuals are over-represented in their linked samples. Mill 
(2013) attributes this to “the more concentrated distribution of first names in rural areas” (Mill 2013, pg. 86). 
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individual in the 1930 linked sample is $19.21 and the average educational attainment is 10.64 
years.  
 
 
3.4 SCHOOL RESOURCES AND STUDENT OUTCOMES IN THE EARLY 
TWENTIETH CENTURY: BASELINE EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
 
3.4.a. Effect of school resources on the rate of return to education 
 
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the effect of school resources on the rate of return 
to education (the slope of the lines in Figure 12). To estimate this relationship we use a method 
developed by Card and Krueger (1992) and extended by Heckman et al. (1996). The model is 
given by:  
 𝑙𝑛[𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠]𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑐 = 𝜃𝑒𝑐 + 𝜃𝑙𝑐 + 𝑿
′
𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒄𝜷𝒄 + 𝐸𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑐(𝛼𝑒𝑐 + 𝛼𝑙𝑐) + 𝜀𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑐  (1) 
where i indexes individuals, e indexes county-of-education, l indexes county-of-residence, and c 
indexes cohort (there are two cohorts; 1920 and 1930). In the above equation 𝜃𝑒𝑐 is a cohort-
specific fixed effect for individuals educated in county e, 𝜃𝑙𝑐 is a cohort-specific fixed effect for 
individuals living in county l, and 𝑿′𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒄 is a vector of control variables for individual i that 
include: potential work experience and its square, an indicator if individual i is married and an 
indicator if individual i resides in an SMSA.62 𝐸𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑐 is the educational attainment of individual i. 
Importantly, in Equation (1) 𝐸𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑐  is assumed to be linearly related to the log of earnings. 
However, as shown in Appendix C Figures A8 and A9, this is not the case for individuals who 
attain very low and very high levels of education. Appendix C Figure A8 shows the earnings-
                                                        
62 We define potential experience as: age – years of education – 6. 
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education profile for the 1920 cohort, and it appears to be fairly linear for individuals who have 
between 4 and 16 years of education. As such, for the 1920 cohort, we do not include individuals 
who attained less than 4 or greater than 16 years of education in our estimates of the return to 
education. Similarly, Appendix C Figure A9 shows the earnings-education profile for the 1930 
cohort. For the 1930 cohort we only estimate the return to education for individuals who attained 
between 5 and 16 years of education, as this appears to be the linear part of the relationship.63 
We allow the rate of return to education to consist of two components: a cohort-specific return to 
the county-of-education, 𝛼𝑒𝑐, and a cohort-specific return for the county-of-residence, 𝛼𝑙𝑐. Note 
that when education is interacted with both county-of-education and county-of-residence fixed 
effects, the county-of-education component of the return to education, 𝛼𝑒𝑐 , is identified by 
individuals who were educated in one county and then move to another county.64 Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑐 is 
a stochastic error term.  
We assume that the cohort specific county-of-education return to education, 𝛼𝑒𝑐 , is 
related to school resources in the following way:  
 𝛼𝑒𝑐 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛽[𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠]𝑒𝑐  (2) 
                                                        
63 Very few individuals report education levels above and below our cutoffs. In the 1920 cohort, 0.82% of the 
sample has less than 4 years of education and 2.31% has more than 16 years of education. In the 1930 cohort, 1.1% 
of the sample has less than 5 years of education and 0.6% of the sample has more than 16 years of education. We 
could follow Card and Krueger (1992) in defining educational attainment as: 𝐸𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑐 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑐 − 𝑇𝑒𝑐 , 0}, where 
𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑐 is the actual number of years of education attained by individual i and 𝑇𝑒𝑐  is the years of education attained by 
the second percentile of the education distribution in county e for cohort c. However, we find that the education-
earnings profile is still non-linear when defining education this way. 
64 It would be possible to allow the return to education to have a state-of-residence or region-of-residence specific 
component, instead of a county-of-residence component. However, the county-of-education component of the return 
to education would then be identified by individuals who are educated in one county, and then move out of the state 
or region they were educated in. Few individuals in our linked sample move out the state or region they were 
educated in. 
 133 
Where [𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠]𝑒𝑐  is one of the three measures of school resources, described in 
Section 3.3.a, and 𝛼𝑐 are cohort specific constants.
65 Following Card and Krueger and Heckman 
et al. we estimate the effect of school resources on the rate of return of education using a two-
step procedure where we first estimate equation (1) for each cohort (1920 and 1930) and then 
regress estimates of the rate of return to education on school resource measures (equation (2)). 
The second stage regressions are OLS regressions weighted by the inverse sampling variance of 
the observation (i.e. weighted by the number of observations used to estimate the return to 
education in each county-cohort cell in the first stage). Standard errors are clustered at the 
county-of-education level. 
 The results from the second stage of this procedure are displayed in Table 18. In column 
(1), a 10% increase in expenditures per pupil increases the rate of return to education by 0.45 
percent. In column (2) a 10% increase in expenditures per teacher increases the rate of return to 
education by 0.37% and the coefficient on the pupil-teacher ratio in column (3) is small in 
magnitude and insignificant. In column (4) we estimate the effect of both expenditures per pupil 
and the pupil-teacher ratios in the same regression.66 The coefficient on expenditures per pupil 
remains about the same in magnitude and significance as in column (1) and the coefficient on the 
pupil-teacher ratio remains insignificant and in the wrong direction. Table 18 provides evidence 
that school resources, especially expenditures per pupil, appear to have increased the return to 
education for the cohorts educated in 1920 and 1930. 
 
                                                        
65 Note that we could allow 𝛼𝑒𝑐 to depend on county-specific constants. However, due to the instrumental variables 
approach we will employ later, we cannot include county-specific constants since our instrument does not vary at 
the county-cohort level.  
66 The correlation between log expenditures per pupil and log expenditures per teacher is 0.83 and, therefore, it is 
difficult to separately identify the coefficient on both variables in the same regression. Regressions identifying both 
log expenditures per teacher and log pupil-teacher ratios yield similar results and are available upon request. 
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3.4.b. Effect of school resources on county-of-education intercepts 
 
We next consider the possibility that school resources could impact the county-of-education 
intercepts, or 𝜃𝑒𝑐, in equation (1). We model the relationship between the county-of-education 
intercepts and school resources in the following way:  
 𝜃𝑒𝑐 = 𝜃𝑐 + 𝛽[𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠]𝑒𝑐  (3) 
Where [𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠]𝑒𝑐  is one of our measures of school resources and 𝜃𝑐  are cohort 
specific constants. We, again, estimate the effect of school resources on the county-of-education 
intercepts through a two-step process that first requires us to estimate the county-of-education 
intercepts from equation (2) for each cohort, and then relate these intercepts to school resources 
using equation (3) as a second-stage regression. Following the procedure laid out in Section 
3.4.a., the second stage OLS regressions are weighted by the inverse sampling variance of the 
observation and standard errors are clustered at the county-of-education level. 
 The results are displayed in Table 19. In column (1), a 10% increase in expenditures per 
pupil results in a 0.5 log-point decrease in the county-of-education intercept and a similar 
decrease is found with a 10% increase in expenditures per teacher (column (2)). In column (3), a 
10% decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio is associated with a 0.14 log-point increase in the county-
of-education intercept, although this is not significant. Column (4) separately identifies the effect 
of expenditures per pupil and pupil-teacher ratio. Again, a 10% increase in expenditures per 
pupil is associated with a 0.55 log-point decrease in the county-of-education intercept. Table 19, 
provides evidence consistent with the model in Section 3.2.b. and results found in Heckman et al. 
(1996). 
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3.4.c. Effect of school resources on educational attainment 
 
The final channel through which school resources might affect labor market outcomes is by 
increasing students’ educational attainment. Therefore, in this section, we examine the effect of 
school resources on the conditional average educational attainment in a county-cohort cell. First 
we regress an individual’s educational attainment on individual-level characteristics and county-
of-education fixed effects, described in Section 3.4.a. The coefficients on the county-of-
education fixed effects provide the average education achieved by individuals educated in that 
county, conditional on the other characteristics. We then relate these conditional averages to our 
measures of school quality in the following way: 
 [𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛]𝑒𝑐 = 𝜃𝑐 + 𝛽[𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑒𝑐  (4) 
Where [𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛]𝑒𝑐 is the average years of education for the sample of 
linked individuals in county-of-education e in cohort c, conditional on other characteristics. We 
regress this average on cohort fixed effects and one of our three measures of school resources. 
 The results from estimating equation (4) are displayed in Table 20, which is set-up 
analogously to Table 18. In column (1) a 10% increase in expenditures per pupil results in an 
increase in educational attainment by 0.03 school years. In column (2) a 10% increase in 
expenditures per teacher results in a 0.025 school years increase in attainment. Finally, in column 
(3) a 10% decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio results in a 0.03 school year increase in attainment. 
Column (4) separately identifies the coefficients on log expenditures per pupil and log pupil-
teacher ratio and, again, finds that a 10% increase in expenditures per pupil results in an increase 
in attainment by about 0.03 school years. The coefficient on pupil-teacher ratio is no longer 
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significant. In Table 20 it, therefore, appears that school resources do increase educational 
attainment. 
 
 
3.5 SCHOOL RESOURCES AND STUDENT OUTCOMES IN THE EARLY 
TWENTIETH CENTURY: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES SPECIFICATIONS 
 
 
3.5.a. German-share of population instrument 
 
We have demonstrated, thus far, that school resources appear to increase the return to education 
and increase educational attainment. We now attempt to establish exogenous variation in the 
school resource variables. To do this we instrument for expenditures per pupil with the German-
share of a county’s population in 1910. The logic for this instrument can be stated as follows: a 
high-German share of the population prior to World War I resulted in more anti-German hysteria 
during World War I and a larger push to Americanize immigrants, especially enemy aliens, 
during the 1920s and 1930s. This push to Americanize immigrants was accompanied by 
increases in school resources, which might have had spillover effects on the native population. 
Our exclusion restriction is, therefore, that the German-share of a county population in 1910 
effects the outcomes of students educated in that county only through the increase in 
expenditures per pupil that occurred as a result of the Americanization efforts after World War I. 
To construct this instrument we use the 1910 complete count census to count the number of 
German-born immigrants living in a county prior to the outbreak of World War I. From these 
counts we calculate the percent of each county’s population that was German-born. 
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We perform a variety of exercises to establish the strength of our instrument and validate 
the exclusion restriction. We begin by demonstrating that the German-share of a county 
population in 1910 is, indeed, a strong predictor of school resources in 1920 and 1930. The 
empirical model takes the following form: 
 [𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑒𝑡
= 𝛿𝑒 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛[𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1910]𝑒 ∗ [𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑤𝑤𝑖]𝑡 + 𝜀𝑒𝑡  
(5) 
Where e indexes counties and t indexes years (1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930). [𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑒𝑡 
is one of our three measures of school quality, 𝑙𝑛[𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1910]𝑒  is the log of the 
German-share of the county population in 1910.67 [𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑤𝑤𝑖]𝑡 is an indicator variable for years 
after World War I (1920 and 1930) and we also include county fixed effects, 𝛿𝑒, and year fixed 
effects, 𝛿𝑡. 
Results from estimating equation (5) are displayed in Table 21. In column (1), a 10% 
increase in the German-share of the county population prior to World War I is associated with a 
0.3% increase in expenditures per pupil after World War I. In column (4), a 10% increase in the 
German-share of the county population is associated with a 0.25% increase in expenditures per 
teacher after World War I, and in column (7) a 10% increase in the German-share of the county 
population is associated with a 0.2% decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio. 
Next, we show visual evidence that expenditures per pupil increased in counties with a 
high German-share of the population relative to counties with a low German-share of the 
population after World War I. Time series of expenditures per pupil, in both nominal and real 
terms, for counties with high and low German-shares of the population are displayed in Figure 
15. Panel A (upper) graphs expenditures per pupil in nominal terms. From 1900 to 1910 counties 
                                                        
67 The lowest German-born share is 0.05% in Spartanburg County, SC and the highest German-born share of over 
17% of the population is Milwaukee County, WI. 
 138 
with high and low German populations followed a similar trend with about $7 separating the two 
sets of counties in 1910 (high German was $40.28 and low German was $33.22). By 1920, after 
the conclusion of World War I, the difference in expenditures per pupil between low and high 
German-share counties had more than doubled to over $14 (high German was $73.12 and low 
German was $58.80). Panel B graphs expenditures per pupil in real terms. The widening of the 
gap is slightly less evident in this graph, but the gap between high-German and low-German 
counties, nevertheless, widens considerably after World War I. In 1910 the gap was $12 ($69.80 
for high-Germans and $57.56 for low-Germans), whereas in 1920, the gap was almost $14 
($71.17 for high-Germans and $57.24 for low-Germans), an increase of nearly 17%. 
Furthermore, the gap continued to widen so that by 1930 it was over $30, double what existed in 
1920. Figure 15 provides visual evidence that expenditures per pupil increased in counties with a 
high German-share of the population more rapidly than they increased in counties with a low 
German-share of the population after World War I. 
We next turn to examining the validity of the instrument. For our instrument to be valid, 
the German population share in 1910 must affect student outcomes only through school 
resources. A potential concern with this exclusion restriction is that the German-share of the 
population is correlated with the overall immigrant share of the population, and immigrants, in 
general, might settle in locations that spend more on schooling. Columns (2) and (8) of Table 21 
demonstrate that the Italian-share of the population is not associated with increased school 
resources and columns (3), (6), and (9) show that the Irish-share of the population is, also, not 
associated with increased school resources. In column (5) it does appear that the Italian-share of 
a county population is significantly associated with expenditures per teacher, but we note that 
this result is not robust to dropping counties in and around New York City (including nearby 
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counties in New Jersey and Connecticut). Therefore, it appears that only the German-share of the 
population matters for school resources after World War I, consistent with the story of increasing 
resources to assimilate enemy aliens. 
A more pressing concern regarding the validity of the instrument might be that Germans, 
and not other immigrant groups, settle in places that spend more on public goods. Cities that opt 
to spend more on public goods might have a more homogenous and wealthier population, which 
would affect student outcomes regardless of the German share. Table 22 refutes this argument. 
While the German-share of the population is positively associated with increased expenditures 
per pupil after World War I, the German-share of the population is actually negatively related to 
spending on public goods such as sewers and fire departments.68 Finally, while the coefficient on 
the interaction of German-share with the post-World War I indicator is positive for spending on 
police departments, the magnitude is extremely small and far from significant. Given the 
evidence presented in this section, we believe that the German-share of the population instrument 
is valid. 
 
3.5.b. Two-stage least squares estimates 
 
We now instrument for school resources in 1920 and 1930 using the German-share instrument. 
Results from these regressions are displayed in Table 23. Columns (1)-(3) use the return to 
education as the dependent variable, columns (4)-(6) use the county-of-education intercept as the 
dependent variable and columns (7)-(9) use educational attainment as the dependent variable. In 
column (1) and (2) a 10% increase in expenditures per pupil or expenditures per teacher increase 
the return to education by about 0.5%, a result that is extremely similar to the OLS estimates in 
                                                        
68 The data on city expenditures was provided by Paul Rhode. 
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Table 18. In column (3), a decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio is associated with an increase in the 
return to education, but our instrument lacks sufficient power, perhaps not surprising given that 
column (7) of Table 21 is only significant at the 10% confidence level. Columns (4) and (5) 
show that a 10% increase in expenditures per pupil or expenditures per teacher significantly 
decrease the county-of-education intercept by about 0.60 log-points a result, that is, again similar 
to the OLS results of Table 19. Again, the instrument lacks power in column (6) when the pupil-
teacher ratio is being instrumented with German-share.  
Finally, we turn to the effect of school resources on educational attainment. In columns 
(7) and (8) a 10% increase in expenditures results in a 0.01 school year increase in educational 
attainment. This increase is a third of the size of the increase found in the OLS results in Table 
20 and is no longer significant. The instrument, again, lacks power in column (9). The 2SLS 
results have demonstrated that the positive and significant relationship between school 
expenditures and the return to education is likely causal. Additionally, expenditures do, indeed, 
lower the county-of education intercept. However, the 2SLS results also demonstrate that school 
resources do not have a large effect, if any, on educational attainment. We conclude that during 
the early twentieth century school resources had large and significant effects on the intensive 
quality of education, i.e. students got a larger return to each additional year of education. 
However, school resources did not keep students in school longer. 
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3.6. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between school resources and student outcomes during 
the early twentieth century. Studying this relationship during the early twentieth century allows 
us to make several contributions to the large literature on this topic. First, if there are diminishing 
marginal returns to school resources then studies examining the relationship between school 
resources and student outcomes using modern data, when the level of school resources is already 
very high, will have difficulty finding any effect. By focusing on the early twentieth century, we 
are studying a time period when school resources were much lower and, therefore, more likely to 
be on the “steep” part of the resources-outcomes curve. We indeed, find evidence that school 
resources did matter for student outcomes such as weekly wage during this time period. 
 A second advantage to studying the early twentieth century is that we are able to use a 
plausibly exogenous shock to school resources that occurred after World War I. In particular, we 
show that counties with a high German-share of the population prior to World War I, 
experienced large, relative increases in school resources after the war as these cities attempted to 
assimilate and Americanize enemy immigrants. This exogenous increase in school resources 
spilled over to natives and resulted in improved student outcomes.  
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3.7 FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
Figure 12: The earnings-education relationship 
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Figure 13: Location of 446 cities with school resource data 
Notes: This map displays the location of the 446 cities for which we have data on expenditures per pupil, expenditures per teacher, 
and pupil-teacher ratios in 1920 and 1930. These 446 cities are located in 338 distinct counties. 
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Figure 14: School resources during the early twentieth century 
 
 
 
Notes: Panel A (upper left) graphs nominal expenditures per pupil, Panel B (upper right) graphs 
real expenditures per pupil using 1930 dollars, Panel C (lower left) graphs the pupil teacher ratio 
and panel D (lower right) graphs real expenditures per teacher using 1930 dollars. All variables 
are computed across the 272 counties for which we have complete data on all three measures of 
school resources in each year. That is, the graphs do not display the averages across the 272 
counties, but rather, are computed across the 272 counties (a graph of the average across the 272 
counties looks quite similar). 
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Figure 15: Expenditures per pupil by German-share 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Panel A (upper) graphs nominal expenditures per pupil for counties with high and low 
German-shares of the population in 1910. Panel B (lower) graphs real expenditures per pupil for 
counties with high and low German-shares of the population in 1910. High and low German-
shares are defined by splitting the sample of 272 counties at the median of German-share, which 
is around 2% of the population that is German. The variables are computed across the 272 
counties for which we have complete data on all three measures of school resources in each year. 
That is, the graphs do not display the averages across the 272 counties, but rather, are computed 
across the 272 counties (a graph of the average across the 272 counties looks quite similar). 
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Table 17: Comparison of linked and unlinked children; 1920 and 1930 IPUMS linked to 1940 full count census 
        Census Year: 1920 
 
1930 
 
Linked Sample 
Unlinked 
Sample 
p-value of 
difference 
 
Linked 
Sample 
Unlinked 
Sample 
p-value of 
difference 
        Distribution state of residence 
      Alabama 0.42 0.86 0 0.65 0.9 0.06 
Arkansas 0.23 0.35 0.09  0.2 0.25 0.48 
California 3.99 4.02 0.9  5.04 5.84 0.02 
Colorado 0.51 0.71 0.05  0.37 0.63 0.02 
Connecticut 2.55 2.54 0.96  3.16 2.86 0.21 
Delaware 0.14 0.27 0.03  0.22 0.28 0.43 
District of Columbia 0.28 0.45 0.03  0.33 0.48 0.13 
Florida 0.27 0.33 0.39  0.41 0.37 0.65 
Georgia 0.57 0.8 0.03  0.43 0.63 0.07 
Illinois 11.2 8.92 0  10.93 8.98 0 
Indiana 2.86 2.62 0.22  2.81 2.85 0.87 
Iowa 1.44 1.53 0.55  1.23 1.42 0.26 
Kansas 0.97 1.08 0.38  0.69 0.85 0.22 
Kentucky 0.52 0.74 0.03  0.52 0.7 0.13 
Louisiana 0.57 0.7 0.2  0.71 0.7 0.93 
Maine 0.42 0.63 0.03  0.43 0.68 0.03 
Maryland 1.29 1.48 0.19  1.6 1.43 0.32 
Massachusetts 7.89 7.49 0.22  7.71 7.24 0.21 
Michigan 4.14 4.64 0.05  5.17 6.15 0 
Minnesota 1.87 2.04 0.32  1.62 1.95 0.1 
Missouri 2.21 2.66 0.02  2.04 2.13 0.66 
Montana 0.06 0.14 0.06  0.09 0.09 1 
Nebraska 0.28 0.37 0.22  0.24 0.34 0.23 
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Table 17 (continued) 
 
New Hampshire 0.52 0.68 0.1  0.54 0.65 0.34 
New Jersey 6.05 6.03 0.95  7.43 5.79 0 
New York 12.69 11.54 0  10.07 9.51 0.19 
North Carolina 0.58 0.76 0.08  0.71 0.69 0.87 
North Dakota 0.04 0.12 0.04  0.02 0.11 0.05 
Ohio 8.37 8.07 0.37  8.29 8.58 0.47 
Oklahoma 0.31 0.22 0.13  0.09 0.36 0 
Oregon 0.3 0.54 0.01  0.45 0.5 0.62 
Pennsylvania 16.38 14.73 0  14.99 14.29 0.17 
Rhode Island 1 1.17 0.19  1.24 1.23 0.95 
South Carolina 0.25 0.28 0.64  0.28 0.32 0.62 
South Dakota 0.13 0.1 0.45  0.02 0.08 0.13 
Tennessee 0.92 1.16 0.06  1.1 1.24 0.38 
Texas 2.17 2.62 0.02  2.42 2.82 0.09 
Utah 0.33 0.54 0.02  0.52 0.53 0.92 
Vermont 0.1 0.16 0.2  0.07 0.04 0.32 
Virginia 0.47 0.64 0.07  0.61 0.49 0.24 
Washington 1.22 1.41 0.18  0.91 1.3 0.02 
West Virginia 0.58 0.62 0.68  0.45 0.62 0.13 
Wisconsin 2.91 3.22 0.15  3.21 3.1 0.66 
        
Personal characteristics        
Mean age 10.33 10.33 0.95  12.18 10.23 0 
Median age 10 10   12 10  
Literate 99.79 99.23 0  99.59 99.41 0.13 
In school 95.11 94.06 0  95.04 92.82 0 
In urban area 76.39 73.66 0  80.19 78.27 0 
In owner occupied housing 55.14 54.02 0.07  47.6 48.62 0.16 
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Table 17 (continued) 
        
Outcomes in 1940        
Weekly wage 28.27    19.21   
Educational attainment 10.36    10.64   
        
Observations 8279 33497   5382 45149  
Notes: This table reports differences in means between individuals who were linked to the 1940 census, as described in the text, and individuals 
who were not linked to the 1940 census. The census question on literacy only applied to persons 10+ years of age in 1920 and 1930. Therefore, 
the sample size used to construct the means is smaller than the observations listed (4,850 linked and 19,367 unlinked in 1920; 4,655 linked and 
45,149 unlinked in 1930). To construct the means for the census question about whether the individual lived in housing that was rented or owned 
by the occupants we dropped individuals who reported "N/A" (8,169 linked and 32,814 unlinked for 1920; 5,305 linked and 44,505 unlinked for 
1930). 
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Table 18: Effect of school resources on the rate of return to education, 1940 Census 
     
 
Percentage Return to Educational Attainment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    Log expenditures per pupil 0.0452***   0.0503*** 
 (0.0135)   (0.0151) 
     
Log expenditures per teacher  0.0374***   
  (0.0133)   
     
Log pupil-teacher ratio (using average daily 
attendance) 
  -0.0117 0.0242 
  (0.0170) (0.0197) 
     
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 645 645 645 645 
Counties 323 323 323 323 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (2) in the text. The unit of observation is a county-
cohort cell. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county-of-education level. 
Estimates are weighted by the inverse sampling variance of the dependent variable. See Section 3.3.a. of 
the text for details on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the percentage return to 
education, which is estimated in a first-stage regression described in Section 3.4.a. of the text. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 19: Effect of school resources on county-of-education intercepts, 1940 Census 
     
 
County-of-education intercepts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log expenditures per pupil -0.487***   -0.538*** 
 (0.151)   (0.169) 
     
Log expenditures per teacher  -0.392***   
  (0.146)   
     
Log pupil-teacher ratio (using average daily 
attendance) 
  0.139 -0.244 
  (0.181) (0.216) 
     
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage FE County County County County 
     
Observations 645 645 645 645 
Counties 323 323 323 323 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (3) in the text. The unit of observation is a county-
cohort cell. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county-of-education level. 
Estimates are weighted by the inverse sampling variance of the dependent variable. See Section 3.3.a. of 
the text for details on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the county-of-education 
intercept, which is estimated in a first-stage regression described in Section 3.4.a. of the text. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 20: Effect of school resources on educational attainment, 1940 Census 
     
 
Educational attainment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log expenditures per pupil 0.323***   0.300*** 
 (0.0873)   (0.0869) 
     
Log expenditures per teacher  0.246***   
  (0.0948)   
     
Log pupil-teacher ratio (using average daily 
attendance) 
  -0.325* -0.111 
  (0.182) (0.169) 
     
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 645 645 645 645 
Counties 323 323 323 323 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (4) in the text. The unit of observation is a 
county-cohort cell. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county-of-education 
level. Estimates are weighted by the inverse sampling variance of the dependent variable. See Section 
3.3.a. of the text for details on the independent variables. The dependent variable is the conditional 
average educational attainment in a county-cohort cell, which is estimated in a first-stage regression 
described in Section 3.4.c. of the text. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 21: Effect of immigrant population shares on school resources 
          
 
Log expenditures per pupil Log expenditures per teacher 
Log pupil-teacher ratio (using 
average daily attendance) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          Log German-share (1910) * 
Post WWI 
0.0362*** 0.0252** -0.0186* 
(0.0135)   (0.0116)   (0.00984)   
          
Log Italian-share (1910) * 
Post WWI 
 0.00657   0.0176**   0.00388  
 (0.00863)   (0.00724)   (0.00588)  
          
Log Irish-share (1910) * 
Post WWI 
  0.0188   0.0122   -0.00721 
  (0.0130)   (0.0123)   (0.00961) 
          
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 1088 1084 1088 1088 1084 1088 1088 1084 1088 
Counties 272 271 272 272 271 272 272 271 272 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (5) in the text. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county level. 
See Section 3.3.a. of the text for details on the independent variables and see Section 3.5.a. for details on the immigrant share variables. Post 
WWI is an indicator variable for the years after World War I (1920 and 1930). 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 22: Effect of German population shares on non-education expenditures 
     
 
Log 
expenditures 
per pupil 
Log 
expenditures 
per capita on 
sewers 
Log 
expenditures 
per capita on 
police 
Log 
expenditures 
per capita on 
fire 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Log German-share (1910) * Post 
WWI 
0.0601** -0.0756 0.00380 -0.0282 
(0.0258) (0.114) (0.0439) (0.0358) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 388 388 388 388 
Counties 97 97 97 97 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates from equation (5) in the text. Standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are clustered at the county level. See Section 3.5.a. for details on the dependent and 
independent variables. Post WWI is an indicator variable for the years after World War I (1920 and 
1930). 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 23: 2SLS estimates of the effect of school resources on the rate of return to education and attainment, 1940 Census 
          
 
Percentage Return to Education County-of-education intercepts Educational attainment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
         
Log expenditures per pupil 0.0568**   -0.609**   0.109   
 (0.0249)   (0.293)   (0.192)   
          
Log expenditures per teacher  0.0587**   -0.630**   0.113  
  (0.0269)   (0.315)   (0.199)  
          
Log pupil-teacher ratio (using 
average daily attendance) 
  -14.99   160.9   -28.86 
  (503.5)   (5404.2)   (972.4) 
          
First stage F-statistic 88 43 0 88 43 0 88 43 0 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 645 645 645 645 645 645 645 645 645 
Counties 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 
Notes: This table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates from equations (2), (3), and (4) in the text. The unit of observation is a county-cohort cell. 
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the county-of-education level. Estimates are weighted by the inverse sampling variance of 
the dependent variable. See Section 3.3.a. of the text for details on the independent variables. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the 
percentage return to education, which is estimated in a first-stage regression described in Section 3.4.a. of the text. The dependent variable in 
columns (4)-(6) is the county-of-education intercept, which is estimated in a first-stage regression described in Section 3.4.a. of the text. The 
dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the conditional average educational attainment in a county-cohort cell, which is estimated in a first-stage 
regression described in Section 3.4.c. of the text. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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3.8 APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL FIGURES 
 
 
Figure A8: Earning-education profile, 1920 cohort 
 
 
 
Figure A9: Earning-education profile, 1930 cohort 
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